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Sectors — InvestCARICOM Skip to content Updated 16 September 2026 Edition 01 · in compilation Independent. Privately owned, for-profit, and no part of any government. Search Sectors Ten sectors, not one The Caribbean investment story is usually told as real estate. It is tenth of ten here — behind o...
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Sectors — InvestCARICOM Skip to content Updated 16 September 2026 Edition 01 · in compilation Independent. Privately owned, for-profit, and no part of any government. Search Sectors Ten sectors, not one The Caribbean investment story is usually told as real estate. It is tenth of ten here — behind offshore energy, the capital behind the hotels, the ports, the regulated financial centres and the cables. Each sector below lists the jurisdictions materially exposed to it, drawn from the guides themselves. Exposure is taken from the sector tags on each published guide, so this index grows as the guides do. A sector with no coverage yet says so rather than offering a page with nothing behind it. 10 of 10 sectors have published coverage · 10 carry a written analysis Filter sectors 10 of 10 shown Search sectors Reset No sector matches those words. 01 Energy & extractives The Community now contains one of the world's significant new oil provinces and one of its mature gas provinces at the same time, and everyone else buys fuel at world prices. That is three different investment propositions wearing one sector label. Exposed jurisdictions Colombia · Curaçao · Dominica · French Guiana · Guyana · Haiti · Mexico · Suriname · Trinidad & Tobago · Venezuela 14 location guides tagged to this sector Reporting Four lines of a gas ledger are the whole Trinidad economy 02 Tourism & hospitality capital Tourism is the region's largest industry and its most misunderstood asset class. The mistake is treating arrivals as the investment case. Arrivals are the demand signal; the investment is in real property with a management contract attached, and those two things behave differently. Exposed jurisdictions Anguilla · Antigua & Barbuda · Aruba · Barbados · Belize · Bermuda · British Virgin Islands · Cayman Islands · Curaçao · Dominica · Dominican Republic · Grenada · Guadeloupe · Jamaica · Martinique · Mexico · Montserrat · Saint-Barthélemy · Saint-Martin · Sint Maarten · St Kitts & Nevis · St Lucia · St Vincent & the Grenadines · The Bahamas · Turks & Caicos Islands 114 location guides tagged to this sector 03 Ports, airports & infrastructure The pipeline the region talks about is airport expansion, port expansion, ferries, mass transit and geothermal. The pipeline that gets built is the subset with committed financing, a published environmental assessment, and a concession that says what happens if nobody breaks ground. Exposed jurisdictions Antigua & Barbuda · Barbados · Colombia · Dominica · Dominican Republic · French Guiana · Grenada · Guadeloupe · Guyana · Jamaica · Martinique · Mexico · Montserrat · Puerto Rico · Saint-Martin · St Kitts & Nevis · St Lucia · St Vincent & the Grenadines · Suriname · Trinidad & Tobago 46 location guides tagged to this sector 04 Financial services & IFC regulation This is the only sector in this publication with a rated lens behind it — 28 of the 30 jurisdictions carry a score. The finding it produces is uncomfortable and worth stating plainly: what separates these jurisdictions is not tax. It is the rulebook, the supervisor and the list you are on. Exposed jurisdictions Anguilla · Antigua & Barbuda · Aruba · Barbados · Belize · Bermuda · British Virgin Islands · Cayman Islands · Colombia · Curaçao · Grenada · Puerto Rico · Saint-Barthélemy · Sint Maarten · St Kitts & Nevis · St Lucia · The Bahamas · Trinidad & Tobago · Turks & Caicos Islands 25 location guides tagged to this sector Reporting Barbados put property values into an immigration schedule, and 270 days into a citizenship one · Belize is retiring its offshore register in bulk, on a five-year clock · Five states built a citizenship regulator on paper. The switch has not been thrown. · A list revised in Brussels changes who has to file in Kingstown · Montserrat abolished its offshore company. Its regulator still advertises one. · Puerto Rico's zero rate closes on 31 December. The statute already says what replaces it. 05 Free zones & manufacturing The region's manufacturing story is almost entirely a free-zone story, and almost all of it sits in one InvestCARICOM comparison market rather than in the Community. The interesting question is not why the zones work. It is whether the tax architecture they were built on still exists. Exposed jurisdictions Belize · Dominican Republic · Haiti · Mexico · The Bahamas · Trinidad & Tobago 17 location guides tagged to this sector 06 Agriculture & agro-processing The Community has set itself a target of cutting food imports substantially, and the binding constraint is not land. It is cold chain, inter-island freight and the fact that a small island's domestic market cannot absorb the output that makes processing economic. Exposed jurisdictions Belize · Colombia · Dominica · Dominican Republic · French Guiana · Grenada · Guadeloupe · Guyana · Haiti · Jamaica · Martinique · Mexico · Montserrat · St Kitts & Nevis · St Lucia · St Vincent & the Grenadines · Suriname 41 location guides tagged to this sector 07 Logistics & shipping The Caribbean sits on one of the world's principal trade lanes and most of it is not on the network. Connectivity here is bimodal — a handful of transhipment hubs with real depth and frequency, and a long tail of islands served indirectly at multiples of the cost. Exposed jurisdictions Antigua & Barbuda · Aruba · Belize · British Virgin Islands · Cayman Islands · Colombia · Curaçao · Dominican Republic · French Guiana · Guadeloupe · Guyana · Haiti · Jamaica · Martinique · Mexico · Puerto Rico · Saint-Martin · Sint Maarten · St Vincent & the Grenadines · Suriname · The Bahamas · Trinidad & Tobago · Turks & Caicos Islands · Venezuela 66 location guides tagged to this sector 08 Digital, telecom & submarine cable Every other sector on this site depends on a small number of fibre-optic cables lying on the seabed, owned by a small number of parties, and in several jurisdictions there is exactly one. That is the sector's defining fact and it is almost never in the pitch. Exposed jurisdictions Anguilla · Barbados · Bermuda · French Guiana · Jamaica · Puerto Rico · The Bahamas 4 location guides tagged to this sector 09 Renewables & grid In most of this region renewable generation is not an environmental policy. It is import substitution against diesel bought at world prices, on grids small enough that a single project changes the system — which is both the opportunity and the reason the projects are hard. Exposed jurisdictions Antigua & Barbuda · Aruba · Barbados · Dominica · Grenada · Guadeloupe · Martinique · Montserrat · Puerto Rico · St Kitts & Nevis · St Lucia · St Vincent & the Grenadines 12 location guides tagged to this sector 10 Real estate This site was rebuilt from a property portal, and real estate is now tenth of ten sectors — not because it is unimportant, but because treating it as the frame produced a decade of analysis that started in the wrong place. It is a title, a licence and a registry before it is a building. Exposed jurisdictions Anguilla · Antigua & Barbuda · Aruba · Barbados · Belize · Bermuda · British Virgin Islands · Cayman Islands · Curaçao · Dominica · Dominican Republic · Grenada · Guyana · Haiti · Jamaica · Montserrat · Puerto Rico · Saint-Barthélemy · Saint-Martin · Sint Maarten · St Kitts & Nevis · St Lucia · St Vincent & the Grenadines · Suriname · The Bahamas · Trinidad & Tobago · Turks & Caicos Islands 123 location guides tagged to this sector Reporting Two buildings put Paramaribo on the danger list. Two more are still going up.
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#### Final Report: Toward Harmonized AI #### Policies and Recommendations for the #### Caribbean This report is published by the CTU Caribbean AI Task Force (CAITF). This final report reflects the collective experience and expertise of more than 35 nominated members drawn from Caribbean governme...
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#### Final Report: Toward Harmonized AI #### Policies and Recommendations for the #### Caribbean This report is published by the CTU Caribbean AI Task Force (CAITF). This final report reflects the collective experience and expertise of more than 35 nominated members drawn from Caribbean governments and national agencies, multilateral organizations, the private sector, academia, civil-society organizations, non-profit institutions and non governmental organizations. The Caribbean AI Task Force was established by resolution at the Caribbean Telecommunications Union’s 31st General Conference of Ministers, with a one-year mandate to develop harmonized regional AI policy recommendations and coordinate the Caribbean AI Forum in 2026. This report represents the culmination of that mandate. For more comments, information and feedback on the report please contact us at: caitf@ctu.int This report should be cited as: The Caribbean AI Task Force, “Final Report: Toward Harmonized AI Policies and Recommendations for the Caribbean”, Caribbean Telecommunications Union, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago. July, 2026. ##### Table of Contents Executive Framing ... 1 1. Introduction ... 3 A. The Global Inflection Point ... 3 B. Scope and Audience of this Report ... 5 C. Approach ... 6 Promise Against a Backdrop of Disparity ... 10 2. The Caribbean AI Landscape ... 10 A. The Caribbean AI Value ... 10 B. The Connectivity Paradox: Structural Realities ... 11 C. The Global AI Governance and where the Caribbean Region Stands ... 13 D. The Inclusion and Information-Integrity Gap ... 16 E. The Labour-Market Exposure ... 17 3. The Governance Deficit ... 21 Why the Caribbean Cannot Wait ... 21 A. The Representation Gap ... 21 B. The Coordination Gap ... 21 C. The Implementation Gap ... 23 D. The Research Gap ... 24 4. Pillars & Policy Recommendations ... 29 Pillar 1: Data, Digital Infrastructure & Compute ... 30 Pillar 2: Governance, Ethics & Standards ... 31 Pillar 3: Economic Transformation, Innovation & Industry ... 34 Pillar 4: Talent & Skills ... 36 Pillar 5: Public Sector AI ... 38 Pillar 6: Natural Disaster & Climate Resilience ... 39 Pillar 7: Regional Leadership, Trade & Global Interoperability ... 40 5. The Task Force ... 41 About the CTU Caribbean AI Task Force ... 42 ##### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS • AI – Artificial Intelligence • ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations • AU – African Union • CAF – Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean • CARICOM – Caribbean Community • CARDTP – Caribbean Digital Transformation Project • CDB – Caribbean Development Bank • CSME – CARICOM Single Market and Economy • CTU – Caribbean Telecommunications Union • CXC – Caribbean Examinations Council • ECCB – Eastern Caribbean Central Bank • ECLAC – UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean • ECTEL – Eastern Caribbean Telecommunications Authority • GDC – Global Digital Compact • GDP – Gross Domestic Product • HLAB-AI – UN High-level Advisory Body on AI • ICT – Information and Communication Technology • IDB – Inter-American Development Bank • IMPACS – Implementation Agency for Crime and Security • ITU – International Telecommunication Union • MIGDIA – Inter-American Framework on Data & AI Governance (OAS) • MSME – Micro, Small and Medium-sized Enterprise • NDTS – National Digital Transformation Strategy • NIST – U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology • OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development • OECS – Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States • SIDS – Small Island Developing States • SoDTIC – School of Digital Transformation and Innovation in the Caribbean • UNCTAD – United Nations Conference on Trade & Development • UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization • UNGA – United Nations General Assembly The Task Force agrees that the diffusion of Artificial Intelligence is occurring in an environment of profound structural asymmetry. The benefits of AI remain heavily concentrated geographically, economically, and technologically, while unfortunately, the systemic risks associated with its deployment, including algorithmic bias, socioeconomic exclusion, and the erosion of information integrity are distributed universally. To compound this, Caribbean citizens, firms and public institutions are becoming intensive users of AI systems without having proportional influence over their design, deployment, governance or value capture. The global AI market is projected to expand from approximately USD 189 billion in 2023 to USD 4.8 trillion by 2033 1. For Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), AI integration could contribute up to USD 0.5 trillion to the broader economy by 2030, representing a potential 5.4% boost to regional Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 2. Under favourable conditions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects that AI could elevate a developing country's GDP by 2.7% to 3.5% over a single decade 3. Despite generating 6.6% of the global GDP, the LAC region currently captures a mere 1.12% of global AI investment 4. Within the Caribbean sub-region, the deficit is even more acute; AI-native enterprises number in the single digits, and the region operates overwhelmingly as a consumer of imported technology rather than a producer of localized innovation. The Caribbean is currently characterized by a high-intent but low-capacity equilibrium, where policy ambition is consistently outpaced by infrastructural realities, fragmented data governance, and severe human capital attrition. This is a disaster. The Task Force, in its analysis, demonstrates that effective AI governance in the Caribbean cannot be achieved through isolated national strategies. This report, which serves as the foundational advisory framework for the Caribbean AI Task Force, articulates seven primary recommendations centered on themes including a unified regional AI policy framework, building sovereign data infrastructure, catalysing commercial innovation, reversing human capital flight, mobilizing targeted regional 1 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Technology and Innovation Report 2025: Inclusive Artificial Intelligence for Development (Geneva: United Nations, 2025), https://unctad.org/publication/technology-and-innovation-report-2025 2 PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), Sizing the Prize: PwC’s Global Artificial Intelligence Study—Exploiting the AI Revolution (2017), 3 Eugenio M. Cerutti, Antonio I. Garcia Pascual, Yosuke Kido, Longji Li, Giovanni Melina, Marina Mendes Tavares, and Philippe Wingender, The Global Impact of AI: Mind the Gap, IMF Working Paper no. 25/76 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, April 2025), https://doi.org/10.5089/9798229008570.001 4 Álvaro Soto et al., coords., Latin American Artificial Intelligence Index (ILIA) 2025: Key Findings, Applied Artificial Intelligence, and Human Talent, Project Documents LC/TS.2026/1 (Santiago: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean and National Center for Artificial Intelligence, 2026), https://doi.org/10.65730/maolsdjpr. ## Executive Framing financing, and embedding AI within climate resilience strategies. Through multilateral cooperation, the interim report has helped shape the UNDP+CARICOM AI Regional Programme 2026-2030 and the UN ECLAC’s SIDS National AI Agenda. The Caribbean stands as one voice with an agreed set of values, principles and direction. The choice before the Caribbean is therefore not whether AI will transform the region, but whether that transformation will occur primarily on terms established elsewhere. This report provides the foundation for collective action; implementation must now become the region’s priority. ## 1.1.Introduction Introduction A. The Global Inflection Point Since the first wave of national AI strategies emerged around 2017, global AI policy has rapidly matured from early phases of strategic posturing, innovation competition, and localized ethical standardization into an era strictly defined by the realities of generative AI advancements, rigorous systemic risk regulation, and intense geopolitical contests over technological sovereignty. What has not happened, across any of these phases, is convergence on a single governance model. Instead, a differentiated landscape has emerged in which countries calibrate AI governance to their own economic structure, institutional capacity, and strategic position. For most of this period, the Caribbean's engagement with this evolution has been largely indirect; the region has been a consumer of AI tools, an object of global policy discourse, and a participant, when at all, in instruments designed elsewhere, for other contexts. This report is built on the premise that this indirect posture is no longer adequate to the stakes involved, and that the region has the human capacity, the institutional foundation and a closing window of opportunity to change it. The urgency of this global inflection point was codified by the United Nations with the release of the Preliminary Report of the Independent International Scientific Panel on AI: Evidence-based assessment of opportunities, risks and impacts of AI in July 2026. The UN report explicitly warns that current evaluation methods and institutional safeguards cannot keep pace with the exponential growth of AI capabilities, noting that the world cannot effectively govern what it cannot independently evaluate or understand. Table 1.1- The Seven Key Domains of the UN Independent International Scientific Panel on AI (July 2026) | Domain Focus Area | Core Analytical Imperatives Highlighted by the UN Scientific Panel | | --- | --- | | AI Science, Advances & Trajectories | Tracking the exponential growth of frontier models, emergent autonomous agentic behaviours, and the extreme geographical concentration of global computing power. | | Societal Applications | Evaluating the integration and disparate impacts of AI within foundational societal pillars, including empirical science, public health, educational ecosystems, and agricultural modernization. | | Economic Implications | Analysing macroeconomic disruptions, labour market exposure, wealth concentration dynamics, and the specific vulnerabilities of developing economies. | | Security, Systems & Environment | Assessing systemic risks introduced by interacting AI agents, cybersecurity vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure, and the massive energy and environmental footprint of data centres. | Human Rights, Information & Democracy Investigating the erosion of information integrity, the proliferation of synthetic media (deepfakes), authoritarian capture of digital ecosystems, and structural algorithmic discrimination. Cultural Flourishing & Child Safety Examining the long-term cognitive and cultural impacts of continuous human-AI interaction, autonomy preservation, and the specific vulnerabilities of minors in digital spaces. Management, Governance & Reliability Highlighting the severe underdevelopment of independent risk evaluation methodologies and the fragmented nature of current corporate-led governance instruments. Crucially for the Caribbean context, the UN Preliminary Report confirms that the so called “AI divide” is no longer a question of technological access; it is fundamentally an asymmetry in the capacity to influence AI development, shape its design, and govern its deployment. The global evidence base regarding AI's socioeconomic impacts is highly skewed toward high-income, English-language contexts, while the underlying AI evaluation infrastructure remains linguistically and geographically concentrated. The overwhelming concentration of computational power, where a few advanced economies and their domiciled corporate entities control virtually all leading general-purpose models, threatens to entrench existing global inequalities and significantly undermine democratic accountability. The economic stakes are also substantial. UNCTAD projects that the global AI market will expand approximately twenty-fivefold by 2033, increasing from about 7% to 29% of the frontier-technology market. 5It also estimates that the United States and China together hold approximately 60% of AI patents and produce about one-third of AI-related research publications. The Caribbean does not need to compete in frontier-model development. It must, however, determine the terms under which external models, platforms, infrastructure, and standards enter the region. This requires more than defensive regulation. The region must engage the market directly, developing systems that meet its own needs, investing in research and building research-to-commercialization capacity, producing tools that can be exported to other markets. The region is not starting from zero. ECLAC’s ILIA 2025 notes that Latin America and the Caribbean account for 14% of global visits to AI solutions and rank third worldwide in downloads of generative AI applications 6, 5 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Technology and Innovation Report 2025: Inclusive Artificial Intelligence for Development (Geneva: United Nations, 2025), https://unctad.org/publication/technology-and-innovation-report-2025. 6 Álvaro Soto et al., coords., Latin American Artificial Intelligence Index (ILIA) 2025: Key Findings, Applied Artificial Intelligence, and Human Talent, Project Documents LC/TS.2026/1 (Santiago: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean and National Center for Artificial Intelligence, 2026), https://doi.org/10.65730/maolsdjpr. showing that demand and user adoption are real, but that the region retains weak control over the upstream layers of value creation. Within this precise global framework, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) has sharply framed the geopolitical stakes for the region. During the high-level dialogue series convened in May 2026 alongside the eLAC Digital Agenda and the EU Global Gateway, the existential digital sovereignty question was posed. Will emerging economies remain perpetual “rule-takers,” or will they evolve into “rule-makers”? Rule-takers are structurally forced to adapt to predetermined, established technological systems and regulations designed by external entities. This reactive posture leaves their fragile economic and social fabrics highly vulnerable to foreign regulatory paradigms and exogenous technological shocks over which they have no agency. Rule-makers, conversely, leverage regional integration to assert digital sovereignty, demanding interoperability, technological localization, and equitable, unified participation in standards-setting forums. For the Caribbean, delaying proactive, unified governance inevitably increases long-term dependency on external models, foreign computational infrastructure, and imported normative frameworks. We cannot delay any longer. B. Scope and Audience of this Report This report is addressed to the governments of CARICOM member states, the regional institutions whose mandates intersect with AI policy, to development and financing partners considering support for Caribbean digital transformation, and to the wider public whose engagement will determine whether AI policy in the region is shaped with legitimacy or imposed without it. There are three things this report deliberately does not attempt to do. First, it does not provide a costed implementation plan, budget allocation, or financing instrument design; these are the subject of work led by the relevant regional and international partners and prescribing them here would substitute the Task Force's judgment for that of the institutions actually responsible for delivery. Second, it does not propose a single uniform model to be adopted identically across all member states; Caribbean states differ materially in population, fiscal space, and institutional capacity, and effective AI policy must be adapted accordingly. Third, it does not attempt to forecast the technology itself; its recommendations are framed to be robust to a range of plausible AI trajectories, rather than contingent on any single technical scenario. C. Approach This report is the product of a regional advisory process led by the CTU Caribbean AI Task Force. The Task Force brings a Caribbean perspective to the rapidly evolving global AI policy landscape by consolidating available evidence, examining its implications for small states, and translating that evidence into practical recommendations for CARICOM governments and regional institutions. Its role is not to replace national policymaking or the mandates of implementing agencies, but to provide a shared analytical foundation from which coordinated national and regional action can proceed. This report draws on prior thematic work which includes the Caribbean-specific findings of UNESCO's Caribbean Artificial Intelligence Policy Roadmap, built on consultation with more than 1,000 stakeholders; ECLAC's exploratory review of Caribbean AI readiness and its companion regional policy brief; the global benchmarking and governance-gap analysis of the UN Secretary-General's High-Level Advisory Body on AI; and current data from UNCTAD, the World Bank, the International Telecommunication Union, the European Investment Bank, and national and regional sources cited throughout. Where the available evidence is inconsistent, incomplete, or no longer current, the report identifies those limitations explicitly and avoids implying a level of precision that the underlying data cannot support. For example, CARICOM’s Secretary-General has cited a regional food-import bill of approximately US$13.76 billion over 2018–2020, equivalent to roughly 5% of regional GDP alongside estimates that the Caribbean imports more than 60% of the food it consumes 7. Similarly, widely cited estimates of skilled emigration from Caribbean states originate in International Monetary Fund research published in 2006. This report therefore uses those estimates as evidence of a persistent structural challenge, not as a measurement of present-day migration rates, which may have changed materially over the intervening two decades. The Task Force also treats missing data as a substantive policy finding. Several CARICOM members are absent from, or incompletely represented in, international datasets concerning AI infrastructure, innovation, investment and readiness. Such omissions limit the region’s ability to benchmark progress, identify investment needs and participate effectively in evidence-based international governance. Strengthening national statistical capacity and establishing a comparable regional AI evidence base are therefore integral components of the report’s recommendations, rather than secondary research concerns. An interim version of the report was released in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, in December 2025 and subsequently circulated for regional review. Its findings and 7 Caribbean Community (CARICOM), “Investment Matters More Than Ever-CARICOM Secretary-General,” e-CISTAR, November 10, 2022, https://www.caricomstats.org/E-CISTAR/2022/11/10/investment-matters more-than-ever-caricom-secretary-general/. recommendations were examined through conferences, seminars, panels, presentations and stakeholder discussions. Written and verbal feedback from these engagements was consolidated by the Task Force and used to refine the analysis and recommendations presented in this final report. This document should therefore be understood as both an evidence synthesis and a regional policy contribution as it identifies Caribbean priorities while recognizing that implementation must be adapted to the institutional capacity, economic structure and development circumstances of individual member states. ### B
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### DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Alberto Farca Salma Jalife Ricardo Martinezgarza Pau Puig Gabarró Enrique Iglesias Rodríguez ##### Authors ## DEVELOPMENT AND ## USE OF ARTIFICIAL ## INTELLIGENCE IN ## LATIN AMERICA AND ## THE CARIBBEA...
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### DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Alberto Farca Salma Jalife Ricardo Martinezgarza Pau Puig Gabarró Enrique Iglesias Rodríguez ##### Authors ## DEVELOPMENT AND ## USE OF ARTIFICIAL ## INTELLIGENCE IN ## LATIN AMERICA AND ## THE CARIBBEAN Authors: Alberto Farca Salma Jalife Ricardo Martinezgarza Pau Puig Gabarró Enrique Iglesias Rodríguez JEL Codes: L86, O33, H54, Q55, R58 Keywords: artificial intelligence, cloud computing, connectivity, cybersecurity, data cen ter industry, digital infrastructure, digital sovereignty, digital transformation, economic competitiveness, environmental sustainability, green data centers, infrastructure devel opment, Internet of Things, investment incentives, Latin America and the Caribbean, public-private partnerships, regional cooperation, regulatory frameworks, renewable energy, workforce development Copyright © 2026 Inter-American Development Bank (“IDB”). This work is subject to a Creative Commons license CC BY 3.0 IGO (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/ igo/legalcode). The terms and conditions indicated in the URL link must be met and the respective recognition must be granted to the IDB. Further to section 8 of the above license, any mediation relating to disputes arising under such license shall be conducted in accordance with the WIPO Mediation Rules. Any dispute related to the use of the works of the IDB that cannot be settled amicably shall be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) rules. The use of the IDB's name for any purpose other than for attribution and the use of IDB's logo shall be subject to a separate written license agreement between the IDB and the user and is not authorized as part of this license. Note that the URL link includes terms and conditions that are an integral part of this license. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Inter-American Development Bank, its Board of Directors, or the countries they represent. Inter-American Development Bank 1300 New York Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20577 www.iadb.org The Institutions for Development Sector was responsible for the production of this publication. External vendors: Production Editor: Sarah Schineller (A&S Bespoke Editorial Partners, LLC) Editor: Amy Scott (Nomad Editorial) Design: The Word Express, Inc. iii Executive Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix Key Messages. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Context and Relevance of ICT Infrastructure for AI and Other Emerging Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Technology Convergence Paradigm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Strategic Technology Drivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Market Impact and Value Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Strategic Implications for Latin America and the Caribbean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Implementation Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Looking Ahead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Objectives and Scope of This Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Document Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Deliverables and Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Key Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Economic Impact Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Expected Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 ##### 2. Conceptual Framework for AI Data Technologies and Advanced Digital Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Why Governments Must Invest in Infrastructure for AI and Other Emerging Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Economic Growth and National Competitiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Strategic Independence and National Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Social Development and Public Service Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Environmental Sustainability and Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Economic Risk Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Innovation Ecosystem Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Regional Competitiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Future-Proofing National Economies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Long-Term Cost Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Recommendations for Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 #### Contents iv Ecosystem Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Stakeholder Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Investment Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Regulatory Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Technological Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Implementation Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Key Components of AI Data Technologies and Advanced Digital Infrastructure . . 21 Energy Infrastructure and Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Network Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Data Management Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Security Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Environmental Monitoring and Control Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Integration and Management Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Recommendations for Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Considerations for Hardware and Software Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Hardware Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Computing Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Network Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Storage Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Operating Systems and Platforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Middleware and Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Security Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Optimization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Recommendations for Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Networks and Connectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Network Architecture Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Connected Society Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Economic Development Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Implementation Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Recommendations for Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Data Centers and Cloud Computing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Evolution and Benefits of Cloud Computing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Hybrid and Multicloud Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Challenges and Strategic Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 High-Performance Computing and Advanced Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Integration with Emerging Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Sustainability and Efficiency Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Strategic Investments and Human Capital Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 National Research and Education Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 RedCLARA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 SCALAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Contents v Technological Evolution and Global Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 The Rise of Quantum Computing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 AI and the Growth of Foundation Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 5G and the Proliferation of IoT and Edge Computing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 The Rise of Decentralized and Distributed Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Sustainability and the Green Technology Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Conclusions and Strategic Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 3. Infrastructure Needs for AI Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Data and Model Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Infrastructure for Data Storage and Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Data Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Edge Data Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Cloud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 AI Infrastructure as a Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Infrastructure for Data Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Supercomputing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 High-Performance Computing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Advanced Computing Infrastructure for Frontier Applications in Science, Technology, Innovation, and Industry 4 .0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Infrastructure for Data Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 High-Speed Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Low Latency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 High Reliability and Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 Internet Exchange Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 AI Development Frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 4. Cross-Cutting Considerations for AI Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Investment and Financing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 The Role of Public-Private Partnerships in AI Infrastructure Development . . 61 International Collaboration and Accessing Multilateral Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Innovative Financing Models for Sustainable Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 Mitigating Financial Risks and Ensuring Long-Term Viability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 Human Capital Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 Enhancing Educational Programs and Digital Literacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 Strengthening Industry-Academia Collaboration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Attracting and Retaining Top AI Talent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 Promoting Regional Collaboration and Knowledge Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 Developing Policies for Responsible, Ethical, and Inclusive AI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Environmental Sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 The Environmental Impact of Digital Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Adopting Green Technologies and Energy-Efficient Designs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 Renewable Energy Integration for AI Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 vi Measuring and Monitoring Carbon Emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Aligning AI Infrastructure Investments with Global Climate Goals . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Scalability and Flexibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Designing Scalable AI Infrastructure for Growing Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Embracing Flexible Architectures and Open Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 Addressing Multitenancy and Hybrid Cloud Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 Implementing Resilient and Adaptive AI Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Scaling AI Infrastructure for Emerging Markets and Applications . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Cybersecurity and Data Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 The Expanding Cyberthreat Landscape in AI Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 Implementing AI-Driven Cybersecurity Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 Strengthening Data Protection Frameworks and Privacy Regulations . . . . . . 71 Promoting Cross-Border Cybersecurity Collaboration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Building a Culture of Cybersecurity Awareness and Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 5. AI Use Cases in the Public Sector in Latin America and the Caribbean . . . . . . . . 73 Health: Improving Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Connecting the Caribbean to the Pan-American Highway for Digital Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Diabetic Retinopathy Screening with AI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 AnemiaApp: Early Detection of Anemia with AI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 Education: Improving Public Education Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Developing Writing Skills with AI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 An Algorithm to Combat School Dropout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Environment: Supporting Monitoring Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 AI Predictive Model for Air Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 Security: Improving Public Safety and National Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 AI and Video Surveillance Cameras to Enhance Public Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 ECU 911: AI-Integrated Emergency Response System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 Public Administration: Simplifying Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 Boosting Employment Services with AI .
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### Textbox 1 1 The author of this textbox is Robert Hieroms, an Economic Analysis and Research Specialist at the CBCS. 2 This textbox is an updated version of “Some Insights into Inflation” originally published in the second Quarterly Bulletin of 2022 and reflects recent inflationary trends. 3...
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### Textbox 1 1 The author of this textbox is Robert Hieroms, an Economic Analysis and Research Specialist at the CBCS. 2 This textbox is an updated version of “Some Insights into Inflation” originally published in the second Quarterly Bulletin of 2022 and reflects recent inflationary trends. 3 Aggregate demand comprises consumer spending, private investments, public spending, public investments, and net exports (exports minus imports). 4 Aggregate supply refers to the total amount of goods and services that producers in an economy are willing and able to supply at a given price level. ## INFLATION DYNAMICS IN CURAÇAO AND SINT MAARTEN 1,2 American writer and humorist Sam Ewing once remarked “Inflation is when you pay USD15.00 for the USD10.00 haircut you used to get for USD5.00 when you had hair”. Broadly defined, inflation is the overall increase in prices of goods and services in an economy over a fixed period of time. Inflation causes a drop in the real value of money and, as a result, erodes consumers’ purchasing power, all else being equal. However, recurring inflation does not necessarily indicate that the economy is performing poorly. In fact, low and stable inflation rates often signal to investors that the economy is relatively healthy. The European Central Bank, for instance, targets an inflation rate of 2.0% over the medium term, while the U.S. Federal Reserve applies the same target over the long term. There are several indicators for calculating and presenting the development of general prices, with the most widely used being the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The annual inflation rate is typically calculated as the percentage change over a 12-month period in the CPI of a predefined basket of goods and services consumed by an average household. This basket is mostly kept constant for consistency but is adjusted periodically to reflect changes in consumer spending patterns. In Curaçao, the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) is responsible for calculating and publishing the monthly CPI. The CBS methodology is based on a weighted average of price development across different categories of goods and services, such as food, energy, housing, clothing & footwear, and medical care. The weight of each category is determined by household surveys, conducted approximately every 10 years. Similarly, in Sint Maarten, the department of Statistics (STAT) is responsible for compiling and publishing the CPI. Inflation can be triggered by pressures on the demand and supply side of the economy. On the demand side, shocks such as expansionary fiscal policies, including increased government spending or tax cuts can result in higher aggregate demand 3 that exceeds aggregate supply 4 and, as a result, cause an increase in average prices. This is referred to as demand-pull inflation. In addition, higher indirect taxes on goods and services can also temporarily add to inflationary pressures. On the supply side, shocks such as an increase in the cost of production, including labor costs or cost of raw materials, can result in cost push inflation, as producers pass higher costs on to consumers. Expansionary monetary policy can also trigger inflation if the increase in money supply exceeds real output growth. Furthermore, expectations matter: if consumers and firms expect higher future inflation, they include their expectations in wage negotiations and contractual price adjustments. As a result, inflation expectations become self-fulfilling. Graph 1 illustrates the annual inflation rates for Curaçao, Sint Maarten, the U.S., Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), and the world over the period 2008-2024. Overall, developments since 2020 show an upward trend in inflation, driven by global commodity shocks stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath, as well as the war in Ukraine. Although inflationary pressures have eased from their peak in 2022, except in the LAC region, rates have remained elevated. Graph 1 Inflation development 2008-2024 -1 2 5 8 11 14 17 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 World LAC Curaçao Sint Maarten U.S. Source: World Economic Outlook Database, Central Bureau of Statistics Curaçao and Department of Statistics Sint Maarten. Inflation in the LAC region has tended to be structurally higher compared to Curaçao, Sint Maarten, the United States, and the world average, especially since 2014. Several factors have driven this trend, such as higher food prices, exchange rate fluctuations, variations in energy and public goods prices, and fiscal consolidation efforts. 5 Between 2008 and 2024, Curaçao’s inflation rate averaged 2.8%, while Sint Maarten’s averaged 2.3%. In both economies, inflation remained relatively low and generally moved in line with U.S. inflation. This close alignment with the 5 ECLAC report. 2019. Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean., “The new global financial context: effects and transmission mechanisms in the region.” U.S. makes sense considering that it is the main source market for imports in both economies. However, the correlation seems stronger between Sint Maarten and the U.S. than between Curaçao and the U.S. The high dependence on imports 6 in both Curaçao and Sint Maarten means that inflation is, to a large extent, imported. 7 Given this dependence, particularly on imported energy and food, developments in global oil and food prices have played a central role in shaping domestic inflation in Curaçao and Sint Maarten. Graph 2 shows average crude oil price alongside inflation in Curaçao and Sint Maarten. Higher international oil prices directly raise energy and transportation costs, which are essential goods and services in both countries. Because these items carry significant weight in the consumer basket and indirectly affect the prices of other goods, changes in crude oil prices have a significant impact on inflation in both economies. Graph 2 Development in crude oil price versus inflation in Curaçao and Sint Maarten -2 0 2 4 6 8 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 U Crude Oil price Curaçao inflation (r.h.s.) Sint Maarten inflation (r.h.s.) Note: Crude oil price is the simple average of three spot prices i.e., Dated Brent, West Texas Intermediate and Dubai Fateh in US dollar per barrel. Source: World Economic Outlook Database, Central Bureau of Statistics Curaçao and Department of Statistics Sint Maarten. As shown in the graph, inflation in both Curaçao and Sint Maarten tends to move closely with global oil price cycles. Major spikes or drops in crude oil prices have consistently translated into domestic inflation peaks and troughs. However, the pass-through appears stronger in Curaçao while inflationary effects of oil prices shocks are more muted in Sint Maarten, particularly since 2018. 6 Over the period 2010-2019, import of goods and services amounted on average to 85% of GDP in Curaçao and 93% of GDP in Sint Maarten. The 2020 import figures are not included in this calculation since 2020 was an extraordinary year because of the pandemic. As a result, the shares of imports in GDP in 2020 do not give an accurate representation of the degree of import dependence. 7 Curaçao and Sint Maarten import on average 45.0% and 54.5%, respectively, of their total imports from the U.S. over the 2008-2024 period. A similar pattern emerges with international food prices, measured by a global food price index (Graph 3). Inflation in both Curaçao and Sint Maarten broadly co-moves with global food price cycles, underscoring their import dependence. However, the magnitude of response in Sint Maarten seems to be smaller than in Curaçao, particularly since 2018. Also, food price volatility often has an asymmetrical impact: when global prices go up, inflation increases, but when prices fall, domestic prices tend to adjust downward more slowly, partly due to uncertainty about future food price movements. Graph 3 Development in global food price index versus inflation in Curaçao and Sint Maarten -2 0 2 4 6 8 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 In d e x Commodity Food Price index Curaçao inflation (r.h.s.) Sint Maarten inflation (r.h.s.) Note: Commodity Food Price Index includes cereal, vegetable oils, meat, seafood, sugar, bananas and oranges price indices. Source: World Economic Outlook Database, Central Bureau of Statistics Curaçao and Department of Statistics Sint Maarten. The weaker response of inflation in Sint Maarten to both oil and food price shocks, particularly since 2018, warrants further in-depth analysis. One possible explanation may be the open border with the French side of the island, where in some cases price differentials, partly driven by subsidies on certain goods, reduce the relative weight of these commodities in Sint Maarten’s consumer basket. A closer examination of inflation in both Curaçao and Sint Maarten between 2008 and 2024 reveals that both economies experienced broadly similar patterns, which can be divided into distinct subperiods largely shaped by international developments. The first subperiod spans the years 2008 to 2009. Inflation peaked in 2008, reflecting the global surge in international food and oil prices ahead of the international financial crisis. In 2009, however, inflation dropped in both economies as the global recession reduced external price pressures. Particularly, aggregate demand dropped due to lower consumption on the back of rising global unemployment rates, as well as a decline in private investments because of increased uncertainties. The second subperiod (2010 – 2012) saw inflation gradually increase again partly due to domestic policy measures as both governments increased the sales tax rates, Sint Maarten in 2011 and Curaçao in 2012, exacerbating inflationary pressures. Inflation then subsided between 2013 and 2015, with Curaçao even recording negative inflation in 2015, largely due to falling international oil prices. A modest recovery followed in 2016 – 2017, while inflation stabilized at moderate levels during 2018 – 2019, though Curaçao experienced upward pressure after raising excises on tobacco, liquor, beer, and wine, and increasing the sales tax rate on imports from 6.0% to 9.0% in 2019. Inflation rose again in 2020 - 2021 as Curaçao and Sint Maarten, being highly dependent on imports, were affected by several global developments. Although the COVID-19 pandemic initially dampened demand in 2020, global supply chain disruptions and rising shipping costs soon pushed prices upward. In 2021, inflation accelerated further, driven by increased domestic demand in, particularly, advanced and emerging market economies. The increase in demand was supported by substantial fiscal support and accommodative monetary policies. As economies reopened, excess savings accumulated during the pandemic fueled additional domestic spending. On the supply side, input shortages and supply-chain disruptions exerted further upward pressure on prices. In particular, the shutdown of factories in China in early 2020, prolonged lockdowns in many countries, labor shortages, disruptions of logistic networks, and capacity constraints caused an increase in freight costs, particularly container prices, exerting an upward pressure on inflation. The disruption of the global logistics network was further aggravated in March 2021 with the grounding of the containership Ever Given in the Suez Canal, which blocked one of the world’s main shipping routes for about seven days and left nearly 400 cargo ships stranded. Global food and beverage prices peaked in May 2021 at their highest real level since the 2010 – 2011 food crisis, with adverse weather conditions such as la Niña further affecting harvests in key exporting economies. In 2022, inflation spiked across many countries due to the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As Russia is a major producer of oil, natural gas, and wheat, the war severely disrupted global supply chains and drove up energy prices. The crisis was further exacerbated by international sanctions on Russia, which led to soaring oil and gas prices, since Russia is a major exporter of natural gas. Food prices also spiked, as Ukraine, one of the major exporters of wheat and other grains, was unable to maintain its normal production and export levels. The combined effects of energy and food price increases contributed to widespread inflation in both developed and developing economies. Curaçao recorded its highest inflation over a decade at 7.4%, whereas Sint Maarten’s also experienced elevated inflation, though at a more moderate level of 3.8%. Consistent with the development in global and U.S. inflation, inflation eased in both Curaçao and Sint Maarten in 2023. The latter reflected primarily efforts by major central banks to tame inflation. Increased output of natural gas, mostly in the United States, and higher oil production levels by non-OPEC countries contributed to an unexpected decline in global energy prices, supporting the deceleration in inflation. In addition, supply chain pressures declined considerably in the first three quarters of 2023 due to the return of shorter delivery times and lower transportation costs after the bottlenecks caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The lower inflation in both Curaçao and Sint Maarten was the result of the drop in international oil prices that passed through into domestic fuel and electricity prices, while domestic food prices rose at a slower pace. In 2024, global inflation continued to ease as the world economy showed signs of recovery from the commodity price shocks caused by the pandemic and the war in Ukraine. The normalization of labor markets allowed inflation to decline without triggering a severe slowdown in economic activity, while labor supply was boosted by substantial immigration flows. 8 Central banks also played a crucial role in anchoring inflation expectations and preventing harmful wage price spirals, though price inflation in the service industry remained stubbornly high in many regions. Average prices dropped largely without significant job losses in advanced economies, mainly due to supply-side developments such as lower energy prices and rising labor force participation. 9 Consistent with global developments, U.S. inflation also eased. The development in Curaçao mirrored these global and U.S. trends in 2024, with inflationary pressures easing as domestic gasoline and electricity prices declined in response to lower international crude oil prices, because of an increase in global oil supplies. Moreover, food prices rose at a more moderate pace. By contrast, average consumer prices in Sint Maarten accelerated in 2024. This increase was driven by elevated food and domestic energy prices, despite the drop in international oil prices. Looking ahead, although inflation is projected to follow a downward path in both Curaçao and Sint Maarten over the medium term, reaching around 2.0% by 2029, the outlook remains highly uncertain with risks tilted to the downside. Key risks to the inflation outlook include heightened geopolitical tensions, not only in Eastern Europe but also in the Middle East, which could trigger new hikes in international commodity prices, supply chain disruptions and higher shipping costs. Furthermore, rising trade protectionism, particularly by the United States which is the two countries’ main trading partner for imports, and increasing global trade fragmentation could further elevate commodity prices. These factors could cause inflation to deviate significantly from the baseline projections. 8 IMF, World Economic Outlook October 2024, Policy Pivot, Rising Threats. 9 IMF, World Economic Outlook October 2024, Policy Pivot, Rising Threats. CBCS - Economic Bulletin - September 2025 | 29 The objective of this textbox, by analyzing the drivers of inflation in Curaçao and Sint Maarten between 2008 and 2024, is to highlight that inflation in both economies has been shaped largely by external factors. Global commodity price cycles, the COVID-19 pandemic, supply chain disruptions, and the war in Ukraine were the dominant factors shaping inflation trends. While domestic policy measures occasionally amplified price pressures, the strong reliance on imports means that external shocks remain the key determinant of inflation in Curaçao and Sint Maarten. As small open economies, Curaçao and Sint Maarten are inherently more vulnerable to external shocks compared to larger and more diversified economies. Still, both countries could take measures to reduce their dependence on imports and limit the pass-through of international crude oil and food price fluctuations. This could be achieved by further developing renewable energy sources such as solar, wind and waterpower, which are available in abundance. In addition, targeted efforts to simulate local food production could help strengthen resilience and partly reduce exposure to global price volatility. ## APPENDIX I Table 2 Real GDP and inflation 2022-2026 | | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025* | 2026* | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Real GDP growth (%) | | | | | | | Curaçao | | | | | | | Current projection | 6.9 | 4.2 | 5.0 | 3.4 | 2.4 | | Economic Bulletin June 2025 | 6.9 | 4.2 | 5.0 | 3.1 | 2.4 | | Sint Maarten | | | | | | | Current projection | 13.9 | 3.8 | 3.0 | 2.8 | 2.4 | | Economic Bulletin June 2025 | 13.9 | 3.8 | 3.0 | 2.4 | 2.2 | | Monetary Union | | | | | | | Current projection | 9.2 | 4.1 | 4.4 | 3.2 | 2.4 | | Economic Bulletin June 2025 | 9.2 | 4.1 | 4.4 | 2.9 | 2.3 | | Inflation (%) | | | | | | | Curaçao | | | | | | | Current projection | 7.4 | 3.5 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.1 | | Economic Bulletin June 2025 | 7.4 | 3.5 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.1 | | Sint Maarten | | | | | | | Current projection | 3.8 | 2.1 | 3.6 | 2.0 | 2.0 | | Economic Bulletin June 2025 | 3.8 | 2.1 | 3.6 | 2.4 | 2.2 | | Monetary Union | | | | | | | Current projection | 6.2 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 2.4 | 2.0 | | Economic Bulletin June 2025 | 6.2 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 2.5 | 2.1 | * Projections of the CBCS. Table 3 Underlying assumptions for 2025 baseline outlook EB June 2025 Current projection Revision Curaçao Expenditure side contribution to GDP (%) Domestic demand 3.5 2.7 -0.8 Private demand 2.5 2.2 -0.3 Public demand 1.0 0.5 -0.5 Net foreign demand -0.3 0.7 1.0 Exports -0.1 0.6 0.7 Imports 0.2 -0.2 0.4 Production side growth indicators (%) Construction 5.0 5.3 0.3 Accommodation & food services 9.8 10.3 0.5 Transport, storage & communication 4.1 4.7 0.6 Sint Maarten Expenditure side contribution to GDP (%) Domestic demand 2.0 2.6 0.6 Private demand 1.3 1.5 0.2 Public demand 0.6 1.1 0.5 Net foreign demand 0.4 0.2 -0.2 Exports 0.1 0.9 0.8 Imports -0.3 0.7 1.0 Production side growth indicators (%) Construction 3.0 3.0 0.0 Accommodation & food services 6.6 5.0 1.6 Transport, storage & communication 3.6 3.6 0.0 International indicators International oil price (%) -15.1 -14.2 1.1 U.S. inflation (%) 3.0 3.0 0.0 Source: Projections of the CBCS, IMF World Economic Outlook, U.S. Energy Information Administration (eia), Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB). Table 4 Economic key figures Curaçao (in millions Cg) 2022 2023 2024 2025* 2026* Real economy GDP 5,504.6 5,873.7 6,320.1 6,697.5 6,995.7 Nominal growth (%) 14.3 7.7 7.6 6.0 4.5 Real growth (%) 6.9 4.2 5.0 3.4 2.4 Inflation (%) 7.4 3.5 2.6 2.6 2.1 Unemployment rate (%) 13.1 11.7 7.8 7.6 7.4 Public finances Overall budget balance 18.6 -54.7 65.9 56.2 64.3 % GDP 0.3 -0.9 1.0 0.8 0.9 Current budget balance 75.9 11.0 141.5 147.5 156.7 % GDP 1.4 0.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 Public debt 4,273.5 4,154.9 4,139.2 4,186.8 4,342.4 % GDP 77.6 70.7 65.5 62.5 62.1 Domestic 869.5 812.0 864.1 799.2 799.2 % GDP 15.8 13.8 13.7 11.9 11.4 Foreign 3,40
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CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW AND OUTLOOK 2025 - 2026 CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW AND OUTLOOK 2025 - 2026 #### FOREWORD The Caribbean enters 2026 at a pivotal moment. Over the past several years, the region has navigated complex global and domestic pressures. During 2025, the development landscape beca...
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CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW AND OUTLOOK 2025 - 2026 CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW AND OUTLOOK 2025 - 2026 #### FOREWORD The Caribbean enters 2026 at a pivotal moment. Over the past several years, the region has navigated complex global and domestic pressures. During 2025, the development landscape became more challenging, as the strong post-pandemic rebound, rooted in the revival of tourism, had largely run its course. At the same time, external conditions became less supportive, shaped by shifting trade dynamics and international financial conditions, heightened economic uncertainty, and intensifying climate impacts, ushering in a period marked by slowing and low growth. On the heels of the last hurricane, Beryl in 2024, Melissa, a devastating Category 5 storm, struck in 2025, compounding the continuing struggle with recurring shocks. These overlapping recoveries continue to test the region’s resilience while the persistent structural challenges and long‑standing impediments - low productivity, high debt burdens, high energy costs, limited diversification, climate vulnerability - continue to weigh on the region’s development prospects. Global prospects also remain a source of concern in 2026. Escalating tensions in the Middle East are contributing to renewed volatility in global energy markets, which could rekindle price pressures and dampen growth. Yet, the Caribbean is not without agency. While many of the shocks confronting the region originate beyond its control, development outcomes are not predetermined. Policy choices matter. Institutions matter. Implementation matters. Countries that invest in resilient infrastructure and institutions, strengthen fiscal and financial frameworks, improve implementation and project delivery, build human and institutional capital while investing in lifting productivity are better positioned to not only better absorb shocks, but will recover more quickly, setting a stronger foundation for durable long -term growth. This pivotal moment therefore calls for renewed commitment to collective action. Regional cooperation, through shared learning, coordinated responses to climate risks, and joint efforts to mobilise and use financing more effectively, can materially improve outcomes. The Caribbean Economic Review and Outlook 2025/26 is offered in this spirit. It provides a comprehensive assessment of recent economic performance and the outlook across the region, while highlighting the shared risks and policy challenges that will influence the region’s development trajectory. The Caribbean Development Bank remains committed to supporting its Borrowing Member Countries in strengthening resilience, improving implementation capacity, and advancing inclusive and sustainable development. In the face of uncertainty, the region can innovate, transform, and thrive. Our response must remain consistent: to stand together, to act intentionally, and to shape our own development outcomes, even in a world we cannot fully control. Christine Dawson Director of Economics FOREWORD 6 CARIBBEAN ECAONOMIC REVIEW AND OUTLOOK 2025 - 2026 FOREWORD 4 NOTES 8 COUNTRY ABBREVIATIONS 8 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9 ECONOMIC REVIEW 11 Borrowing Member Country Economic Performance 12 Labour Market Developments 16 Inflation and Price Dynamics 19 Fiscal and Debt Performance 22 External Sector Performance 27 Financial Sector Performance 30 BMC OUTLOOK AND KEY RISKS 33 DEVELOPMENT IMPERATIVES: CLOSING IMPLEMENTATION DEFICITS TO UNLOCK GROWTH 36 Implementation Performance: Where We Stand 37 Key Drivers of Implementation Deficits 39 Why Implementation Deficits Matter? 39 From Diagnosis to Action 40 BORROWING MEMBER COUNTRY PROFILES 43 ## CONTENTS TABLE OF FIGURES AND TABLES Figure 1: Regional GDP Growth Trends (%) 12 Figure 2: Relative Size of BMC Economies (Real GDP) 12 Figure 3: Real GDP Growth (Excluding Guyana) 2024 vs 2025 (%) 13 Figure 4 Visitor Arrivals in Service-Exporting BMCs (Thousands) 14 Figure 5: Oil Production in Guyana 2019 – 2025 (Thousands of Barrels) 15 Figure 6: Labour Market Trends in Reporting BMCs (%) 16 Figure 7: Labour Market Trends Among Different Populations in 2025 (%) 17 Figure 8: Regional and Global Trends in Inflation (%) 19 Figure 9: Primary Balances to GDP 2024 vs 2025 (%) 22 Figure 10: Composition of Central Government Revenue by Source, 2025 23 Figure 11: Central Government Debt to GDP 2024 vs 2025 (%) 24 Figure 12: Real GDP Growth (Excluding Guyana) 2025 vs 2026 (%) 25 Figure 13: Key Downside Risks to the Caribbean Economic Outlook 27 Figure 14: Gross Reserve Assets Coverage of Imports of Goods and Services (Months) 29 Figure 15: Private Sector Credit Growth (%) 30 Figure 16: Financial Soundness Indicators (%) 31 Figure 17: Real GDP Growth (Excluding Guyana) 2025 vs 2026 (%) 33 Figure 18: Key Downside Risks to the Caribbean Economic Outlook 34 Figure 19: Systemic Drivers of Implementation Deficits in the Caribbean 38 Table 1: Retirement Ages and Targets Across Selected BMCs 18 Table 2: Changes in Sovereign Credit Ratings for BMCs in 2025 26 NOTES • The Caribbean economy or regional economy in this report refers to the 19 Borrowing Member Countries (BMCs) of the Caribbean Development Bank, unless otherwise stated. These economies are further classified by analytic groups as follows: Service -exporting countries: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, the Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Turks and Caicos Islands. Commodity -exporting countries: Guyana, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. • Eight BMCs are members of the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU/EC): Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. • Five BMCs are United Kingdom Overseas Territories: Anguilla, the Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, and Turks and Caicos Islands. • The analysis in this report is based on data available as at 16 February 2026. More recent data may have become available since that date. Data and estimates for 2025 are preliminary. • All data reported refer to the year 2025, and comparisons are with respect to 2024, unless otherwise stated. • Dollars ($) throughout this report refer to United States dollars, unless otherwise stated. COUNTRY ABBREVIATIONS | Abbreviation AI | Country Anguilla | Abbreviation HT | Country Haiti | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | AG | Antigua and Barbuda | JM | Jamaica | | BS | The Bahamas | MS | Montserrat | | BB | Barbados | KN | St Kitts and Nevis | | BZ | Belize | LC | Saint Lucia | | VG | The Virgin Islands (British) | VC | St Vincent and the Grenadines | | KY | Cayman Islands | SR | Suriname | | DM | The Commonwealth of Dominica | TT | Trinidad and Tobago | | GD | Grenada | TC | Turks and Caicos Islands | | GY | Guyana | EC | Eastern Caribbean Currency Union | ### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Economic performance across the Caribbean remained subdued in 2025, unfolding against a backdrop of stable global growth, but heightened geopolitical uncertainty, and evolving trade and tariff policies that weighed on external conditions. These headwinds were compounded by intensifying climate impacts and domestic structural constraints, shaping the region’s overall performance. Excluding Guyana, growth slowed to 0.6% from 1.4% as activity weakened across most Borrowing Member Countries (BMCs). Including Guyana, regional growth was 4.7%, down from 8.3% in 2024, with overall growth still driven largely by Guyana’s performance. Among commodity exporters, outcomes were mixed: Suriname recorded moderate gains, supported by offshore energy related investment, while growth was flat in Trinidad and Tobago amid weak performance in the energy and non -energy sectors. Service -exporting economies recorded softer outturns as tourism momentum eased, source -market conditions weakened, and climate -related disruptions, notably Hurricane Melissa, dampened capacity and demand in Jamaica and Haiti. Haiti’s economy contracted for the seventh year, as insecurity also continued to suppress economic activity. Despite subdued growth, labour market conditions remained broadly stable, with unemployment declining in most reporting BMCs. However, longstanding gender and youth disparities persisted, alongside labour shortages. Inflation moderated across the region but remained above pre -pandemic averages. Lower global commodity prices helped push inflation below 2024 levels in nearly all BMCs. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Fiscal consolidation momentum, however, weakened across some economies. The regional primary surplus, excluding Guyana, narrowed to 1.3% of GDP in 2025 from 1.6%, reflecting slower revenue growth and rising spending pressures. Including Guyana, whose sizeable deficit reflected substantial capital expenditure, the regional overall primary surplus shifts to 0.2% of GDP. Debt remained elevated in several economies, with nine BMCs recording central government debt‑to‑GDP ratios above 60.0%. External balances also came under pressure. Merchandise trade deficits widened in most economies, but most maintained adequate international reserves, supported by external financing, and remittances. Financial sectors remained broadly stable, supported by adequate capitalisation, strengthened credit growth, and high liquidity. Continued regulatory reforms further supported financial‑sector resilience. The Caribbean’s near‑term outlook is shaped by modest growth prospects and significant downside risks. In 2026, regional growth (excluding Guyana) is expected to remain subdued at 1.1%. Including Guyana, regional growth is projected at 6.2%, largely reflecting continued expansion in Guyana’s oil sector. Fiscal outturns will remain mixed, with continued consolidation in some economies offset by persistent pressures from post‑disaster recovery, rising wage costs, and declining non‑tax revenues in others. Risks including slower global growth, geopolitical tensions, commodity price volatility, climate shocks, and fiscal vulnerabilities continue to cloud the outlook. Accelerating reform implementation and strengthening institutional and project execution capacity will be essential to lifting long‑term growth, enhancing resilience, and advancing the region’s development ambitions. ### ECONOMIC REVIEW Growth momentum across Borrowing Member Countries (BMCs) moderated further in 2025, as global conditions became less supportive and downside risks materialised. Eleven of the 19 BMCs recorded smaller expansions relative to 2024, while three experienced contractions. Consequently, real GDP (excluding Guyana) grew by an estimated 0.6%, down from 1.4% in 2024 1. Including Guyana, growth decelerated to 4.7% from 8.3% in 2024, as Guyana’s expansion moderated from extraordinary levels, though the economy continued to grow at a robust pace and remained the principal driver of regional performance. Global output expanded by 3.3% in 2025, in line with 2024, but still below the pre -pandemic average of 3.7% (International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook, January 2026 Update). Headwinds from trade tensions, elevated policy uncertainty and geopolitical tensions continued to weigh on confidence and external demand in the region’s key trading partners, even as investment, particularly in technology, and more accommodative financial conditions helped support overall activity. Growth in advanced economies eased slightly to 1.7% from 1.8% with the United States (U.S.), the Caribbean’s main trading partner, slowing from 2.8% to 2.1%. BMC ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE Service -exporting economies recorded modest growth in 2025, expanding by 0.6%, from 1.0% in 2024, though performance varied across countries. Growth decelerated in most economies, reflecting softening tourism demand. However, a few countries experienced stable or stronger outturns as some continued to recover from weather -related shocks and disruptions in the previous year. Figure 1: Regional GDP Growth Trends (%) Figure 2: Relative Size of BMC Economies (Real GDP) Regional real GDP growth decelerated in 2025. Regional GDP is heavily influenced by outcomes in a small number of larger BMCs. Sources: IMF, BMC Central Banks, Ministries of Finance, Statistical Offices, Caribbean Development Bank (CDB). 1 Regional GDP growth reflects the percentage change in the aggregate level of GDP across all BMCs. Figure 1: Regional GDP Growth Trends (%) 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 -2 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Regional Regional Excl. Guyana Service Exporters Commodity Exporters Excl. Guyana World Figure 2: Relative Size of BMC Economies (Real GDP) JM BZ MS GD BS VC TC KY KN VG SR LC AG AI BB TT HT DM GY Figure 3: Real GDP Growth (Excluding Guyana) 2024 vs 2025 (%) Real GDP growth decelerated in most BMCs in 2025. Sources: Central Banks, Ministries of Finance, Statistical Offices, CDB. 2 Tourism data are reported up to the latest available data for each country and compared with the corresponding period of the previous year. As at the time of writing, the most recent observations are as follows: September – Montserrat and St. Kitts and Nevis; October – St. Vincent and the Grenadines; November – Dominica, Antigua and Barbuda (cruise arrivals only); December – All other BMCs. 3 In 2024, hotel room capacity in St. Vincent and the Grenadines increased with the opening of the Holiday Inn and the Sandals Resort. Tourism momentum moderated across service -exporting BMCs in 2025, following strong growth in the post -pandemic period 2. Stayover arrivals declined across the region compared with the previous year, reflecting softer conditions in key source markets. The region’s two largest tourism markets recorded declines, with the Bahamas reporting a 2.6% decrease, driven largely by weaker U.S. demand. Jamaica posted a 10.3% contraction, also driven by weaker external demand and disruptions caused by Hurricane Melissa. Performance across smaller markets was mixed, with double -digit growth recorded in Dominica (17.1%), and St Vincent and the Grenadines 3 (19.8%), supported by increased airlift in both countries and the opening of new hotels in St. Vincent and the Grenadines 3. Arrivals also increased in Anguilla, Barbados, Belize, Cayman Islands, and St. Kitts and Nevis, but fell in Antigua and Barbuda, the Virgin Islands, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Lucia, and Turks and Caicos Islands. Cruise tourism remained supportive in 2025, but growth slowed alongside broader moderation in travel demand. Collectively, cruise passenger arrivals increased across the region compared with the previous year, but at a slower pace than the exceptionally strong growth recorded in earlier years. Performance varied across destinations, with increases in Anguilla, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, the Virgin Islands, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Turks and Caicos. In contrast, several destinations including Antigua and Barbuda, Cayman Islands, Jamaica, Montserrat, and Saint Lucia experienced declines. Expansion in tourism -related services including accommodation and food services, wholesale and retail and transport, storage, and communications moderated, reflecting slowing momentum in tourist arrivals. Construction activity also contributed positively to economic growth across several service exporting economies, even as a Figure 3: Real GDP Growth (Excluding Guyana) 2024 vs 2025 (%) AI AG BS BB BZ VG KY DM GD HT JM MS KN LC VC SR TT TC 2024 2025 Regional Growth 2024 Regional Growth 2025 8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6 Figure 4 Visitor Arrivals in Service-Exporting BMCs (Thousands) J a n F e b M a r A p r M a y J u n J u l A u g S e p O c t N o v D e c J a n F e b M a r A p r M a y J u n J u l A u g S e p O c t N o v D e c 1,000 800 600 400 200 3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 0 2022 2023 2024 2025 Stayover Arrivals Cruise Arrivals 2022 2023 2024 2025 4 Subsequent to the completion of the analysis for this report, the Planning Institute of Jamaica estimated flat growth for 2025, dampened by an estimated 11%–13% contraction in real value added in the final quarter of 2025. 5 Planning Institute of Jamaica (2025), Review of Economic Performance, October–December 2025, media briefing. few large projects were completed, and implementation delays persisted in some BMCs due to capacity constraints. Nevertheless, construction activity continued to be supported by public sector investment, with ongoing upgrades to air and seaports in Anguilla, and Dominica, while major port construction works in St. Vincent and the Grenadines were completed in 2025. Improvements to social infrastructure including housing, healthcare, and education facilities were undertaken in Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Belize, Cayman Islands, Grenada, Guyana, Montserrat, and St. Kitts and Nevis. Investments in economic infrastructure, particularly in roads and utilities, occurred in Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, the Cayman Islands, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, and Saint Lucia, alongside the completion of Dominica’s geothermal energy power plant in 2025. Construction activity was further supported by post -disaster reconstruction in Grenada and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, which also contributed to activity across multiple subsectors. Although some tourism -related investments were postponed amid heightened global uncertainty, continued private -sector investment in hotel construction, refurbishment, and other commercial and residential developments provided additional momentum. Climate shocks continued to affect the region. Jamaica’s economy is estimated to have contracted for a second consecutive year, with Figure 4 Visitor Arrivals in Service-Exporting BMCs (Thousands) Tourism growth moderated across service-exporting BMCs in 2025. Sources: Caribbean Tourism Organisation, Statistical Offices, and National Tourism Boards real GDP declining by 1.1% in 2025 following a contraction of 0.5% in 2024. This outturn was largely attributable to disruptions to key sectors caused by the passage of Hurricane Melissa, which compounded and delayed recovery from the effects of Hurricane Beryl which impacted the island 14 months earlier. 4 Hurricane Melissa made landfall as a Category 5 hurricane, the strongest to ever impact the island and among the most powerful Atlantic hurricanes ever observed. It inflicted an estimated $12.2 billion (bn) in damage and losses (56.7% of GDP) 5. Hurricane Melissa ravaged Jamaica’s agriculture productive belt, destroying over 41,000 hectares of farmland and 3,000 fishing boats. The storm also caused significant structural damage to the tourism infrastructure, particularly along the western corridor, resulting in temporary hotel closures. Beyond sectoral impacts, Hurricane Melissa caused extensive destruction to critical infrastructure including roads, housing, and utilities, disrupting lives, livelihoods, and economic activity. In Haiti, economic activity remained severely constrained in 2025 as the deteriorating security environment continued to disrupt normal life and hinder productive activity. Preliminary estimates indicate that the economy contracted for a seventh consecutive year. Real GDP is estimated to have declined by 2.7%, 6 Authorised in 2023, deployed in mid-2024, initially for 12 months, but extended through to 2025. Figure 5: Oil Production in Guyana 2019 – 2025 (Thousands of Barrels) Guyana’s oil production increased at a slower pace in 2025, following the first full year of output from its third oil field in the previous year. Source: Bank of Guyana, Ministry of Finance Figure 5: Oil Production in Guyana 2019 – 2025 (Thousands of Barrels) 80,000 60,000 40,000 20,000 0 ‘0 0 0 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 2019
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Consumer Price Index - ECCU Use the latest browser recommended by Microsoft Get speed, security and privacy with Microsoft Edge Close Launch now Phone: (869) 465-2537 Fax: (869) 465-9562 Email: info@eccb-centralbank.org --> Home Statistics Economic Statistics Consumer Price Index - ECCU Consumer Pri...
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Consumer Price Index - ECCU Use the latest browser recommended by Microsoft Get speed, security and privacy with Microsoft Edge Close Launch now Phone: (869) 465-2537 Fax: (869) 465-9562 Email: info@eccb-centralbank.org --> Home Statistics Economic Statistics Consumer Price Index - ECCU Consumer Price Index - ECCU --> --> Loading... Modify Table × Country * Select All ECCU Frequency * Quarterly Annual From * To * Rows Select All Inflation Rate - end of period Inflation Rate - period average All Items Food Alcoholic Drink and Tobacco Housing and Utilities Fuel and light Clothing and footwear Household and Furniture Equipment Transportation and Communication Medical Care and Expenses Education Personal Services Miscellaneous Columns Select All Inflation Rate - end of period Inflation Rate - period average All Items Food Alcoholic Drink and Tobacco Housing and Utilities Fuel and light Clothing and footwear Household and Furniture Equipment Transportation and Communication Medical Care and Expenses Education Personal Services Miscellaneous Filter --> Generate Report Advanced Search × Category * Monetary and Financial Sector Economic Statistics Subject * Country * Select All Anguilla Antigua and Barbuda Commonwealth of Dominica Grenada Montserrat Saint Christopher (St Kitts) and Nevis Saint Lucia Saint Vincent and the Grenadines ECCU Frequency * Monthly Quarterly Annual From * To * Rows * Select All Generate Report Download Table × Download your table in CSV format Download your table in Excel format Dashboard Food Import Bill Tracker Fuel Price Tracker Monetary and Financial Sector Monetary and Financial Statistics Statement of Asset and Liabilities Selected Commercial Bank's Assets and Liabilities Interest Rates Publication of Side-by-Side Data for Commercial Banks Financial Soundness Indicators (%) Economic Statistics External Sector National Accounts Other Real Sector Public Sector Debt Central Government Fiscal Accounts Regional Government Securities Market Interactive Database Surveys Balance of Payments Business Outlook Credit Market Conditions Financial Literacy and Financial Inclusion Metadata and References Advanced Release Calendar Metadata Documents Other Reference Documents Infographics Consumer Price Index - ECCU Country: ECCU ECCU Time frequency: Annual Quarterly Annual Reference period: 2021 to 2025 Update Data Modify Chart Table Download Advanced Search Unit 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Inflation Rate - end of period % 2.99 12.39 0.17 2.90 0.57 Inflation Rate - period average % 2.02 10.34 3.51 3.20 -0.06 All Items Index 167.22 187.94 188.25 193.70 194.81 Food Index 192.42 226.98 234.39 239.82 242.73 Alcoholic Drink and Tobacco Index 179.18 198.36 204.70 213.15 217.68 Housing and Utilities Index 136.44 150.17 142.22 145.97 147.71 Fuel and light Index 156.61 182.10 169.58 172.49 174.77 Clothing and footwear Index 166.67 185.56 188.20 196.16 194.96 Household and Furniture Equipment Index 152.38 179.54 181.36 181.29 179.22 Transportation and Communication Index 178.20 202.68 201.06 201.12 205.80 Medical Care and Expenses Index 194.78 213.11 219.84 234.59 231.82 Education Index 132.83 125.30 129.20 133.49 141.89 Personal Services Index 100.75 94.80 98.55 100.54 101.59 Miscellaneous Index 133.49 148.48 155.59 175.65 165.02 Source Central Statistical Offices of the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU) and the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) Line Chart Bar Chart Column Chart Metadata × The Consumer Price Index (CPI) – from which the inflation rate is calculated – is compiled on the 2001 base year at the ECCU level. The base year is set to 100 and it is used to compare values from other years. End of Period End of Period is calculated as period over period. For example, monthly data is calculated as June of the current year over May of the current year; quarterly is calculated as June of the current year over March of the current year; and annual is calculated as December of the current year over December of the previous year. This website uses cookies to improve your experience. For more information view our privacy policy here. Cookie Settings Accept Exchange Rates Interest Rates
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## Economic survey of the Caribbean 2024 Sheldon McLean Michael Hendrickson Machel Pantin Christa Julien Dejeanne Serville ISSN 1728-5445 SERIES #### STUDIES AND PERSPECTIVES 135 ##### ECLAC SUBREGIONAL HEADQUARTERS FOR THE CARIBBEAN ### Thank you for your interest in this ECLAC publication P...
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## Economic survey of the Caribbean 2024 Sheldon McLean Michael Hendrickson Machel Pantin Christa Julien Dejeanne Serville ISSN 1728-5445 SERIES #### STUDIES AND PERSPECTIVES 135 ##### ECLAC SUBREGIONAL HEADQUARTERS FOR THE CARIBBEAN ### Thank you for your interest in this ECLAC publication Please register if you would like to receive information on our editorial products and activities. When you register, you may specify your particular areas of interest and you will gain access to our products in other formats. Click on the link below for our social networks and other channels for accessing our publications: ##### Register https://bit.ly/m/CEPAL ## Economic survey of the Caribbean 2024 Sheldon McLean Michael Hendrickson Machel Pantin Christa Julien Dejeanne Serville 135 This document was prepared by Sheldon McLean, Coordinator of the Economic Development Unit of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) subregional headquarters for the Caribbean; Michael Hendrickson, Economic Affairs Officer; Machel Pantin, Associate Economic Affairs Officer; Christa Julien, Research Assistant; and Dejeanne Serville, Project Assistant, all of the same Unit. The United Nations and the countries it represents assume no responsibility for the content of links to external sites in this publication. Mention of any firm names and commercial products or services does not imply endorsement by the United Nations or the countries it represents. The views expressed in this document, which has been reproduced without formal editing, are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Organization or the countries it represents. United Nations publication ISSN: 1728-5445 (electronic version) ISSN: 1727-9917 (print version) LC/TS.2025/104 LC/CAR/TS.2025/8 Distribution: L Copyright © United Nations, 2025 All rights reserved Printed at United Nations, Santiago S.2500665[E] This publication should be cited as: McLean, S., Hendrickson, M., Pantin, M., Julien, C. and Serville, D. (2025). Economic survey of the Caribbean 2024. Studies and Perspectives Series-ECLAC Subregional Headquarters for the Caribbean (135) (LC/TS.2025/104-LC/CAR/TS.2025/8). Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. Applications for authorization to reproduce this work in whole or in part should be sent to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Documents and Publications Division, publicaciones.cepal@un.org. Member States and their governmental institutions may reproduce this work without prior authorization, but are requested to mention the source and to inform ECLAC of such reproduction. Contents Abstract ... 5 I. Global and subregional performance ... 7 A. Global analysis and performance ... 7 B. Caribbean growth performance and prospects ... 8 C. Unemployment ... 10 II. Fiscal and debt performance ... 13 A. Fiscal ... 13 B. Debt ... 14 C. Debt service payments ... 15 III. Monetary policy and prices ... 17 A. Money supply and credit ... 18 B. Inflation ... 20 IV. External sector developments ... 23 A. Current account ... 23 B. Foreign direct investment ... 24 V. Conclusion ... 27 Bibliography ... 29 Studies and Perspectives series - The Caribbean: issues published ... 30 Tables Table 1 Global economic performance and prospects, 2022–2024 ... 8 Table 2 Caribbean GDP growth rates, 2021–2024 ... 9 Table 3 Caribbean GDP growth rates index, 2021–2024 ... 10 ECLAC - Studies and Perspectives series-The Caribbean (135) Economic survey of the Caribbean 2024 4 Table 4 Unemployment rates, 2016–2023 ... 11 Table 5 M2 and domestic credit to the private and public sector, 2022–2023 ... 18 Table 6 Inflation and West Texas intermediate oil prices, Jan 2023–June 2024 ... 20 Table 7 Foreign direct investment inflows, 2023 ... 25 Figures Figure 1 Overall fiscal deficit, 2018–2023 ... 14 Figure 2 Total public debt, 2023 ... 15 Figure 3 Total debt service 2023 ... 16 Figure 4 Inflation and West Texas intermediate oil prices, Jan 2023–June 2024 ... 21 Figure 5 Current account balance, 2023 ... 24 Figure 6 Year-on-year change in foreign direct investment inflows, 2023 ... 25 Abstract This survey examines the economic performance of economies of the Caribbean in 2023 and the first few months of 2024 and comprises five chapters. The first chapter gives an overview of global, regional and subregional economic performance in the Caribbean. The second provides an analysis of the subregion’s fiscal performance and debt burden. The third looks at monetary policy and their impacts. The fourth is focused on the external sector, while the fifth concludes. I. Global and subregional performance A. Global analysis and performance In 2023, the global economy slowed significantly, still unable to fully recover from the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine conflict. However, by early 2024 through April, global activity and world trade stabilized, showing surprising resilience. Global recovery advanced as the the impact of recent crises and their cyclical effects on economic performance diminished. Inflation, however, remains persistent, even as energy and food prices have returned to pre-pandemic levels in many countries, hampering a full recovery. This persistence is largely attributed to rising demand for services and labor, which has driven up wages and service costs. Escalating trade tensions and policy uncertainty have also raised the likelihood that central banks in advanced economies will adopt a more cautious approach to easing monetary policies. In early 2024, the United States delayed monetary policy normalization (when inflation surged unexpectedly), thereby sustaining inflation, particularly in the services sector, and straining fiscal discipline, pushing its debt-to-GDP ratio steadily higher, with accompanying risks to both the domestic and global economy. Given these persistent inflationary pressures and uncertainties, managing fiscal and trade policies effectively becomes crucial. Over-tightening should be avoided, so as to avoid harmful economic spillovers to the rest of the world. In the short term, central banks should focus on price stability while fiscal policies rebuild reserves for future economic shocks. International cooperation is vital for fostering sustainable recovery, with multilateral policies and structural reforms boosting productivity and global growth. As cyclical factors subside, the gap in output between faster- and slower-growing economies has diminished, with growth rates converging toward their potential and sustainable levels. Asia’s emerging markets, particularly India and China, continue to drive nearly half of global growth. In the first quarter, China’s growth was bolstered by resurgent domestic consumption and a temporary export surge, further reducing output divergences. Turning to global economic performance and prospects, global growth is projected at 3.3% in 2025, following 3.2% in 2024. Emerging and developing economies, particularly India and China, remain key drivers of growth. India leads global growth at 8.2% in 2023, moderating to 7.0% in 2024 and 6.5% in 2025, consistently outpacing China, whose growth slows from 5.2% in 2023 to 5.0% in 2024 and 4.5% in 2025. Advanced economies show much lower growth, averaging 1.7–1.8%, with the United States projected to grow at 2.6% in 2024 but slowing to 1.9% in 2025, reflecting moderated consumption and a negative contribution from net trade. Meanwhile, Latin America and the Caribbean are expected to remain on a low-growth path in 2024, with an average growth rate of just 1.8%, as cyclical factors fade, and economic activity aligns with its potential. Table 1 Global economic performance and prospects, 2022–2024 (Percentages) | | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Advanced economies | 2.6 | 1.5 | 1.4 | | Emerging market and developing countries | 4.1 | 4.0 | 4.0 | | Euro area | 3.3 | 0.7 | 1.2 | | Latin America and the Caribbean | 4.1 | 2.3 | 2.3 | | China | 3.0 | 5.0 | 4.2 | | India | 7.2 | 6.3 | 6.3 | | United States | 2.1 | 2.1 | 1.5 | | World | 3.5 | 3.0 | 2.9 | Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook. (2023). Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. Note: Projections for 2024. B. Caribbean growth performance and prospects In 2023, all fifteen countries in the region experienced positive economic growth. The Caribbean average growth was 6.5% which was a deceleration of 1.4 percentage points compared to 2022, with the goods producers growing at 12.2% and service producers at 4.54%. Guyana continued to dominate the regional growth landscape, leveraging its burgeoning oil sector to achieve a growth rate of 32.2% in 2023. As a result, the Caribbean excluding Guyana grew by 4.18%. When Guyana is also excluded from among the good producer’s growth rate was 3.17%. There was, however, still a positive growth among the remaining three: Belize, Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname which had growth rates of 4.8%, 2.7% and 2% respectively. Service-producing economies also demonstrated positive growth in 2023, led by Anguilla and Barbados with growths of 8.2% and 4.9% respectively. Growth rate varied across the service producers between 8.2% (Anguilla) and 2% (Suriname). It is projected that there will be positive growth among the countries of the subregion in 2023. For the Caribbean as a whole, growth is anticipated to be some 5.6% while the goods and services will grow by 9.53% and 4.14% respectively. When Guyana is excluded from among the regional economies, growth falls to 3.9% and 2.97% among the good producers. Guyana’s growth, while still substantial, is anticipated to decrease by 10 percentage points from 2023 to 29.2% in 2024. Among the other good producers Suriname is expected to grow to 2.4% whilst Trinidad and Tobago anticipate a fall to 2.4%. Turning to service producers, growth is expected to vary between 6.9% (Anguilla) and 1.8% (Jamaica). Table 2 Caribbean GDP growth rates, 2021–2024 (Percentages) | | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Anguilla | 12.8 | 24.2 | 8.2 | 6.9 | | Antigua and Barbuda | 8.2 | 9.5 | 3.9 | 6.3 | | Bahamas (The) | 15.4 | 10.8 | 2.6 | 2.3 | | Barbados | -1.2 | 13.5 | 4.9 | 3.7 | | Belize | 17.9 | 8.7 | 4.8 | 4.1 | | Dominica | 6.9 | 5.6 | 4.7 | 4.6 | | Grenada | 4.7 | 7.3 | 3.6 | 4.1 | | Guyana | 20.1 | 63.3 | 39.2 | 29.2 | | Jamaica | 4.6 | 5.2 | 2.1 | 1.8 | | Montserrat | 5.5 | 2.5 | 7.3 | 4.8 | | Saint Kitts and Nevis | 0.5 | 10.5 | 2.3 | 3 | | Saint Lucia | 10 | 18.2 | 3.4 | 3.4 | | Saint Vincent and the Grenadines | 0.8 | 7.2 | 6 | 4.7 | | Suriname | 2.4 | -2.4 | 2 | 2.4 | | Trinidad and Tobago | -1 | 1.5 | 2.7 | 2.4 | | The Caribbean | 6.0 | 12.8 | 9.4 | 8.7 | | Goods Producers | 4.9 | 16.8 | 15.5 | 13.8 | | Service Producers | 7.0 | 8.9 | 3.0 | 2.7 | | The Caribbean excluding Guyana | 4.2 | 5.7 | 2.9 | 2.6 | | Goods producers excluding Guyana | 0.7 | 1.3 | 2.7 | 2.5 | Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. On the basis of official data. Since the overall growth rate was starting from a low economic base due to the closure of Caribbean economies under COVID-19, an index of production using 2019 as the base period can be informative. In 2023, the Caribbean’s production index reached 121.5, indicating that economic activity in the region surpassed 2019 levels. However, when Guyana (391.8) is excluded among the goods producers the index falls to 98.5 %, which is below the 2019 level. Conversely, the production index for service producing economies remained above the 2019 levels, although four economies: Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica and Saint Kitts and Nevis, registered indicesbelow their 2019 benchmarks. In 2024 the Caribbean’s overall production index is anticipated to be 132. Goods-producing economies are forecast to achieve an index 202, while service-producing economies are expected to record an index of 107.2, further soldifying the region’s economic recovery trajectory. Table 3 Caribbean GDP growth rates index, 2021–2024 (2019=100) | | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Anguilla | 79.1 | 98.3 | 106.4 | 113.7 | | Antigua and Barbuda | 87.8 | 96.1 | 99.8 | 106.1 | | Bahamas (The) | 90.7 | 100.5 | 103.1 | 105.5 | | Barbados | 86.5 | 98.1 | 102.9 | 106.7 | | Belize | 101.7 | 110.6 | 115.9 | 120.7 | | Dominica | 89.2 | 94.1 | 98.6 | 103.1 | | Grenada | 90.3 | 96.8 | 100.3 | 104.4 | | Guyana | 172.3 | 281.4 | 391.8 | 506.2 | | Jamaica | 94.2 | 99.1 | 101.2 | 103.0 | | Montserrat | 104.3 | 106.9 | 114.7 | 120.2 | | Saint Kitts and Nevis | 85.0 | 94.0 | 96.1 | 99.0 | | Saint Lucia | 82.9 | 98.0 | 101.4 | 104.8 | | Saint Vincent and the Grenadines | 97.1 | 104.1 | 110.3 | 115.5 | | Suriname | 86.1 | 84.1 | 85.7 | 87.8 | | Trinidad and Tobago | 90.0 | 91.3 | 93.8 | 96.1 | | The Caribbean | 90.8 | 95.4 | 105.4 | 129.2 | | Goods Producers | 98.4 | 102.1 | 117.9 | 156.8 | | Service Producers | 84.1 | 89.6 | 94.5 | 104.8 | | The Caribbean excluding Guyana | 86.9 | 89.9 | 94.0 | 101.0 | | Goods producers excluding Guyana | 90.6 | 90.3 | 93.4 | 96.1 | Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. On the basis of official data. C. Unemployment The growth performance of the economies has a direct impact on unemployment. Unfortunately, consistent unemployment data for the Caribbean region remains a challenge. While the table provides unemployment figures for several countries, the data are not uniformly updated. Only in the case of four countries are the data complete and these are Barbados, Belize, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago. In the case of Barbados where the data set is complete there has been a decrease in unemployment which can be attributed to the sustained recovery in the tourism and hospitality sector. The unemployment rate decreased from 8.4% in 2022 to 7.9% in 2023. A similar conclusion can be drawn for Trinidad and Tobago where the unemployment rate decreased from 4.9% in 2022 to 4.0 % in 2023 due to the growth of the non-energy sector. In the case of Belize the unemployment rate was 5.0% in 2022 and fell to 4.0% in 2023 reflecting the growth in that year from agriculture and tourism. In the case of Guyana, the unemployment rate decreased from 6.3% in 2022 to 4.4% in 2023.This was driven by the rapid expansion of the oil and gas sector, which has transformed the country's economy. Table 4 Unemployment rates, 2016–2023 (Percentages) | | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Bahamas (The) | 12.7 | 10.1 | 10.7 | 9.5 | - | - | - | 8.8 | | Barbados | 9.7 | 10.0 | 9.7 | 10.1 | 15.7 | 14.1 | 8.4 | 7.9 | | Belize | 9.5 | 9.3 | 9.4 | 9.0 | 13.7 | 10.2 | 5 | 4 | | Grenada | 28.2 | 23.6 | 20.6 | 15.4 | 24.9 | 18.1 | - | - | | Guyana | 13.2 | 11.7 | 9.1 | 7.8 | 10.3 | 8.5 | 6.3 | 4.4 | | Jamaica | 21.3 | 20.2 | 20.2 | 16.83 | 21.69 | 21.9 | 16.5 | - | | Saint Lucia | 9.7 | 7.6 | 9.4 | 10.5 | - | - | - | - | | Suriname | 4.0 | 4.8 | 3.9 | 4.3 | 5.7 | 5.4 | 4.9 | 4.0 | | Trinidad and Tobagoa | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Source: International Labour Organization and Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. On the basis of official data. a Data was unavailable at the time of drafting the report. II. Fiscal and debt performance This section analyses the recent fiscal performance of the subregion as it adjusts to the post-pandemic environment marked by shocks from the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, higher global inflation, foreign exchange constraints and continued domestic pressure from high public debt and debt servicing costs. A. Fiscal Caribbean countries continued on the path to fiscal consolidation in 2023 to normalise their fiscal position after the slippage necessitated by the pandemic. The fiscal deficit contracted by 0.5 percentage points from 2.6% of GDP in 2022 to 2.2% of GDP 2023. The deficit contracted in seven countries but increased in six. The reduction in the deficit was driven by the service producers whose deficit declined from 3.6% of GDP to 2.0% of GDP. Among the service producers, Grenada has the largest turnaround in its fiscal position. Grenada's fiscal surplus expanded by 7.6 percentage points to 8.5% of GDP. Non-tax revenues were bolstered by strong growth in receipts from the Citizen by Investment Programme. Tax revenues also posted dynamic growth, thereby reinforcing the overall growth in total receipts. Meanwhile, Saint Kitts and Nevis, the Bahamas and Antigua and Barbuda registered the largest reductions in their deficits. Saint Kitts and Nevis' deficit fell by 4.5 percentage points, underpinned by a sharp (28.5%) fall in capital spending, owing to the completion of the land repurchase programme, which cost the government in excess of EC$200 million. Current spending fell marginally by 0.7%, reflecting lower outlays on transfers and subsidies. The lower deficit in the Bahamas reflected higher revenues and reduced spending. Revenues were bolstered by a 10.2% increase in VAT receipts, while expenditure declined, owing to lower outlays on goods and services and public sector salaries. This was only partly offset by higher capital expenditure to acquire fixed assets and land. In Antigua and Barbuda, the deficit fell by 1.7 percentage points to 3.7% of GDP because of lower capital spending on personal emoluments and goods and services and higher tax receipts, which bolstered revenues. Figure 1 Overall fiscal deficit, 2018–2023 (Percent of GDP) Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. On the basis of official figures. By contrast, for the goods producers, the deficit rose by 1.3 percentage points to 2.6% of GDP. Among the goods producers, the fiscal situation worsened the most in Trinidad and Tobago, with a reversal from a surplus of 0.7% of GDP in 2022 to a deficit of 1.8% of GDP in 2023. The increase in the deficit reflected higher expenditure that offset the increase in revenue. The overall increase in revenue was pegged back by a fall in receipts from the energy sector, although there was an increase in non-energy sector revenues. The growth in spending was mainly driven by an increase in transfers associated with higher allocations to the Heritage and Stabilisation Fund (HSF) and transfers to households. In Suriname, the deficit rose by 1.0 percentage point to 1.9% of GDP. B. Debt With the decline in the fiscal deficit, public debt-to-GDP contracted from 66.4% of GDP in 2022 to 63.2% of GDP in 2023. Public debt declined in both the goods and service producers, as most countries sought to put their debt on a downward path after the pandemic. The debt ratio narrowed by 3.9 percentage points to 63.0% of GDP in the service producers and by 1.2 percentage points to 63.7% of GDP in the goods producers. Among the service producers, the largest declines in the debt ratio of 10.6, 7.4 and 6.1 percentage points occurred in Jamaica, Anguilla and Antigua and Barbuda, respectively. The decline in the debt ratio in Jamaica resulted from firm growth in revenues and contained non-wage expenditure, which led to reduced borrowing. This brought public debt down to 73.9% of GDP in 2023, the lowest in more than two decades and below the pre-pandemic levels. Anguilla's debt contracted on account of a robust fiscal surplus of almost 11 % of GDP and no new borrowing in 2023, as the government sought to achieve a sustainable position. The fall in Antigua and Barbuda's debt ratio reflected an improved fiscal position and an almost 6% decline in Central Government's external debt stock. Meanwhile, among the goods producers, Suriname and Belize registered declines in Central Government debt of 12.9 and 0.4 percentage points. Suriname continues its fiscal adjustment programme to bring down p
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SECTION 1 2024 CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW AND 2025 OUTLOOK CDB ANNUAL REPORT 2024 19 20 CDB ANNUAL REPORT 2024 OVERVIEW Real regional GDP, excluding Guyana, expanded by 1.7% in 20241, a slowdown from 2.5% in 2024. Both service and commodity exporting economies grew, though four BMCs remained b...
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SECTION 1 2024 CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW AND 2025 OUTLOOK CDB ANNUAL REPORT 2024 19 20 CDB ANNUAL REPORT 2024 OVERVIEW Real regional GDP, excluding Guyana, expanded by 1.7% in 20241, a slowdown from 2.5% in 2024. Both service and commodity exporting economies grew, though four BMCs remained below their pre-pandemic real output levels. Tourism and construction were the key growth drivers. Including Guyana’s oil-driven growth, regional growth reached 8.8%, up from 6.6%. Disinflation trends were supported by declining global commodity prices, although price levels remained elevated compared with pre-pandemic norms. Fiscal outturns were generally positive, with most governments achieving primary surpluses. However, expenditures rose in many countries, reflecting increased outlays for personal emoluments and critical infrastructure. Regional central government debt-to-GDP declined to 50.9%, primarily driven by the increase in nominal economic growth. While several economies, such as Antigua and Barbuda, and Suriname, made significant strides in debt reduction, debt ratios exceeded 60% in nine BMCs, underscoring ongoing fiscal vulnerabilities. CDB projects regional growth (excluding Guyana) of 2.5% in 2025, underpinned by continued growth in key sectors such as tourism, construction, and commodities. Including Guyana, the forecast rises to 4.6%. Most governments are expected to maintain fiscal surpluses which, combined with economic expansion, should support further debt reduction. Nevertheless, significant downside risks persist including potential slowdowns in major source markets such as the United States of America (US), geopolitical tensions, adverse weather events, and rising protectionism which could weigh on exports, commodity prices, and economic growth. 1 The data presented in this section was accessed and analysed before February 21, 2025. More recent data may have become available since then. All estimates for 2024 are preliminary. All data reported refer to the year 2024, and comparisons are with respect to 2023, unless otherwise stated. CDB ANNUAL REPORT 2024 21 underpinned by the continued expansion of tourism, with stayover arrivals from January to September reaching 6.8 mn, 7.1% higher than 2023, and 6.6% above the corresponding period of 2019. Ten BMCs surpassed 2019 levels of stayover arrivals, with some setting record highs. The expansion in tourism activity benefitted related sectors such as wholesale and retail, and transportation. Construction activity contributed positively to economic growth, with public investments focusing on upgrading economic and social infrastructure, including transport and utilities, and large-scale private sector investments concentrating primarily on hotel construction and commercial properties. BMCs Output Performance The regional economy (excluding Guyana) continued to grow in 2024, although at a slower pace. Regional real GDP, excluding Guyana, grew by 1.7% in 2024, down from growth of 2.5% recorded in the previous year (see Chart 1). Both service and commodity-exporting economies contributed positively to this outturn, with four BMCs2 still lagging their pre-pandemic levels. Including Guyana’s strong performance, regional growth rose to 8.8%, up from 6.6% in 2023. The Region benefited from a steady global growth rate of 3.2%, largely driven by strong demand from the US, a key market for Caribbean exports. Natural hazards impacted several service-exporting BMCs in 2024. Hurricane Beryl caused agricultural disruptions in Barbados and Jamaica, cruise cancellations in the Cayman Islands, and significant infrastructure damage in Grenada and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Service-exporting economies grew by 1.6%, following growth of 2.8% in the previous year. Key contributors to that outcome include Belize (7.5%), Barbados (4.0%), the Cayman Islands (2.8%), and Trinidad and Tobago (1.9%). The growth was Chart 1: 2024 vs 2023 Real GDP Growth (Excluding Guyana) (%) Sources: Central Banks, Ministries of Finance, Statistical Offices, CDB Excluding Guyana, commodity-exporting economies have experienced a slower recovery to pre-pandemic levels. In 2024, the economy of Trinidad and Tobago expanded by 1.9%, up from 1.4%, fuelled by increased activity in non‑energy sectors and a rebound in the energy sector. Suriname’s economy grew by 2.0%, down from 2.5%, as a contraction in wholesale and retail weighed on overall growth. However, the expansion was supported by growth in manufacturing, agriculture, and other services including information and communication. Guyana remained a standout performer, growing by 43.5%, up from 33% in 2023. This was attributed to increased oil production, which reached a capacity of 660,000 barrels per day. The non-oil economy also demonstrated strong growth. Haiti continued to grapple with political instability, a security crisis, and high inflation, ultimately contributing to the country’s sixth consecutive contraction and a deepening humanitarian crisis. In the external sector, strong tourism receipts and increases in export values generally supported BMCs’ external positions. However, these gains were counterbalanced by a rise in merchandise imports, driven by economic expansion and hurricane-induced reconstruction efforts. Elevated 2 Haiti, St. Kitts and Nevis, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. 22 CDB ANNUAL REPORT 2024 imports of food, fuel, and raw materials, alongside increased purchases of equipment and machinery for construction, tourism infrastructure upgrades, and mining and manufacturing activities, contributed to this trend. Despite this, most BMCs sustained healthy reserve asset positions. women consistently exceed those of men, and youth unemployment remains higher than national averages. Similarly, labour force participation rates are higher among men, with gender gaps of as much as 26.2 percentage points in Belize. Prices Labour Market Labour market outcomes showed signs of improvement in 2024, through trends varied across countries. Labour force participation rates3 increased in several countries including Barbados (63.4%), Saint Lucia (69.8%), and the Cayman Islands (83.6%), while Belize (56.5%) and Trinidad and Tobago (54.8%), saw slight declines. Meanwhile, average unemployment rates fell in most BMCs, supported by growth in tourism, services, and construction, reaching 2.5% in Belize, 2.8% in the Cayman Islands, 7.2% in Barbados, 8.5% in Grenada, 8.7% in The Bahamas, and 11.3% in Saint Lucia—all below pre-pandemic levels. However, unemployment rose to 4.8% in Trinidad and Tobago. Moreover, in Jamaica, the unemployment rate stood at 4.2% based on updated methodology4. Notably, significant disparities persist in labour markets across the Region. Unemployment rates among Prices showed a disinflationary trend, aligning with lower global commodity prices influenced by improved supply chains and tighter global monetary policies5. The regional inflation rate dropped to 4.3%, from 8.0% the year prior, pulled down by reductions in the heavily weighted consumer price subindices for gas, electricity, other fuels, and food (see Chart 2). However, it remained above the preCOVID (2015-19) average of 1.5%. This improvement largely reflected a significant reduction in inflation in Suriname, aided by a stronger Surinamese dollar. However, Haiti had the highest inflation in the Region at 26.9%, exacerbated by instability which affected the supply of goods and services. At the same time, Antigua and Barbuda, the British Virgin Islands, and Montserrat experienced slight inflation increases. Chart 2: Regional Trends in Inflation Sources: Statistical Offices, CDB 3 Labour force participation rates and unemployment rates for 2024 represent the average of available data from January to the time of writing and are compared with the same period in 2023. 4 As a result of methodological improvements made to Jamaica’s CDB ANNUAL REPORT 2024 Labour Force Survey in 2024, labour force statistics from 2024 are not directly comparable with data from previous years. 5 After peaking at 8.6% in 2022, global inflation eased to 5.8% in 2024. 23 While food inflation eased, it remained well above the pre-COVID average, at 5.7%. When excluding Haiti and Suriname, the rate moderated to 3.6%, closely aligning with the global food inflation rate of 3.0%. In some BMC economies, localised factors like adverse weather events led to supply shortages, pushing up food prices in both the affected countries and those dependent on imports from them. Governments maintained measures in 2024 to protect consumers’ purchasing power, which had been significantly weakened by three years of high inflation. Such measures included reduced taxation on fuel, food and other essential items, as well as limits on markups for some basic goods. Fiscal and Debt Performance Most BMC Governments achieved a primary surplus (see Chart 3). Higher revenue collections and continued fiscal consolidation efforts, resulted in a regional primary surplus of 1.6% of GDP, excluding Guyana. When including Guyana, the regional primary surplus shrinks to 0.1% of GDP, reflecting the country’s large primary deficit. Total revenue grew in tandem with the economic expansion, keeping the tax revenue-to-GDP ratio consistent with historical averages at approximately 21.1%. Key contributors to this growth included increases in taxes on domestic goods and services, as well as taxes on international trade. Revenue-boosting measures, such as an increase in the sales tax rate in Antigua and Barbuda from 15% to 17% and the implementation of tax compliance and collection strategies in Grenada and The Bahamas, contributed to increased tax revenue. Non-tax revenue also rose, but at a slower pace. Antigua and Barbuda and Grenada recorded higher Citizenship-byInvestment (CBI) programme revenues but there was a substantial decline in CBI receipts in St. Kitts and Nevis. Concurrently, Anguilla continued to benefit from robust growth in domain name registration fees, while Guyana gained significantly from oil revenues and carbon credit sales. Revenue-boosting measures, such as an increase in the sales tax rate in Antigua and Barbuda from 15% to 17% and the implementation of tax compliance and collection strategies in Grenada and The Bahamas, contributed to increased tax revenue. Chart 3: 2024 vs 2023 Primary Balance to GDP (%) by Country Sources: Central Banks, Ministries of Finance, Statistical Offices, CDB 24 CDB ANNUAL REPORT 2024 Total expenditure grew but remained consistent with historical averages at 23.5%. All recurrent spending categories increased, particularly personal emoluments which grew by 11.3% due to public sector wage increases in 10 BMCs, spending on goods and services, and on higher interest payments. Capital expenditure growth reflected ongoing infrastructure development, including roads, bridges, utilities, schools, housing, energy projects, and expansions of air and seaports, as well as rehabilitation works following adverse weather events in Grenada, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and the Cayman Islands. In Guyana, capital expenditure surged by an extraordinary 53.2% to reach 12.6% of GDP, as the Government accelerated priority investments. Central government debt-to-GDP ratios declined in most BMCs, reducing the regional ratio to 50.9%, although debt ratios remain above 60% in 9 BMCs (see Chart 4). The decline in the regional debt ratio was primarily driven by nominal GDP growth which countered a 3.3% increase in overall debt levels. In the five overseas territories, debt ratios continued to fall, averaging just 6.6% of GDP. Guyana’s debt ratio dropped to 27.8%, supported by its oil‑driven economic expansion. In Suriname, a strengthened exchange rate, debt restructuring, and high nominal GDP growth significantly improved debt dynamics, lowering the debt ratio to 82.4% from 99%. In Jamaica, amortisation payments fell by 22.9%, reflecting the success of the Government’s liability management efforts in reducing debt levels. Notably, Guyana, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago incurred additional debt to finance fiscal deficits. In Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, borrowing for posthurricane reconstruction raised the country’s debt ratio to 93.8%. Chart 4: 2024 vs 2023 Central Government Debt to GDP (%) Across BMCs Sources: Central Banks, Ministries of Finance, Statistical Offices, CDB CDB ANNUAL REPORT 2024 25 2025 Outlook Excluding Guyana, CDB forecasts regional growth of 2.5% in 2025. Guyana is projected to grow by 11.9%. Including Guyana, the regional growth forecast climbs to 4.6%. Other commodity-exporting economies are expected to accelerate as their post-COVID recovery continues, supported by growth in both the commodity and non-commodity sectors. In contrast, service-exporting economies are expected to grow by 2.2% with tourism and related sectors, along with construction activity, remaining the main impetus of growth. Disinflationary trends are forecast to persist across BMCs, consistent with anticipated declines in global commodity prices. Most BMC governments will continue to target primary fiscal surpluses, supported by rising revenues in line with economic growth. However, these surpluses will be limited by higher expenditures as governments prioritise critical capital investments. Additionally, sustained primary surpluses, alongside economic expansion, are expected to contribute to a continued reduction in debt-to-GDP ratios. The outlook remains subject to downside risks and heightened global policy uncertainty. A slowdown in key source markets could dampen demand for the Region’s exports. Geopolitical tensions and the resurgence of protectionist trade policies present further risks to global trade and commodity prices, potentially suppressing growth. Additionally, the persistent threat of adverse weather events remains a significant concern. Considering these risks, it is imperative to pursue robust regional initiatives aimed at enhancing resilience. BMC governments will need to continue to upgrade infrastructure and institutions to drive competitiveness and diversify exports. Increased focus on climate change adaptation will also be necessary to reduce the impact of climate-related hazards. Strengthening internal and external buffers will play a critical role in mitigating vulnerabilities and ensuring sustainable growth. 26 CDB ANNUAL REPORT 2024
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Community Outreach Us - Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago # Strengthening Communities Through Collaboration Discover how the Central Bank collaborates with diverse organizations to promote financial literacy and strengthen communities. #### Our Commitment to Community Outreach The National Fin...
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Community Outreach Us - Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago # Strengthening Communities Through Collaboration Discover how the Central Bank collaborates with diverse organizations to promote financial literacy and strengthen communities. #### Our Commitment to Community Outreach The National Financial Literacy Programme is dedicated to actively working to empower communities. We partner with various ministries, community groups, associations, agencies and organizations to foster financial awareness and empower individuals across Trinidad and Tobago. The NFLP delivers free financial literacy group sessions which cover a wide range of topics and partners with agencies at career fairs and expositions. The following are a few of the agencies with which the department has previously engaged: - Amalgamated Workers Union - Association of Caribbean States - Blue Waters Products Limited - Cipriani College of Labour and Cooperative Studies - Civilian Conservation Corps of Trinidad and Tobago - COLFIRE Trinidad and Tobago - Cooperative Credit Union League of Trinidad and Tobago - Families in Action - First Belmont Assembly - Geriatric Adolescent Partnership Programme - Heliconia Foundation - Ministry of Community Development, Culture and the Arts - Ministry of Education - Ministry of National Security - Ministry of Public Administration and Communication - Ministry of Social Development & Family Services - Ministry of Sport and Youth Affairs - Ministry of the Attorney General and Legal Affairs - Moms For Literacy - NALIS - Oilfield Workers Trade Union - Port of Spain North/St Ann’s West Women’s League - The Heroes Foundation - Trinidad and Tobago Association for Retired Persons - Trinidad and Tobago Blind Welfare Association - Trinidad and Tobago Defense Force - Trinidad and Tobago Fire Service - Trinidad and Tobago Police Service - Trinidad & Tobago Association For The Hearing Impaired - University of Trinidad and Tobago - Women’s Federation for World Peace - Youth Training and Employment Partnership Programme Address P.O. Box 1250 Eric Williams Plaza Independence Square Port of Spain Email: info@central-bank.org.tt Phone: (868) 621-CBTT(2288) (868) 235-CBTT(2288) Opening Hours: Monday to Friday: 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. Email: museum@central-bank.org.tt Phone: (868) 491-7186 (868) 773-6763 (868) 225 – CBTT(2288) Central Bank Auditorium Email: auditorium@central-bank.org.tt Phone: (868) 621- CBTT(2288) Email: museum@central-bank.org.tt Phone: (868) 785 – 0492 (868) 225 – CBTT(2288) Email: auditorium@central-bank.org.tt Phone: (868) 621- CBTT(2288)
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Public Education - Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago --> Slide right to see more National Financial Literacy Programme Currency Education Public Education Resources Public Education Note Series Public Education The Bank remains committed to deepening its role in financial education. To achieve thi...
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Public Education - Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago --> Slide right to see more National Financial Literacy Programme Currency Education Public Education Resources Public Education Note Series Public Education The Bank remains committed to deepening its role in financial education. To achieve this, the Bank engages in a number of outreach activities annually, inclusive of Global Money Week, the Know Your Money campaign and provision of public education resources on a range of topics designed to promote financial literacy, cybersecurity awareness and currency education to the public. The National Financial Literacy Programme A key mandate under the Bank’s public education agenda is to produce better informed, educated and more financially aware citizens with the skills and knowledge needed to make sensible decisions about their money through the National Financial Literacy Programme (NFLP). This objective is achieved through various methods ranging from virtual and in-person group presentations to the production and promotion of public education material in the form of articles, games and online content. The group presentations are flexible and address societal needs and concerns of a financial nature. Sessions and educational material address a variety of financial concepts and topics. These include but are not limited to: The Right Financial Attitude Financial Goal Setting Budgeting & Saving Debt Management Retirement Planning Investing Entrepreneurship Risk Management & Insurance Home Ownership Click on the button below to learn more about these initiatives or to request a session. Learn More Currency Education The Bank’s annual Know Your Money campaign takes an innovative and impactful approach to currency education. Launched in 2016 as a collaboration between the Bank and its banknote printers De La Rue to educate the public about banknote security features, the initiative has continually evolved to meet changing communication needs and demographics. The campaign’s integrated approach combines traditional and digital media, including in-person 90 minute seminars, social media advertisements, influencer collaborations, television interviews, newspaper advertisements, outdoor billboards, and radio advertisements. The multipronged strategy ensures comprehensive reach across diverse audience segments, including the visually impaired, deaf communities, taxi operators, and local businesses. Learn More Public Education Resources The Central Bank's Educational Resources is a series of written and visual summaries of Central Banking roles and functions, terms and concepts in an easy-to-follow format. Learn with CeeBee, our Mascot, who will guide you through each video designed with our local context in mind. Printable transcripts of each video are available for download. What is Money? Money has always been a pertinent topic – how we earn it, use it…even the various forms it takes! Interestingly though not many are familiar with the origins of money or can easily define what money is. In this edition of the Bank’s Public Education Series we explain the concept and evolution of money. Learn More Roles & Functions of The Central Bank The Bank shall have as its purpose the promotion of such monetary, credit and exchange policies as would foster monetary and financial stability and public confidence and be favourable to the economy of Trinidad and Tobago. Learn More Inflation Inflation measures the increase in the general price level. The Bank, being responsible for the maintenance of price stability, closely monitors the inflation rate in its policy decision making. Learn More STOP the Scammers! – Fraud Campaign Fraud poses a serious threat to our financial system. In most cases, people are being misled to believe that they will benefit from receiving a large quantity of cash after taking certain steps. Before you act, the Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago urges all citizens to STOP! Learn More Cyber Safe Series Through our Cyber Safe Series Central Bank urges all citizens to be vigilant against cybercrimes such as phishing, identity theft, internet fraud and banking fraud. Follow the tips to learn how to protect yourself and your loved ones. Learn More Tariffs and International Trade Tariffs are customs taxes on imported goods, guided by international agreements and varying by product origin. They protect domestic industries, support agricultural sectors, ensure food security, generate revenue, and counter unfair pricing practices like dumping. Learn More Public Education Note Series Note Series Note Series This note series explains important economic concepts and monetary policy actions to a broad public audience in non-technical terms: Trinidad and Tobago's Relationship with the World Bank (02/2025 May 2025) Tariffs and International Trade (01/2025 May 2025) Why UPI will be a game changer in Trinidad and Tobago ( 06/2024 November 2024) How is Climate Change Affecting Trinidad and Tobago’s Economy? (05/2024 November 2024) Why is Trinidad and Tobago a member of the IMF? (04/2024 October 2024) How Important is the Increase in Deposit Insurance Coverage from $125,000 to $200,000 to Me? (03/2024 August 2024) Transition from direct to indirect monetary policy instruments (02/2024 August 2024) Net Errors and Omissions in The Balance of Payments of Trinidad and Tobago (01/2024 August 2024) Presentations Presentations Introduction of the New Polymer $5, $10 and $20 notes Know your Money 2017 – Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago Know Your Money 2017 – De La Rue Currency Videos keyboard_arrow_up Menu Facebook Twitter LinkedIn WhatsApp Gmail Print Explore the full Strategic Plan 2026/27-2030/31: Insight to Impact Explore Full Plan
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Financial Education in the Caribbean | NFEC Skip to content National Financial Educators Council 2026-09-15T05:38:00+00:00 National Financial Educators Council – Caribbean Empowering Financial Education Champions. Elevating Financial Readiness Outcomes Across the Caribbean Region. The National Finan...
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Financial Education in the Caribbean | NFEC Skip to content National Financial Educators Council 2026-09-15T05:38:00+00:00 National Financial Educators Council – Caribbean Empowering Financial Education Champions. Elevating Financial Readiness Outcomes Across the Caribbean Region. The National Financial Educators Council Caribbean supports financial educators with tools, data-driven training, and professional acknowledgement aimed at producing measurable improvements in people’s financial lives. As a Certified B Corporation and Accredited Provider through IACET, the NFEC Caribbean’s programs are independent, solid, and constructed to achieve measurable results. Join us to help promote economic empowerment through top-grade financial education across the Caribbean. By supporting the training and qualification of financial educators and implementing evidence-based instruction, we help communities build the skills, knowledge, and confidence their residents need to make informed financial decisions. Inspire Financial Change Get Certified to Teach Personal Finance Learn More Enhance Program Excellence Elevate Program Standards & Quality Learn More Champion Financial Education Advocate for Advancing Financial Education Learn More Lead Locally. Impact Nationally Join Advisory Board Leadership & National Movement Learn More Building a Movement for Financial Empowerment across the Caribbean Region We mobilize champions of financial health across the Caribbean who bring practical learning and proven support to communities around the world. Our mission is to inspire a world where people are capable to make qualified financial decisions and take confident, effective action – meeting their basic needs, taking advantage of opportunities, and making families and communities more resilient. Join a worldwide network of well-prepared practitioners and partners who are making progress toward economic empowerment through actionable financial education. Learn more about our resources, request a demo, or connect with us to learn how we can increase impact in your community. Accreditation, Governance, Impact, & Standards The NFEC is trusted for rigor, independence, and measurable impact. NFEC combines complete independence with recognized accreditation, verified social impact, and industry-leading standards so partners, educators, and learners can rely on our work. Below are the four pillars that make our programs rigorous, transparent, and mission-driven. Accreditation As an IACET Accredited Provider, the NFEC offers IACET CEUs for its learning events that comply with the ANSI/IACET Continuing Education and Training Standard. Social Impact As a Certified B Corporation, the NFEC meets the highest standards for socially responsible commerce, using the power of business to build more sustainable economies. Standards The NFEC set industry standards for the financial education and financial coaching industry These standards are used to review and recognize programs that align with these standards. Independent We are proudly 100% independent – no national sponsors, no financial products, and no government affiliations – ensuring that our materials are purely educational and free from external influence. How We Support Financial Educators and Communities Across the Caribbean Leading Training & Credentials for Financial Educators The NFEC has trained and certified more than 5,000 graduates who completed our Certified Financial Education Instructor (CFEI) course. Our CFEI-certified educators have successfully completed over 300,000 hours of professional development. Their efforts have reached over 1.4 million people in more than 71 countries and in every U.S. state. At the heart of our movement lie the industry standards we developed for well-qualified financial educators. The Framework for Teaching Personal Finance (adapted in partnership with the Danielson Group and based on InTASC principles) defines the knowledge, aptitudes, and recognizable practices that distinguish financial educators of the highest caliber. The CFEI credential indicates that an instructor meets those standards – leading every program with the utmost rigor, ethical practice, and instructional excellence. Learn More Educator Credentials Launch-to-Impact Program Support The NFEC provides start-to-finish support so program leaders and teachers can focus on results. Whether you’re creating an initiative from scratch or building on an existing program, we help design and staff scalable, high-quality financial education campaigns that achieve measurable impact. We approach all program development with a simple goal: improve effectiveness while reducing the time, cost, and personnel required to get results. The financial education movement operates at the grassroots level, and we strive to offer equitable access so organizations of any size can provide meaningful programs. Through turnkey materials, training, funding guidance, and local collaboration, we help communities deliver practical financial education programming that develops confidence, capability, and resilience across the long term. Review Support Options Program Support Community Mobilization – Local Chapter Leadership Our regional chapters propel targeted awareness-raising, local support, and financial wellness initiatives capable to scale – transforming instructor training into action. From life-altering skills to partnerships with community leaders, NFEC chapters have provided support to local organizations and celebrated their effectiveness with award ceremonies to recognize outstanding students, educators, and community champions. Each chapter is led by a regional Advisory Board whose efforts emphasize three priorities: Empowerment – giving individuals and families skills and confidence to make informed financial decisions; Advocacy – spearheading multi-level initiatives to secure funding and support policy change; and Relationships – developing partnerships with educational institutions, employers, media, and legislators to drive policy adoption and create sustainability. In combination, these pillars convert classroom learning into lasting, quantifiable community change. View Your Local Chapter Community Leadership National Advocacy with Community Impact The NFEC is intensifying action to make sure that young people graduate from high school with the financial skills they need to become self-sufficient. We’ve moved to a multi-faceted, results-driven advocacy strategy – enhancing standards, shaping public opinion, progressing policy, and driving systems reform to eradicate financial illiteracy. By building relationships, adopting rigorous standards, and targeting policy change, we’re driving a movement that makes financial wellness a national priority across the health, economic, and educational sectors. We have mobilized individuals and organizations with a passion for promoting financial education by inviting them to join our United for Financial Literacy Advocacy Committee. Each quarter we target a specific campaign on which to focus efforts to advance financial wellness. Learn More National Advocacy References Bahamas Barbados Belize Jamaica Trinidad and Tobago Page load link HTML Snippets Powered By : XYZScripts.com Go to Top
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State of the MSME Sector in CARICOM – Prospects for the Future | Caribbean Development Bank Skip to main content State of the MSME Sector in CARICOM – Prospects for the Future Downloads Download PDF Summary I. INTRODUCTION I want to begin my remarks this morning by thanking Senator Lynette Holder, C...
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State of the MSME Sector in CARICOM – Prospects for the Future | Caribbean Development Bank Skip to main content State of the MSME Sector in CARICOM – Prospects for the Future Downloads Download PDF Summary I. INTRODUCTION I want to begin my remarks this morning by thanking Senator Lynette Holder, CEO of the Barbados Small Business Association for inviting me to deliver the keynote address at this year’s State of the Sector Conference. I also want to congratulate the SBA for its continuing advocacy of micro, small and medium-sized businesses across Barbados, and for organising this important event. I encourage you to remain steadfast in your mission“to provide effective representation and exemplary development services to and on behalf of micro, small and medium enterprises, nationally” and to continue to play a leadership role in elevating MSME issues on the local policy agenda. This Conference is a perfect opportunity for all stakeholders here today to exchange ideas and widen their collective understanding of effective ways to catalyse MSME development in Barbados. By providing a platform for dialogue and exchange of information, fora like this one can deepen the partnership between the Government, the Small Business Association and MSMEs. I feel especially privileged to have been asked to address this Forum on the topic “ State of the MSME Sector in CARICOM – Prospects for the Future. ” This discussion is timely. In 2015, all CARICOM countries became signatories to the United Nations 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. MSMEs are regarded as an important vehicle for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Through their significant job creation impact, MSMEs can play a pivotal role in reducing poverty and income inequality, especially amongst women and youth. The Caribbean Development Bank shares the SBA’s ambition to nurture and unleash the transformation potential of MSMEs and to create a strong, enabling business ecosystem. Importantly, we, at the CDB, are in the midst of preparing our strategic plan for the period 2020-2024; and the MSME sector is emerging as a critical area for strategic and focused attention in our Region’s ongoing efforts to achieve sustainable and inclusive economic growth, and eliminate abject poverty, and inequality. Based on our almost 50 years of experience working in 19 borrowing member countries, including Barbados, we have come to realise that MSMEs across this Region share similar history, experiences, challenges and prospects. Our intention, therefore, is to continue to craft programmes of support that are available and accessible to all of these countries. I must also admit to my own personal and longstanding interest in MSMEs’ potential for contributing to economic growth and development, having myself grown up in a family whose livelihood was sustained by small business. My colleagues at CDB can confirm that I consistently pore through the clippings of local, regional and international newspapers, and other publications in search of new information on MSMEs. The main objective is to broaden my own understanding of what strategies can galvanise the growth of the MSME sector in our neck of the woods, so to speak! Even as I thank you for offering me this platform, I also seek your forgiveness for taking the liberty of expanding the scope of my mandate to speak, this morning, on the state of MSMEs and their prospects, largely from a regional perspective. Interestingly, as I prepared for this event, I was reminded of the relative paucity of in-depth studies of the MSME sector in our part of the world, and hence the need for CDB to commission the study entitled “ Micro Small Medium Enterprise Development in the Caribbean: Towards a New Frontier .” That 2016 study examined MSMEs in 12 Caribbean countries. I assure you, ladies and gentlemen, that there is considerable commonality in the structure, experience, and challenges facing MSMEs across our Region. So too are the lessons which inform the appropriate policy responses for this group. This morning I propose to draw four general conclusions. II. MSMEs ARE ESSENTIAL FOR CARIBBEAN LONG-TERM GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT First, let me underscore the importance of MSMEs. They are the backbone of the private sector and are key drivers of economic growth, and social inclusion in Barbados. Their importance for this island’s long-term growth and development is undeniable. According to a survey commissioned by the Small Business Association in 2016, MSMEs in Barbados accounted for approximately 92% of formal enterprises and over 60% of private sector employment. The bulk of these jobs was in small service companies, which were responsible for 34% of private sector employment. MSMEs also accounted for 39% of total exports. In addition, 34% of enterprises had women as the largest owner, while 6% had equal male and female ownership. Based on findings published in CARICOM’s 2016 Regional MSME policy and reconfirmed in the CDB-financed study, the situation in Barbados is very typical of the rest of the Region. On average, MSMEs contribute 50% of GDP and create 45% of the jobs in our Region. But their full potential remains unrealised. MSMEs can do so much better. What is the basis for my conclusion? If MSMEs account for such a significant proportion of enterprises, and provide the bulk of employment, should we not also expect them to make a bigger contribution to Barbados’ exports? Certainly if our MSMEs are operating efficiently, then it would be reasonable to assume that they are competitive and have the potential to export. Therefore, we have to figure out how to unravel those issues that are preventing them from operating more efficiently, more productively and more competitively. If we understand the constraints, we can design workable solutions to unleash this potential and create a business environment in which MSMEs can grow and flourish in a well-functioning market economy. Because of the size of its contribution to GDP, the performance of the MSME sector is generally a good barometer of the state of the wider economy. Further, because these countries are small and open, there is a strong nexus between our ability to trade and economic growth performance. Therefore, we must first come to grips with the issues affecting MSMEs, before our Region can expect to overcome the challenges of low growth, weak trade and investment, and persistently high poverty and inequality. The issues, which are constraining MSMEs from realising their full potential are generally well known. A weak enabling environment; high energy and other production costs; limited and poor product/service quality and standards; and limited access to both loan and equity finance are the principal limiting factors. III. GETTING THE ENABLING ENVIRONMENT RIGHT This brings me to my second general conclusion this morning. If we accept these limiting factors, then those of us charged with policy-making must be resolute in our advocacy for giving high priority to creating a business-friendly environment within which MSMEs can develop. The World Bank’s Doing Business surveys benchmark all countries which participate in the yearly exercise against the regulations that affect business performance. In the most recent survey of 190 countries Barbados ranked 129 and the average for the Caribbean was 126, suggesting that, relative to other countries, much work remains to be done to create an environment which is “good for business.” In many Caribbean countries, there is ample evidence of inadequate legislative and regulatory frameworks; weak public sector institutions for providing legal protection; and inefficient business support and training services. In some Caribbean countries, for example, property registration continues to be time consuming and expensive because property rights are not adequately defined or protected. Bankruptcy laws are often excessively punitive; and severe penalties can confound the willingness to invest in new business ventures. Also, better enforcement of copyright, patents and trademarks is required to provide appropriate protection for businesses and to avoid litigation and copyright infringement. Then, our Region suffers from prolonged delays in implementing agreements reached under the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. Several issues require urgent attention. For example, market access has not improved despite the removal of over 450 legal and administrative barriers to the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour in most CARICOM countries. The establishment of a single jurisdiction to allow for the equal treatment of business entities across CARICOM is outstanding. And a CARICOM business must still register in every jurisdiction in which it wishes to operate! And alien landholding licensing requirements are still in place. Then, most of the 12 participating CSME countries have failed to enact the requisite legislation that would allow the free movement, of even the ten categories of persons that now have the right to seek employment in other CARICOM member states without the need for a work permit. These are restrictions which add to the cost and slow pace of doing business, and hamper the extent to which CARICOM businesses can penetrate regional markets. In the past 15 months, there has been a renewed focus on the CSME. I remain optimistic that accelerated interest in honouring Treaty obligations will follow shortly. Our Governments must remain committed to improving the business environment and scale up their efforts to create a policy and institutional framework that responds appropriately to the characteristics and special needs of MSMEs. Are the tax regimes and regulatory requirements making compliance costs too burdensome? Or are they incentivising SMEs to remain in the informal sector? Priority must be given to cutting red tape; increasing the transparency and the cost-efficiency of regulations; collecting data on a systematic basis; and adopting stronger evidence-based policies. During the Budget presentation earlier this year, Prime Minister Mottley gave notice of her Government’s intention to utilise technology to enhance the quality and speed of delivering services via online platforms for clearing imports, submitting planning and development applications, renewing driver’s licenses; obtaining Police Certificates of Character; and paying of taxes. These measures are encouraging enhancements of the business eco-system. IV. ACCESS TO FINANCE My third comment this morning directs attention to the difficulty that MSMEs face in accessing appropriate financing. Because they drive economic growth and job creation, MSMEs can be one of our most potent weapons in the fight against unemployment, poverty and social exclusion. But to play this role effectively, the conditions must be also be “ripe” for them to grow and flourish. We have to give highest priority to creating an eco-system in which MSMEs become more willing to embrace uncertainty and to take risks. Key to creating this environment is access to finance and financial services. Limited access to credit; the paucity of venture capital; and the generally underdeveloped nature of our Region’s capital markets are troublesome constraints facing MSMEs in Barbados and the rest of the Caribbean. The issue is not simply that funds are unavailable. In fact, even in situations where the financial system is reporting high levels of liquidity, MSMEs struggle to access resources from the banking system at acceptable interest rates. Diagnostic studies conducted by the Inter-American Development Bank reveal that only 3-5% of Caribbean micro-entrepreneurs have access to financing. Indeed, financial institutions are generally reluctant to lend to MSMEs, because they lack adequate collateral; they operate in unfavourable business environments; or they have limited access to affordable accounting, legal, auditing and other services. According to the study also, MSMEs prefer informal modes of credit, which are relatively easy and cheap to secure. As a result, the uptake of micro-credit has lagged behind expectations. This suggests that the mainstream financial system, working collaboratively with Government and the business community, may need to consider redesigning their products and offering special mechanisms for enhanced MSME access. These mechanisms could include: (a) credit bureaux to facilitate the lending institution’s assessment of credit worthiness; (b) collateral registries to restrict the possibility of fraudulent re-use of collateral; (c) guarantee schemes , to reduce the risk spread in the pricing of MSME loans by sharing the risk with retail lenders; and (d) additional financing channels , such as equity funds, angel investor networks and junior stock exchanges. Let me make special mention of junior stock exchanges as a financing modality to promote the use of equity financing by MSMEs. Junior markets can be found in Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Jamaica, with the incentive of a ten-year tax holiday for listing, has the most active exchange. Important lessons can be learned from the experiences of these three junior markets. One lesson for those countries without junior exchanges is that the legal reforms which encourage MSMEs to raise equity financing by listing their companies on local junior markets must be implemented to facilitate growth and expansion of small businesses. I strongly recommend that MSMEs formalise their businesses by keeping proper accounting records and adopting sound business practices. The greatest inhibitor to accessing finance, global competitiveness, or even growth is the failure to adopt good business practices. MSMEs should also register to be members of business support organisations. Across Europe, this is mandatory when registering a business. These organisations, similar to the SBA, lobby on behalf of their members, bring sector issues to the table, and represent their interests in policy discussions. BSOs are also key in capacity building, PPP engagements and making links in new markets. V. BUSINESS CULTURE/MINDSET My fourth point is with respect to changing the business culture and mindset. “The Biggest mistake that a small business can make is to think like a small business.” I am not sure to whom I should give credit for this quote, but it describes succinctly the mindset needed for successful MSMEs and should be included, alongside effective business planning, good financial management, continuous marketing, and excellent customer service. MSMEs are simply the incubators for most large businesses. So you must be able to visualise the company having the DNA of an elephant, as the distinguished Barbadian management consultant and newspaper columnist, Dr. Basil Springer would characterise it. Such a company would be capable of operating outside the narrow geographical confines of Barbados. With increased trade we can expect more jobs, higher economic growth and increased prosperity. “Thinking big” will open up new opportunities for MSMEs to compete on the international market by becoming part of a regional value chain. The theme for this Conference, “Small Size, Big Thinking – Changing the Mindset for Global Engagement” says it well! The attractiveness of this strategy is substantiated by the achievements of several large, medium and small Caribbean enterprises, which have grown their businesses by moving cross-border to other regional and international markets. Companies like these become large by embracing behaviours and practices that engender superior levels of production efficiency and cost effectiveness. The regional market alone gives MSMEs immediate access to just over 18 million consumers under the CSME arrangement. Firms which are incapable of competing in the local and/or regional markets and do not employ good international business practices will not graduate to the world stage. With duty and quota free access for most of our goods and services under the CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership Agreement, the European Union still offers a relatively protected market for regional MSMEs to hone their competitiveness skills prior to venturing onto the wider unprotected world market. VI. CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT BANK I have said quite a bit, this morning, about what needs to be done in the eco-system to support MSMEs in our Region. It would be remiss of me to discuss the development role and impact of MSMEs without mentioning my own institution. So before I close, let me quickly recap CDB’s own contribution to supporting MSME development. Our strategic posture is informed by three general principles: (a) CDB’s operations should increase the flow of capital into BMCs for the benefit of MSMEs; (b) We should use our interventions to enhance financial intermediation and develop regional and sub-regional capital markets; and (c) CDB should cooperate and build alliances with other financial institutions, including multilateral institutions, to increase the overall impact of assistance to MSMEs. Within this operating framework, since 2015, we have committed US$30 million and disbursed US$20 million to over 900 firms for private sector development. Going forward, our focus is on ramping up our engagement with the Barbadian and Caribbean-wide private sector whilst maintaining the high credit quality of CDB’s banking function. There is scope and need for CDB to continue to intermediate funding to MSMEs through public and privately-owned financial institutions. However, careful attention will have to be paid to the pricing of our funding through the privately-owned institutions, in particular, to ensure that their on-lending rates are competitive. We are determined to increase our involvement with MSMEs and to play an even bigger role in unleashing their potential. In this regard, we have embarked on some innovative approaches to attract additional financial flows for our MSME programme. In 2018, for example, we launched the multi-donor Cultural and Creative Industries Innovation Fund (CIIF) with start-up capital of U$2.6 million. There is no shortage of demand for CIIF which provides grants and technical assistance to MSMEs in order to encourage innovation and job creation in the creative industries. Our most recent proposal is to mobilise additional financing which can be used to derisk lending to MSMEs by providing partial credit guarantees to financial institutions. Additional technical assistance will be offered to assist MSMEs in bolstering their creditworthiness by developing suitable marketing and business plans and ensuring that proper accounting systems are in place. This initiative is to be executed through the Caribbean Consultancy Technological Services, our main mechanism for delivering professional services to MSMEs. It is a small programme of direct technical assistance, workshops, and training attachments; but it delivers big results with huge impact! VII. CONCLUSION In closing, I wish to point out that the current business environment, while still being difficult because of weak global growth, has presented us with a window of opportunity in the form of increased funding for MSMEs. CDB remains committed to supporting the development of MSMEs in Barbados and the rest of our Region. We are giving high priority to financing and promoting initiatives that enhance their competitiveness. And we are relying on institutions like the Small Business Association to help us design programmes that are better targeted for MSMEs to drive economic growth and employment creation in Barbados and the wider Caribbean. Thank you Related NEWS & EVENTS News Feb 11, 2020 CDB disbursements rose in 2019 News Dec 27, 2018 225 Caribbean Technology Entrepreneurs Selected for CDB funded Programme Events Mar 31, 2026 Caribbean Evaluation Space 2026 Conference
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CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR EMPLOYMENT AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE CARIBBEAN REGION Strengthening Caribbean Economic Growth (SCEG) August 2025 Authored by Sasha Muench and Deborah Gordon ## Contents 1. Introduction ... 3 2. Methodology and Limitations of Findings ... 4 2.1 Market C...
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CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR EMPLOYMENT AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE CARIBBEAN REGION Strengthening Caribbean Economic Growth (SCEG) August 2025 Authored by Sasha Muench and Deborah Gordon ## Contents 1. Introduction ... 3 2. Methodology and Limitations of Findings ... 4 2.1 Market Constraints Research ... 4 2.2 Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices (KAP) Survey ... 4 3. Key Findings ... 6 3.1 Small Island Economies ... 6 3.2 Tourism ... 8 3.3 Labor Force Participation ... 10 3.4 Education and Workforce Skills Gap ... 11 3.5 Enterprise Challenges ... 14 3.6 Limited Access to Finance ... 16 3.7 Lack of Mobile Internet Utilization ... 19 3.8 Weak Business Resilience Capacities ... 21 3.9 Limited Business Development Services (BDS) ... 22 4. Potential for Change ... 24 5. Conclusion ... 25 Annexes ... 27 Annex A: Emigration Data for 11 of the 12 Jurisdictions ... 27 Annex B: Obstacles to Business Innovation – Perception of Enterprises in the Caribbean ... 28 Annex C: Detailed Information on Caribbean Credit Unions ... 29 Annex D: Other Relevant Programs ... 30 Annex E: KAP Survey Participant Demographics ... 33 Annex F: KAP Correlation Analysis ... 35 Annex G: KAP Survey Questions ... 36 References ... 38 ## 1. Introduction Figure 1: Map of the Caribbean The U.S. Department of State-funded program, Strengthening Caribbean Economic Growth (SCEG), aims to build the economic strength and job skill sets of individuals aged 16 and older so they may better pursue employment, entrepreneurship, and economic well-being. To achieve this goal, the SCEG program will launch a small grant challenge to identify and implement solutions that measurably improve job skills training, employment opportunities, and livelihood outcomes within 12 jurisdictions in the Caribbean: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, the Bahamas, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Five Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. Establishing a small-grant challenge grounded in evidence based research is vital to providing tangible and effective solutions. To achieve this, the SCEG program conducted two complementary assessments to identify the constraints and opportunities facing individuals seeking employment and micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) interested in growing and hiring more workers: a survey of macro-level market constraints and an assessment of individuals’ knowledge, attitudes, and practices (KAP). | Country | Population | GDP (in billions) | GDP per economies, with populations capita ranging from 47,000 in Saint | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Antigua & Barbuda | 93,772 | 2.2 | $ 23,726 Kitts and Nevis to 11.3 million | | Bahamas | 401,283 | 15 | $ 39,455 in the Dominican Republic, all | | Barbados | 282,467 | 7.2 | $ 25,366 of which are either stable or | | Dominica | 66,205 | 0.7 | declining. Annual Gross $ 10,405 | | Dominican Republic | 11,427,557 | 124 | Domestic Products (GDPs) $ 10,876 | | Grenada | 117,207 | 1.4 | range from US$700 million in $ 11,872 | | Jamaica | 2,839,175 | 20 | Dominica to US$124 billion in $ 7,020 | | St Kitts & Nevis | 46,843 | 1.1 | the Dominican Republic, with a $ 22,771 | | St. Lucia | 179,744 | 2.6 | median GDP of US$3.65 billion $ 14,182 and median GDP per capita of | | St. Vincent & the 5 Grenadines | 100,616 | 1.2 | $ 11,501 US$12,027 (compared to a | | Suriname | 634,431 | 4.7 | GDP per capita of US$85,810 $ 7,431 | | Trinidad and Tobago | 1,368,333 | 26 | in the United States, according $ 19,315 | Table 1: Jurisdictions’ Populations and GDPs as of 2024 The 12 jurisdictions offer varied to the World Bank). Tourism is the dominant economic sector in some jurisdictions (e.g., Antigua and Barbuda) but a minor one in MERCY CORPS Constraints and Opportunities for Employment and Entrepreneurship in the Caribbean Region 4 others (e.g. Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago). Some jurisdictions are heavily oriented toward supply chains and economic linkages with the United States (e.g. Jamaica and Barbados) while others are more connected to Latin America (e.g. Dominican Republic). Given the economic diversity across the region, the research summarized in this report focused on cross-cutting constraints that are common across the region and can potentially be addressed with small-scale interventions and/or investments. The report briefly explains the methodology used and then outlines the key findings as well as the potential opportunities for change. ## 2. Methodology and Limitations of ## Findings ### 2.1 Market Constraints Research The research on market constraints utilized a literature review of relevant reports, as well as an analysis of data sets from the International Labor Organization (ILO), the World Bank, and the Inter American Development Bank (IDB). An independent consultant hired by Mercy Corps conducted the research. It is important to note there are significant information gaps in the region. For some jurisdictions, especially the smaller ones, there is little recent localized data, and they are generally not included in the data sets mentioned above (or the data included is from 2016 or earlier). In addition, the multilateral agencies include different countries in their definitions of the Caribbean region, so regional summaries are not fully comparable. For example, some reports include Belize, Haiti, and/or Guyana and omit the Dominican Republic or Suriname. Summary information that includes the entire Latin American and Caribbean region (LAC) was omitted from this report as the Caribbean is a relatively small portion of that region and notably different from other Latin American countries. Where feasible, the raw data was explored and results extrapolated for the 12 jurisdictions included in the SCEG Program. Additionally, some papers included in this literature review narrowed their focus to a few of the larger jurisdictions, usually the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. As a result, conclusions on specific jurisdictions based on findings presented in the SCEG report should not be formed at this stage without additional micro and site-specific research. However, the main themes and findings are applicable to the region, and broad conclusions can be drawn about overlapping constraints, as well as promising sectors and opportunities. ### 2.2 Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices (KAP) Survey The KAP survey was conducted to supplement the analysis of macro-level constraints with additional context and depth at the individual level regarding knowledge, attitudes, and practices related to economic empowerment. The KAP survey was designed by the SCEG Program Manager and the Measurement, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) Manager, with input from Mercy Corps’ Program Quality Advisor and Economic Development teams. The team researched aspects of economic development and designed questions to assess: • Financial Literacy • Economic Empowerment • Access to Resources • Income Generation • Workforce Participation • Entrepreneurship/Business Knowledge Mercy Corps utilized the OnaData platform to build the survey and collect data. To launch the KAP survey, Mercy Corps leveraged three modes of outreach to survey participants: 1) Mercy Corps’ Caribbean Resilience Initiative Facebook page; 2) Existing community-based organization (CBO) networks; and 3) CBOs identified in each jurisdiction during a stakeholder mapping exercise that occurred in December 2024. The survey was launched on June 29, 2025, and remained open for responses until July 14, 2025. Participants were also made aware that the survey would be anonymous. (See Annex E and G for participant demographic details and survey questions, respectively.) The KAP findings summarized in this report indicate a variety of trends across demographic factors and economic determinants. Mercy Corps set a target sample size of 385 respondents; 191 individuals completed the survey, which is not a large enough sample to be statistically representative of the Caribbean population. Therefore, findings are not statistically generalizable across the entire region. Furthermore, the demographic makeup of the KAP participants differs from the Caribbean in several aspects. For example: • 81% (157) of participants identified as female, compared to 51% in the Caribbean at large. 1 • 82% (159) of participants were over the age of 35, while only 42% of the overall region’s total population is over 35. 2 • Most of the participants were educated, with 86% (164) having a secondary education or above, compared to 54% of individuals in the Caribbean. 3 • Of the 12 jurisdictions where Mercy Corps solicited participation in the survey, the Dominican Republic and Jamaica have the largest populations, and therefore it was expected that roughly 73% of the sample would come from those two jurisdictions. However, these two countries only comprised 6% of the survey sample, while Trinidad and Tobago, St. Lucia and Dominica comprised 56% of the respondents, despite comprising only 8.5% of the region’s total population. For these reasons, while the KAP findings can identify high-level trends, the results must be interpreted within the context of existing data and its limitations. 1 Regional figure taken from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.MA.ZS?locations=S3 2 Regional stats taken from https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/. 3 Beuermann, D. W., et. al. eds., Are we there yet? The path toward sustainable private sector development in the Caribbean, IDB, 2024, pg. 58. ## 3. Key Findings ### 3.1 Small Island Economies All 12 jurisdictions in the SCEG program fall into the grouping of Small Island Developing States (SIDS), sharing the common characteristics that they depend on imports for key food, fuel, and manufactured goods, and thus are vulnerable to global price fluctuations, and tariffs, and have experienced overall low private sector investment and growth. 4 The Caribbean SIDS are also marked by high transportation and connectivity costs, despite their proximity to the North and South American land masses. The jurisdictions all have small populations and economies, except for the Dominican Republic, which is the eighth largest economy in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). 5 Economic growth has been relatively slow for decades and the region is marked by high government debt. While the region receives high foreign direct investment, local economic growth returns are low, which suggests the region suffers from low productivity, low rates of technological change within the private sector, and an inability to turn that investment into innovative economic activity. 6 Exacerbating this situation, the Caribbean has one of the highest emigration rates in the world for skilled workers, with assessments calculating that up to 68% of the population with post-secondary education leaves the region to pursue better job opportunities, primarily in the US and the UK. 7 Not only does this lead to an undersupply in skilled workers (as explained more below), “but the net effect of migration and remittances on growth tends to be negative for the Caribbean, which has been characterized by brain drain and relatively small remittance receipts.” 8 Additionally, the Caribbean population is aging, as annual population growth fell from 0.61% in 2000 to 0.37% in 2023, leading to an ever-smaller working age population. 9 (See Annex A for emigration data by jurisdiction). Recent data on primary economic sectors cannot be found for all 12 jurisdictions, but the ILO collected data on primary employment sectors for the Dominican Republic, St. Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago. 10 Figures 2-4 show wholesale and retail trade and vehicle repair as the largest employment sectors in all three countries, ranging from 14% (Trinidad and Tobago) of the working population to 20% (Dominican Republic). However, the education sector employs 19% of working women in Trinidad and Tobago, while construction is the largest employer of men at 17%. 4 For more information on SIDS see https://www.un.org/ohrlls/content/about-small-island-developing-states. 5 County Private Sector Diagnostic: Creating Markets in the Dominican Republic, International Finance Corporation, October 2023, pg. 1. 6 Beuermann, D. W., et. al. eds., Are we there yet? The path toward sustainable private sector development in the Caribbean, IDB, 2024, pg. 36. 7Ibid., pg. 71, 72. 8 Beuermann, D. W., et. al. eds., Are we there yet? The path toward sustainable private sector development in the Caribbean, IDB, 2024, pg. 69. 9 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Population, Development and Rights in Latin America and the Caribbean: draft second regional report on the implementation of the Montevideo Consensus on Population and Development, 2024, pg. 93. 10 Data taken from ILO Statistics on Sectoral Employment. St. Lucia data collected in 2024; Dominican Republic and Trinidad and Tobago data gathered in 2023. Accommodation and food services are significant employers of women in the Dominican Republic (11%) and St. Lucia (16%) (see Figures 2-4). 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% Total Female Male Figure 3: Saint Lucia Employment Sectors 2024 Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles Accommodation and food service activities Construction Public administration and defence; compulsory social security Administrative and support service activities Agriculture; forestry and fishing Transportation and storage Education Manufacturing Human health and social work activities Household activities for own use Other service activities Financial and insurance activities Professional, scientific and technical activities 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% Total Female Male Figure 2: Dominican Republic Employment Sectors 2023 Wholesale and retail trade; vehicle & motorcycle repar Manufacturing Construction Accommodation and food service activities Agriculture; forestry and fishing Other service activities Education Transportation and storage Public administration and defence; compulsory social security Household activity for own use Human health and social work activities Arts, entertainment and recreation Administrative and support service activities Professional, scientific and technical activities ### 3.2 Tourism Each jurisdiction has a different mix of sectors driving its economy, but tourism continues to be a significant source of employment and contributor to gross domestic product (GDP) across the region. Tourism contributed between 11% and 22% of the region’s GDP in 2023 (depending on which countries are included). 11 Data from 2019 shows the tourism sector directly employed 18% of the region’s labor force and indirectly sustained another 43.1% (see Figure 5). 12 However, there is diversity among the selected jurisdictions in the percentage of their economy that is indirectly sustained by tourism, ranging from less than 10% in Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago, to 11 World Bank. 2025. Rethinking Caribbean Tourism: Strategies for a More Sustainable Future. pg. xii. The 22% estimate includes Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. It omits Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname and adds in Belize and Sint Maarten. 12 Table reprinted from Muhummed, A., Beyond tourism: A policy framework for economic diversification and job creation in the Caribbean, ILO, 21 May 2025. The Dominican Republic is included in the Latin American region in ILO calculations and there is no equivalent data available for that country. 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18% 20% Total Female Male Figure 4: Trinidad And Tobago Employment Sectors 2023 Wholesale and retail trade; vehicles and motorcycle repair Construction Education Public administration and defence; compulsory social security Other service activities Information and communication Manufacturing Accommodation and food service activities Transportation and storage Water supply; sewage, waste management Agriculture; forestry and fishing Financial and insurance activities Arts, entertainment and recreation Mining and quarrying Figure 5: Direct and Indirect Employment in the Tourism Industry as a Percentage of Total Employment (2019) 91% in Antigua and Barbuda. While the Coronavirus (COVID) pandemic devastated the tourism industry in 2020 and 2021, by 2023 and 2024 tourism rebounded to pre-pandemic levels in every jurisdiction, and many were setting records for tourist arrivals. Tourism is an especially significant employer of women and youth, with women making up “57–70% of workers directly employed in the hospitality as well as food and beverage industries pre pandemic, higher than in all other sectors combined in the Caribbean” (see Figure 6). 13 The sector is also the highest direct employer of youth (aged 15-24), with the Caribbean jurisdictions holding five of the top 10 spots globally for direct youth employment in the travel and tourism sector as a share of total national employment (see Figure 7). 14 Unfortunately, “most jobs in the sector remain precarious, low-paid, informal, and highly gender segregated.” 15 Jobs are also often insecure because of the sector’s seasonal nature and exposure to natural disasters. As a result, “while the tourism sector offers broad employment opportunities, especially for first-time job seekers, the nature of these jobs…makes it difficult for workers to move up the economic ladder or build resilience against shocks. Often, the sector functions as a revolving door: high turnover, low retention, and few long-term career pathways.” 16 In addition, the tourism sector’s contribution to a diverse local private sector is low because of the historical focus on cruises and all-inclusive resorts rather than local experiences. In 2019, the average amount spent locally per individual tourist in the Caribbean (US$712) was half that in the 13 Rethinking Caribbean Tourism: Strategies for a More Sustainable Future, World Bank, 2025, pg. xii. Chart taken from pg. xiii. 14 Both charts reprinted from Rethinking Caribbean Tourism: Strategies for a More Sustainable Future, World Bank, 2025, pg. xiii. 15 Muhummed, A., Beyond tourism: A policy framework for economic diversification and job creation in the Caribbean, International Labor Organization, 21 May 2025. 16 Llovet Montanes, R., et al., Beyond the Beach Beyond the Beach: Why Job Quality in Caribbean Tourism Matters More Than Ever, June 26, 2025, World Bank. Figure 6: Direct Travel & Tourism Sector Employment, as Percentage of Total National Employment by Age Group (for top 10 countries with highest proportion of young people in2019) Figure 6: Tourism Direct Employment by Gender in Hotels and Restaurants (2019 or last available year) Figure 7: Direct Travel & Tourism sector employment, as share of total national employment, top 10 countries for proportion of young people (2019) Pacific (US$1,428).” 17 To increase the sector’s impact on local jobs, incomes, and profits, it is vital to strengthen local economic linkages by increasing local enterprise engagement directly with tourists and connecting international companies with local supply chains, for example farmers, artisans, and service providers. It is also crucial to increase capacity in local tourism businesses and their workforce, particularly in the areas of digitalization of operations and sustainable tourism. 18 ### 3.3 Labor Force Participation Labor force participation rates in the region are low, at 64%, although there is variation among jurisdictions. 19 An ILO report using 2023-2024 data for nine of the 12 jurisdictions showed labor force participation ranged from 55% for Trinid
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CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR EMPLOYMENT AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE CARIBBEAN REGION Strengthening Caribbean Economic Growth (SCEG) August 2025 Authored by Sasha Muench and Deborah Gordon ## Contents 1. Introduction ... 3 2. Methodology and Limitations of Findings ... 4 2.1 Market C...
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CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR EMPLOYMENT AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE CARIBBEAN REGION Strengthening Caribbean Economic Growth (SCEG) August 2025 Authored by Sasha Muench and Deborah Gordon ## Contents 1. Introduction ... 3 2. Methodology and Limitations of Findings ... 4 2.1 Market Constraints Research ... 4 2.2 Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices (KAP) Survey ... 4 3. Key Findings ... 6 3.1 Small Island Economies ... 6 3.2 Tourism ... 8 3.3 Labor Force Participation ... 10 3.4 Education and Workforce Skills Gap ... 11 3.5 Enterprise Challenges ... 14 3.6 Limited Access to Finance ... 16 3.7 Lack of Mobile Internet Utilization ... 19 3.8 Weak Business Resilience Capacities ... 21 3.9 Limited Business Development Services (BDS) ... 22 4. Potential for Change ... 24 5. Conclusion ... 25 Annexes ... 27 Annex A: Emigration Data for 11 of the 12 Jurisdictions ... 27 Annex B: Obstacles to Business Innovation – Perception of Enterprises in the Caribbean ... 28 Annex C: Detailed Information on Caribbean Credit Unions ... 29 Annex D: Other Relevant Programs ... 30 Annex E: KAP Survey Participant Demographics ... 33 Annex F: KAP Correlation Analysis ... 35 Annex G: KAP Survey Questions ... 36 References ... 38 ## 1. Introduction Figure 1: Map of the Caribbean The U.S. Department of State-funded program, Strengthening Caribbean Economic Growth (SCEG), aims to build the economic strength and job skill sets of individuals aged 16 and older so they may better pursue employment, entrepreneurship, and economic well-being. To achieve this goal, the SCEG program will launch a small grant challenge to identify and implement solutions that measurably improve job skills training, employment opportunities, and livelihood outcomes within 12 jurisdictions in the Caribbean: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, the Bahamas, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Five Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. Establishing a small-grant challenge grounded in evidence based research is vital to providing tangible and effective solutions. To achieve this, the SCEG program conducted two complementary assessments to identify the constraints and opportunities facing individuals seeking employment and micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) interested in growing and hiring more workers: a survey of macro-level market constraints and an assessment of individuals’ knowledge, attitudes, and practices (KAP). Table 1: Jurisdictions’ Populations and GDPs as of 2024 The 12 jurisdictions offer varied | Country | Population | GDP (in billions) | GDP per economies, with populations capita ranging from 47,000 in Saint | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Antigua & Barbuda | 93,772 | 2.2 | $ 23,726 Kitts and Nevis to 11.3 million | | Bahamas | 401,283 | 15 | $ 39,455 in the Dominican Republic, all | | Barbados | 282,467 | 7.2 | $ 25,366 of which are either stable or | | Dominica | 66,205 | 0.7 | declining. Annual Gross $ 10,405 | | Dominican Republic | 11,427,557 | 124 | Domestic Products (GDPs) $ 10,876 | | Grenada | 117,207 | 1.4 | range from US$700 million in $ 11,872 | | Jamaica | 2,839,175 | 20 | Dominica to US$124 billion in $ 7,020 | | St Kitts & Nevis | 46,843 | 1.1 | the Dominican Republic, with a $ 22,771 | | St. Lucia | 179,744 | 2.6 | median GDP of US$3.65 billion $ 14,182 and median GDP per capita of | | St. Vincent & the 5 Grenadines | 100,616 | 1.2 | $ 11,501 US$12,027 (compared to a | | Suriname | 634,431 | 4.7 | GDP per capita of US$85,810 $ 7,431 | | Trinidad and Tobago | 1,368,333 | 26 | in the United States, according $ 19,315 | to the World Bank). Tourism is the dominant economic sector in some jurisdictions (e.g., Antigua and Barbuda) but a minor one in MERCY CORPS Constraints and Opportunities for Employment and Entrepreneurship in the Caribbean Region 4 others (e.g. Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago). Some jurisdictions are heavily oriented toward supply chains and economic linkages with the United States (e.g. Jamaica and Barbados) while others are more connected to Latin America (e.g. Dominican Republic). Given the economic diversity across the region, the research summarized in this report focused on cross-cutting constraints that are common across the region and can potentially be addressed with small-scale interventions and/or investments. The report briefly explains the methodology used and then outlines the key findings as well as the potential opportunities for change. ## 2. Methodology and Limitations of ## Findings ### 2.1 Market Constraints Research The research on market constraints utilized a literature review of relevant reports, as well as an analysis of data sets from the International Labor Organization (ILO), the World Bank, and the Inter American Development Bank (IDB). An independent consultant hired by Mercy Corps conducted the research. It is important to note there are significant information gaps in the region. For some jurisdictions, especially the smaller ones, there is little recent localized data, and they are generally not included in the data sets mentioned above (or the data included is from 2016 or earlier). In addition, the multilateral agencies include different countries in their definitions of the Caribbean region, so regional summaries are not fully comparable. For example, some reports include Belize, Haiti, and/or Guyana and omit the Dominican Republic or Suriname. Summary information that includes the entire Latin American and Caribbean region (LAC) was omitted from this report as the Caribbean is a relatively small portion of that region and notably different from other Latin American countries. Where feasible, the raw data was explored and results extrapolated for the 12 jurisdictions included in the SCEG Program. Additionally, some papers included in this literature review narrowed their focus to a few of the larger jurisdictions, usually the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. As a result, conclusions on specific jurisdictions based on findings presented in the SCEG report should not be formed at this stage without additional micro and site-specific research. However, the main themes and findings are applicable to the region, and broad conclusions can be drawn about overlapping constraints, as well as promising sectors and opportunities. ### 2.2 Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices (KAP) Survey The KAP survey was conducted to supplement the analysis of macro-level constraints with additional context and depth at the individual level regarding knowledge, attitudes, and practices related to economic empowerment. The KAP survey was designed by the SCEG Program Manager and the Measurement, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) Manager, with input from Mercy Corps’ Program Quality Advisor and Economic Development teams. The team researched aspects of economic development and designed questions to assess: • Financial Literacy • Economic Empowerment • Access to Resources • Income Generation • Workforce Participation • Entrepreneurship/Business Knowledge Mercy Corps utilized the OnaData platform to build the survey and collect data. To launch the KAP survey, Mercy Corps leveraged three modes of outreach to survey participants: 1) Mercy Corps’ Caribbean Resilience Initiative Facebook page; 2) Existing community-based organization (CBO) networks; and 3) CBOs identified in each jurisdiction during a stakeholder mapping exercise that occurred in December 2024. The survey was launched on June 29, 2025, and remained open for responses until July 14, 2025. Participants were also made aware that the survey would be anonymous. (See Annex E and G for participant demographic details and survey questions, respectively.) The KAP findings summarized in this report indicate a variety of trends across demographic factors and economic determinants. Mercy Corps set a target sample size of 385 respondents; 191 individuals completed the survey, which is not a large enough sample to be statistically representative of the Caribbean population. Therefore, findings are not statistically generalizable across the entire region. Furthermore, the demographic makeup of the KAP participants differs from the Caribbean in several aspects. For example: • 81% (157) of participants identified as female, compared to 51% in the Caribbean at large. 1 • 82% (159) of participants were over the age of 35, while only 42% of the overall region’s total population is over 35. 2 • Most of the participants were educated, with 86% (164) having a secondary education or above, compared to 54% of individuals in the Caribbean. 3 • Of the 12 jurisdictions where Mercy Corps solicited participation in the survey, the Dominican Republic and Jamaica have the largest populations, and therefore it was expected that roughly 73% of the sample would come from those two jurisdictions. However, these two countries only comprised 6% of the survey sample, while Trinidad and Tobago, St. Lucia and Dominica comprised 56% of the respondents, despite comprising only 8.5% of the region’s total population. For these reasons, while the KAP findings can identify high-level trends, the results must be interpreted within the context of existing data and its limitations. 1 Regional figure taken from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.MA.ZS?locations=S3 2 Regional stats taken from https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/. 3 Beuermann, D. W., et. al. eds., Are we there yet? The path toward sustainable private sector development in the Caribbean, IDB, 2024, pg. 58. ## 3. Key Findings ### 3.1 Small Island Economies All 12 jurisdictions in the SCEG program fall into the grouping of Small Island Developing States (SIDS), sharing the common characteristics that they depend on imports for key food, fuel, and manufactured goods, and thus are vulnerable to global price fluctuations, and tariffs, and have experienced overall low private sector investment and growth. 4 The Caribbean SIDS are also marked by high transportation and connectivity costs, despite their proximity to the North and South American land masses. The jurisdictions all have small populations and economies, except for the Dominican Republic, which is the eighth largest economy in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). 5 Economic growth has been relatively slow for decades and the region is marked by high government debt. While the region receives high foreign direct investment, local economic growth returns are low, which suggests the region suffers from low productivity, low rates of technological change within the private sector, and an inability to turn that investment into innovative economic activity. 6 Exacerbating this situation, the Caribbean has one of the highest emigration rates in the world for skilled workers, with assessments calculating that up to 68% of the population with post-secondary education leaves the region to pursue better job opportunities, primarily in the US and the UK. 7 Not only does this lead to an undersupply in skilled workers (as explained more below), “but the net effect of migration and remittances on growth tends to be negative for the Caribbean, which has been characterized by brain drain and relatively small remittance receipts.” 8 Additionally, the Caribbean population is aging, as annual population growth fell from 0.61% in 2000 to 0.37% in 2023, leading to an ever-smaller working age population. 9 (See Annex A for emigration data by jurisdiction). Recent data on primary economic sectors cannot be found for all 12 jurisdictions, but the ILO collected data on primary employment sectors for the Dominican Republic, St. Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago. 10 Figures 2-4 show wholesale and retail trade and vehicle repair as the largest employment sectors in all three countries, ranging from 14% (Trinidad and Tobago) of the working population to 20% (Dominican Republic). However, the education sector employs 19% of working women in Trinidad and Tobago, while construction is the largest employer of men at 17%. 4 For more information on SIDS see https://www.un.org/ohrlls/content/about-small-island-developing-states. 5 County Private Sector Diagnostic: Creating Markets in the Dominican Republic, International Finance Corporation, October 2023, pg. 1. 6 Beuermann, D. W., et. al. eds., Are we there yet? The path toward sustainable private sector development in the Caribbean, IDB, 2024, pg. 36. 7Ibid., pg. 71, 72. 8 Beuermann, D. W., et. al. eds., Are we there yet? The path toward sustainable private sector development in the Caribbean, IDB, 2024, pg. 69. 9 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Population, Development and Rights in Latin America and the Caribbean: draft second regional report on the implementation of the Montevideo Consensus on Population and Development, 2024, pg. 93. 10 Data taken from ILO Statistics on Sectoral Employment. St. Lucia data collected in 2024; Dominican Republic and Trinidad and Tobago data gathered in 2023. Accommodation and food services are significant employers of women in the Dominican Republic (11%) and St. Lucia (16%) (see Figures 2-4). 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% Total Female Male Figure 3: Saint Lucia Employment Sectors 2024 Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles Accommodation and food service activities Construction Public administration and defence; compulsory social security Administrative and support service activities Agriculture; forestry and fishing Transportation and storage Education Manufacturing Human health and social work activities Household activities for own use Other service activities Financial and insurance activities Professional, scientific and technical activities 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% Total Female Male Figure 2: Dominican Republic Employment Sectors 2023 Wholesale and retail trade; vehicle & motorcycle repar Manufacturing Construction Accommodation and food service activities Agriculture; forestry and fishing Other service activities Education Transportation and storage Public administration and defence; compulsory social security Household activity for own use Human health and social work activities Arts, entertainment and recreation Administrative and support service activities Professional, scientific and technical activities ### 3.2 Tourism Each jurisdiction has a different mix of sectors driving its economy, but tourism continues to be a significant source of employment and contributor to gross domestic product (GDP) across the region. Tourism contributed between 11% and 22% of the region’s GDP in 2023 (depending on which countries are included). 11 Data from 2019 shows the tourism sector directly employed 18% of the region’s labor force and indirectly sustained another 43.1% (see Figure 5). 12 However, there is diversity among the selected jurisdictions in the percentage of their economy that is indirectly sustained by tourism, ranging from less than 10% in Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago, to 11 World Bank. 2025. Rethinking Caribbean Tourism: Strategies for a More Sustainable Future. pg. xii. The 22% estimate includes Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. It omits Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname and adds in Belize and Sint Maarten. 12 Table reprinted from Muhummed, A., Beyond tourism: A policy framework for economic diversification and job creation in the Caribbean, ILO, 21 May 2025. The Dominican Republic is included in the Latin American region in ILO calculations and there is no equivalent data available for that country. 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18% 20% Total Female Male Figure 4: Trinidad And Tobago Employment Sectors 2023 Wholesale and retail trade; vehicles and motorcycle repair Construction Education Public administration and defence; compulsory social security Other service activities Information and communication Manufacturing Accommodation and food service activities Transportation and storage Water supply; sewage, waste management Agriculture; forestry and fishing Financial and insurance activities Arts, entertainment and recreation Mining and quarrying Figure 5: Direct and Indirect Employment in the Tourism Industry as a Percentage of Total Employment (2019) 91% in Antigua and Barbuda. While the Coronavirus (COVID) pandemic devastated the tourism industry in 2020 and 2021, by 2023 and 2024 tourism rebounded to pre-pandemic levels in every jurisdiction, and many were setting records for tourist arrivals. Tourism is an especially significant employer of women and youth, with women making up “57–70% of workers directly employed in the hospitality as well as food and beverage industries pre pandemic, higher than in all other sectors combined in the Caribbean” (see Figure 6). 13 The sector is also the highest direct employer of youth (aged 15-24), with the Caribbean jurisdictions holding five of the top 10 spots globally for direct youth employment in the travel and tourism sector as a share of total national employment (see Figure 7). 14 Unfortunately, “most jobs in the sector remain precarious, low-paid, informal, and highly gender segregated.” 15 Jobs are also often insecure because of the sector’s seasonal nature and exposure to natural disasters. As a result, “while the tourism sector offers broad employment opportunities, especially for first-time job seekers, the nature of these jobs…makes it difficult for workers to move up the economic ladder or build resilience against shocks. Often, the sector functions as a revolving door: high turnover, low retention, and few long-term career pathways.” 16 In addition, the tourism sector’s contribution to a diverse local private sector is low because of the historical focus on cruises and all-inclusive resorts rather than local experiences. In 2019, the average amount spent locally per individual tourist in the Caribbean (US$712) was half that in the 13 Rethinking Caribbean Tourism: Strategies for a More Sustainable Future, World Bank, 2025, pg. xii. Chart taken from pg. xiii. 14 Both charts reprinted from Rethinking Caribbean Tourism: Strategies for a More Sustainable Future, World Bank, 2025, pg. xiii. 15 Muhummed, A., Beyond tourism: A policy framework for economic diversification and job creation in the Caribbean, International Labor Organization, 21 May 2025. 16 Llovet Montanes, R., et al., Beyond the Beach Beyond the Beach: Why Job Quality in Caribbean Tourism Matters More Than Ever, June 26, 2025, World Bank. Figure 6: Direct Travel & Tourism Sector Employment, as Percentage of Total National Employment by Age Group (for top 10 countries with highest proportion of young people in2019) Figure 6: Tourism Direct Employment by Gender in Hotels and Restaurants (2019 or last available year) Figure 7: Direct Travel & Tourism sector employment, as share of total national employment, top 10 countries for proportion of young people (2019) Pacific (US$1,428).” 17 To increase the sector’s impact on local jobs, incomes, and profits, it is vital to strengthen local economic linkages by increasing local enterprise engagement directly with tourists and connecting international companies with local supply chains, for example farmers, artisans, and service providers. It is also crucial to increase capacity in local tourism businesses and their workforce, particularly in the areas of digitalization of operations and sustainable tourism. 18 ### 3.3 Labor Force Participation Labor force participation rates in the region are low, at 64%, although there is variation among jurisdictions. 19 An ILO report using 2023-2024 data for nine of the 12 jurisdictions showed labor force participation ranged from 55% for Trini
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# SAVINGS AND THE RATE OF INTEREST IN TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS / L'EPARGNE ET LE TAUX D'INTERET A TRINIDAD ET TOBAGO: UNE ANALYSE EMPIRIQUE Published: 2016-01-01. 1 citation. ## Abstract This paper examines the effect interest rates have on the formation of domestic sav ings in Tr...
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# SAVINGS AND THE RATE OF INTEREST IN TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS / L'EPARGNE ET LE TAUX D'INTERET A TRINIDAD ET TOBAGO: UNE ANALYSE EMPIRIQUE Published: 2016-01-01. 1 citation. ## Abstract This paper examines the effect interest rates have on the formation of domestic sav ings in Trinidad & Tobago. A cointegration approach is employed using data over the period 1965-1987. This is supplemented by Granger-causal testing procedures. We con clude that interest rates do indeed have an important impact on the savings process although this is more marked in the long rather than in the short run. Other variables income and foreign savings are also found to be important determinants of domestic savings and, indeed, foreign savings seem to be the most influential explanatory variable in the short run. L'EPARGNE ET LE TAUX D'INTERET A TRINIDAD ET TOBAGO: UNE ANALYSE EMPIRIQUE RESUME Dans cet article, nous considerons I'effet qu'ont les taux d'interet sur la formation de I'epargne nationale de Trinidad et Tobago. La methode de la cointegration est utilisee et appliquee aux donnees couvrant la periode 1965 a 1987. A cette approche s'ajou tent a titre supplemental des tests de causalite de Granger. Nous en tirons la conclu sion que les taux d'interet ont effectivement un impact sur le process us d'epargne na tionale bien que cet impact soit plus significatif en longue qu 'en courte periode. D 'autres variables explicatives sont aussi importantes dans la determination de I'epargne na tionale telles le revenu national et tout particulierement I'epargne d'origine etrangere qui se revele etre la variable ayant la plus grande influence en courte periode. ## Authors - Patrick Kent Watson: h-index 13; 411 citations - Carlyn Ramlogan: h-index 9; 485 citations ## Topics - Monetary Policy and Economic Impact - Economic Theory and Policy - Financial Literacy, Pension, Retirement Analysis ## References - V. Sundararajan. Exchange rate versus credit policy. Journal of Development Economics. 1986;20(1):75-105. doi:10.1016/0304-3878(86)90006-4. - David F. Hendry. ECONOMETRIC MODELLING WITH COINTEGRATED VARIABLES: AN OVERVIEW. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics. 1986;48(3):201-212. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0084.1986.mp48003001.x. - Alberto Giovannini. The interest elasticity of savings in developing countries: The existing evidence. World Development. 1983;11(7):601-607. doi:10.1016/0305-750x(83)90005-0. - Alberto Giovannini. Saving and the real interest rate in LDCs. Journal of Development Economics. 1985;18(2-3):197-217. doi:10.1016/0304-3878(85)90054-9. - Martin S. Feldstein. Inflation, Specification Bias, and the Impact of Interest Rates. Journal of Political Economy. 1970;78(6):1325-1339. doi:10.1086/259711. - Gholamreza Nakhaeizadeh. The causality direction in consumption–income process and sensitivity to lag structures. Applied Economics. 1987;19(6):829-838. doi:10.1080/00036848700000113. - Maxwell J. Fry. Saving, investment, growth and the cost of financial repression. World Development. 1980;8(4):317-327. doi:10.1016/0305-750x(80)90030-3. - Hans O. Schmitt. Shaw, Edward S., Financial Deepening in Economic Development, New York, Oxford University Press, 1973, xii + 260 pp. ($7.50 cloth, $3.50 paper). American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 1974;56(3):670. doi:10.2307/1238641. - Joseph Alois Schumpeter, John Maynard Keynes. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. Journal of the American Statistical Association. 1936;31(196):791. doi:10.2307/2278703. - Maxwell J. Fry. Money and Capital or Financial Deepening in Economic Developments?**Extracted by permission from Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Nov. 1978). Copyright © 1978 by the Ohio State University Press. All rights reserved. Elsevier eBooks. 1980;107-113. doi:10.1016/b978-0-08-024041-1.50014-4.
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Saving in Latin America and the Caribbean in: IMF Working Papers Volume 2015 Issue 108 (2015)Jump to Content This site uses*cookies*, tags, and tracking settings to store information that help give you the very best browsing experience.Dismiss this warning AREAER OnlineIMF.orgBookstoreIMF DataMCM D...
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Saving in Latin America and the Caribbean in: IMF Working Papers Volume 2015 Issue 108 (2015)Jump to Content This site uses*cookies*, tags, and tracking settings to store information that help give you the very best browsing experience.Dismiss this warning AREAER OnlineIMF.orgBookstoreIMF DataMCM Data Browse ###### Topics **Business and Economics**** Agribusiness Banks and Banking Budgeting Corporate Finance Corporate Governance Corporate Taxation Crowdfunding Econometrics Economic Development Economic Theory Economics: General Environmental Economics Exports and Imports Finance: General Financial Risk Management Forecasting Foreign Exchange Globalization Industries: Automobile Industries: Energy Industries: Fashion and Textile Industries: Financial Services Industries: Food Industries: General Industries: Hospital,Travel and Tourism Industries: Information Technololgy Industries: Manufacturing Industries: Service Inflation Information Management Infrastructure Insurance International 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For questions or assistance, visit theData Help pageorcontact**DataHelp@imf.org**. * Previous Article Saving in Latin America and the Caribbean Performance and Policies1 Author: Mr. Francesco Grigoli Mr. Francesco Grigoli Search for other papers by Mr. Francesco Grigoli in Current site Google ScholarClose , Alexander Herman Alexander Herman Search for other papers by Alexander Herman in Current site Google ScholarClose , and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel Klaus Schmidt-Hebbelhttps://isni.org/isni/0000000404811396International Monetary Fund Search for other papers by Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel in Current site Google ScholarClose ## Contributor Notes Author’s E-Mail Address:fgrigoli@imf.org;aherman@imf.org;kschmidt-hebbel@uc.cl. Publication Date:18 May 2015eISBN:9781513538167Language:EnglishKeywords:WP;growth rate;LAC subgroup;private sector Download PDF (4 MB) This paper analyzes saving patterns and determinants in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), including key policy variables and regimes. The review of previous empirical studies on LAC saving reveals contradictions and omissions. This paper presents empirical results of an extensive search of determinants of private and public saving rates, adding previously neglected variables (including different measures of key external prices and macroeconomic policy regimes), in linear form and in interactions with other saving determinants. It analyzes statistical differences in saving determinants between LAC and the rest of the world in a nested econometric framework, and discusses differences across three country subgroups within LAC. The results highlight commonalities and differences in saving behavior between LAC and other world regions, as well as within LAC, identifying the role of key policy variables and regimes. ## Abstract This paper analyzes saving patterns and determinants in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), including key policy variables and regimes. The review of previous empirical studies on LAC saving reveals contradictions and omissions. This paper presents empirical results of an extensive search of determinants of private and public saving rates, adding previously neglected variables (including different measures of key external prices and macroeconomic policy regimes), in linear form and in interactions with other saving determinants. It analyzes statistical differences in saving determinants between LAC and the rest of the world in a nested econometric framework, and discusses differences across three country subgroups within LAC. The results highlight commonalities and differences in saving behavior between LAC and other world regions, as well as within LAC, identifying the role of key policy variables and regimes. ## I. Introduction The well-documented correlation between saving and growth performance has been long known and supported by many empirical studies. Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) exhibits much lower private saving rates than the average for the world. However this hides some heterogeneity, as saving is particularly low in smaller countries and volatile in countries subject to exogenous shocks, such as natural disasters or commodity price fluctuations. What policies are most effective in raising saving, especially in LAC, remains an open question. Some research discusses the importance of terms of trade (TOT) in determining saving in LAC (Adler and Magud, 2013;Gruss, 2014). After a decade of rapid growth, international commodity prices have started to fall since 2011. Recent developments saw an important decline especially in the price of oil, as well as other commodities, which call for a renewed analysis of the impact of TOT shocks on saving. Since LAC is highly dependent on commodities, a region-specific analysis is warranted. Moreover, the region went through many institutional and macroeconomic reforms in the last three decades. In particular, the adoption of fiscal rules, inflation targeting, and floating exchange rate regimes has become more common, but remains unclear the extent to which these reforms spurred private saving. While the literature on saving determinants is vast, results are far from conclusive, even for LAC. The range of behavioral assumptions, model specifications, econometric techniques, and data samples is very large, and this contributes to somewhat contradictory results and large variations in reported estimates. At the same time, recent theoretical developments provide new testable hypotheses that are still unexplored. The contribution of this paper to the existing literature is threefold. First, it reviews extensively previous empirical research on private saving in LAC, summarizing its results and identifying contradictions and omissions. Second, this paper presents empirical results of an extensive search of determinants of private and public saving rates, adding previously neglected variables (different measures of TOT and commodity-price shocks and macroeconomic policy regimes, including fiscal rules, monetary regimes, and exchange-rate regimes), in linear form and in interactions with other saving determinants. Third, it analyzes statistical differences in saving determinants between LAC and the rest of the world in a nested econom
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A Comparison of Saving Rates: Micro Evidence from Seventeen Latin American and Caribbean Countries # A Comparison of Saving Rates: Micro Evidence from Seventeen Latin American and Caribbean Countries Author Gandelman, Néstor Date issued July 2015 Generative AI Enabled C81 - Methodology ...
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A Comparison of Saving Rates: Micro Evidence from Seventeen Latin American and Caribbean Countries # A Comparison of Saving Rates: Micro Evidence from Seventeen Latin American and Caribbean Countries Author Gandelman, Néstor Date issued July 2015 Generative AI Enabled C81 - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Microeconomic Data • Data Access; D12 - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis; D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice • Life Cycle Models and Saving; E21 - Consumption • Saving • Wealth Country Bolivia; Brazil; Argentina; Barbados; Costa Rica; Mexico; Trinidad and Tobago; United States; Uruguay; Bahamas; Chile; Colombia; Ecuador; Honduras; Panama; Paraguay; Peru; Nicaragua; Canada Category Using micro data on expenditure and income for 17 Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries, this paper presents stylized facts on saving behavior by age, education, income and place of residence. Counterfactual saving rates are computed by imposing the saving behavior, the population distribution or the income distribution of two benchmark economies (the United States and Korea). The results suggest that the difference in national saving rates between LAC and the benchmark economies can mainly be attributed to differences in saving behavior of the population and, to a lesser extent, to differences in the distribution of the population by educational levels. Other demographic or income distribution differences are not quantitatively important as explanations of saving rates.
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## A Comparison of Saving Rates: Micro Evidence from Seventeen Latin American and Caribbean Countries Néstor Gandelman ### IDB WORKING PAPER SERIES Nº IDB-WP-602 #### July 2015 ### Department of Research and Chief Economist ### Inter-American Development Bank #### July 2015 ## A Comparison...
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## A Comparison of Saving Rates: Micro Evidence from Seventeen Latin American and Caribbean Countries Néstor Gandelman ### IDB WORKING PAPER SERIES Nº IDB-WP-602 #### July 2015 ### Department of Research and Chief Economist ### Inter-American Development Bank #### July 2015 ## A Comparison of Saving Rates: Micro Evidence from Seventeen Latin American and Caribbean Countries Néstor Gandelman ### Universidad ORT Uruguay ### Cataloging-in-Publication data provided by the Inter-American Development Bank Felipe Herrera Library Gandelman, Néstor. A comparison of saving rates: micro evidence from seventeen Latin American and Caribbean countries / Néstor Gandelman. p. cm. — (IDB Working Paper Series ; 602) Includes bibliographic references. 1. Saving and investment—Latin America. 2. Saving and investment—Caribbean Area. 3. Savings accounts—Latin America. 4. Savings accounts—Caribbean Area. I. Inter-American Development Bank. Department of Research and Chief Economist. II. Title. III. Series. IDB-WP-602 Copyright © Inter-American Development Bank. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons IGO 3.0 Attribution NonCommercial-NoDerivatives (CC-IGO BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/ legalcode) and may be reproduced with attribution to the IDB and for any non-commercial purpose, as provided below. No derivative work is allowed. Any dispute related to the use of the works of the IDB that cannot be settled amicably shall be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the UNCITRAL rules. The use of the IDB's name for any purpose other than for attribution, and the use of IDB's logo shall be subject to a separate written license agreement between the IDB and the user and is not authorized as part of this CC-IGO license. Following a peer review process, and with previous written consent by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), a revised version of this work may also be reproduced in any academic journal, including those indexed by the American Economic Association's EconLit, provided that the IDB is credited and that the author(s) receive no income from the publication. Therefore, the restriction to receive income from such publication shall only extend to the publication's author(s). With regard to such restriction, in case of any inconsistency between the Creative Commons IGO 3.0 Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives license and these statements, the latter shall prevail. Note that link provided above includes additional terms and conditions of the license. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Inter-American Development Bank, its Board of Directors, or the countries they represent. http://www.iadb.org 2015 ##### Abstract Using micro data on expenditure and income for 17 Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries, this paper presents stylized facts on saving behavior by age, education, income and place of residence. Counterfactual saving rates are computed by imposing the saving behavior, the population distribution or the income distribution of two benchmark economies (the United States and Korea). The results suggest that the difference in national saving rates between LAC and the benchmark economies can mainly be attributed to differences in saving behavior of the population and, to a lesser extent, to differences in the distribution of the population by educational levels. Other demographic or income distribution differences are not quantitatively important as explanations of saving rates. JEL classifications: C81, D12, D14, D91, E21 Keywords: Saving rates, Latin America 1 This paper benefitted from comments from Eduardo Cavallo and Verónica Frisancho and from participants at internal seminars at the Central Bank of Uruguay, the Instituto de Economía of the Universidad de la Repúbica and the IDB-organized workshop “Domestic Savings in Latin America and the Caribbean.” This paper was undertaken as part of a project of the same name. I wish to thank Braulio Britos for his excellent research assistance. I am indebted to Diether Beuermann, Javier Beverinotti, Carlos Gustavo Machicado, Marcelo Pérez, Eduardo Pontual Ribeiro, Rocío Portilla, José David Sierra, Sung Ju Song and Jorge Tovar for their help to gain access to the databases used in this paper. All errors and omissions remain mine exclusive responsibility. Email: gandelman@ort.edu.uy Address: Facultad de Administración y Ciencias Sociales, Universidad ORT Uruguay, Bulevar España 2633, Montevideo 11.300, Uruguay. ##### 1. Introduction According to the World Development Indicators, gross national savings in Latin America as a percentage of GDP was 20 percent in 2012. This figure is well below East Asia and Pacific (40 percent) and South Asia (30 percent), but at about the same level as other regions like Europe and Central Asia (17 percent) and Sub-Saharan Africa (17 percent) and above the United States (12 percent). The comparison between these regions suggests that there is not an obvious relationship among national savings, growth and development. This might be due to significant heterogeneity within regions. In particular, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) is not a homogeneous entity in many dimensions, including savings rates. In 2012, they were as large as 26 percent in Bolivia and as low as 9 percent in neighboring Paraguay. National savings are themselves aggregates of heterogeneous households’ (or individuals’) personal savings decisions. On theoretical grounds, life-cycle models (Aando and Modigliani, 1963; Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954) imply that individuals’ savings behavior differs by age. Alternatively, the permanent income hypothesis of Friedman (1957) suggests that consumption (and therefore savings) will differ among individuals whose determinants of permanent income are different. Empirically, Carroll, Rhee and Rhee (1994) test for cultural effects on saving behavior in the United States. As will become clear in the methodology section, differences in saving rates among countries can be disaggregated into the following categories: 1. Differences in saving decisions between similar individuals living in different countries (e.g., young people being able to spend above their income level in countries where financial restrictions are less binding, differences in adults’ savings due to alternative national social security systems). 2. Differences in the distribution in the population of the relevant groups (e.g., differences in the proportion of individuals yet to join the workforce, difference in education levels). 3. Differences in the income share of groups (e.g., countries with income concentrated in individuals with low saving rates). The goal of this paper is to address the importance of these differences, with particular interest in the first cause (differences in behavior among groups of the population). In particular, we are interested in addressing how similar or different savings patterns are by age, income, education level and area of residence (urban vs. rural). To do so, we apply a common methodology to micro data on income and consumption of 17 LAC countries and two benchmark economies (the United States and Korea) and compute individual saving rates for the adult population and household savings rates. It has been repeatedly argued that saving rates in Latin America are low (e.g., Edwards, 1996; Gutiérrez 2007, Reinhardt, 2008; and Pérez-Monteiro, 2012) and this constitutes a constraint on sustained growth. Most studies are based on saving rates constructed from macroeconomic variables. There are two steams in this literature. One is based on individual country studies using time-series estimations (e.g., Bulír and Swiston, 2006, and Gollás, 1999, for Mexico; López Mejia and Ortega, 1998, for Colombia; Paiva and Jahan, 2003, for Brazil; and Casillas, 1993, for Argentina and Mexico). The other stream evaluates Latin American saving rates within a broader sample of countries. Papers in this latter group used a variety of panel data techniques. Edwards (1996) is probably the first in this line of research, followed methodologically by Reinhardt (2008), Pérez Monteiro, Radusweski and Cavalcanti (2012), and Lane and Tornell (1998). Other Latin American researchers have an even wider country focus. The World Bank research project “Saving across the World” (see Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén, 2000a, for a review of this project) produced a wide-reaching dataset that permitted testing other issues like the relationship between income inequality and aggregate savings (Schimdt-Hebbel and Servén 2000) and other policy and non-policy factors and savings (Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén, 2000b). Gutiérrez (2007) reviews the empirical literature. According to him, there is a positive association of savings with income level and income growth, macroeconomics stability, foreign credit constraints and demographics. The relations of savings with other variables like real interest rate, types of pension systems and financial development is mixed. In the literature there are several papers who aim to set the main stylized facts of savings rates in particular countries (e.g., Butelmann and Gallego, 2001, for Chile; Alegre and Pou, 2008, for Spain; Castañeda, 2001, for Colombia; Demery and Duck, 2006, for the United Kingdom; and Alan, Atalay and Crossley, 2006, for Canada, among others). Poterba (1994), in whose book several case studies appeared, is probably the classic citation for this type of research. Deaton (1992), Browning and Lussardi (1996) and Attanasio (1999) present comprehensive surveys on consumption and saving that stress the importance of looking at micro-behavior to understand national saving differentials. This article was the end product of research conducted under the Inter-American Development Bank’s Latin American and Caribbean Research Network project “Domestic Savings in Latin America and the Caribbean.” This project explored the low level of domestic savings in Latin America and the Caribbean, the poor financial intermediation of that savings, and its inefficient allocation. This paper presents the results of one of the eight research projects that comprised this study. 2 Our paper contributes to the literature on at least two grounds. First, micro data homogenization and application of a common methodology to a large set of countries has rarely been done in this literature (an exception being Kirsanova and Sefton, 2007, who work with data from the United Kingdom, the United States and Italy). We go beyond individual case studies and set the stylized facts for a wide range of LAC countries in a comparative way. The dimensions considered are important for empirical and theoretical reasons. Among others, Butelmann and Gallego (2001) and Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes (2004) report large disparities in saving rates by current income. The latter authors argue that the more meaningful comparison would take lifelong income and proposes a methodology for doing so. 3 Butelmann and Gallego (2001) also report disparities in savings rates by education level. Those with higher education were the only group with a positive median saving rate in Chile. Differences in savings rates by age are predicted by life-cycle 2 http://www.iadb.org/en/research-and-data/project-details,3187.html?id=2113 3 See Gandelman (2015) for an application to LAC countries. model theories and have been reported in several empirical exercises (e.g., Demery and Duck, 2006, for the United Kingdom and Alegre and Pou, 2008, for Spain). Second, are Latin American saving rates low or high? There is not a natural benchmark for comparinge their relative sizes. We perform a series of counterfactual exercises comparing the structure of savings in LAC with that of the United States and Korea and find that, compared to these countries, LAC saving rates are indeed low. The counterfactual exercises allow us to identify the main differences in saving determinants between LAC and these two benchmarks. In choosing the benchmarks, we selected countries with developed financial markets where constraints on saving and on borrowing are likely to be lower than in Latin America. We also wanted to take countries with different cultural traits that could imply different behavior with respect to consumption and savings. Latin America, belonging to the Spanish-Portuguese tradition, has many differences with the Anglo-Saxon background of the United States and Korea’s Asian culture. Finally, according to WDI, Korean gross savings as percentage of GDP are larger than LAC gross savings, which are in turn larger than U.S. gross savings. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology, and Section 3 the data. The descriptive results on saving rates are reported in Section 4 and the counterfactual exercises in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. ##### 2. Methodology ##### 2.1 Decomposition National private savings can be decomposed among groups of the population. Various dimensions can be used to decompose saving rates. Aggregate private savings are the sum of savings of all relevant groups in a country. These groups are indexed by i (e.g., age brackets). Y and C stand for total private income and consumption, respectively, while yi and ci represent, respectively, group income and group consumption. ni is the size of group i. Therefore national saving is:   i i Y C   yi  ci n (1) By some simple algebraic manipulation this expression can be transformed into the following disaggregation of the national private savings rate:                          N n N Y y y y c Y Y C S i i i i i i t (2) where N is total population. The first term within the sum is the ith group savings rate. The second and third term can be seen as how much this group savings rate is weighted for the aggregate. The second term gives larger weight to those groups whose income level is above the average income level. The third term weights the savings rate according to the relative size of the group. Differences in any of these three terms can explain differences in national saving rates. ##### 2.2 Counterfactual Saving Rates We compute counterfactual saving rates considering various dimensions (age, education income and place of residence). For ease of exposition we explain them in terms of age brackets, but the same procedure is applied to other disaggregations of the population. We take each LAC country and change one of its characteristics (savings rates, population distribution and income distribution by age bracket) for the characteristic of the benchmark economies. In this way we compute the counterfactual LAC saving rates if it had one characteristic of the United States or Korea. Let the superscript * refer to the benchmark countries (United States or Korea) while the variables without superscript refer to a LAC country. There are three exercises to be performed with respect to each benchmark economy. 1. To what extent are differences in national private saving rates between LAC and United States/Korea due to different saving behavior of the population? We assume that groups by age in LAC countries have the saving behavior of the population in United States/Korea but that the income and demographic distribution remains as in LAC. The counterfactual national saving rate for each LAC country is:                         N n N Y y y y c S i i i i LA i i sav sav * * * *ˆ (3) 2. To what extent are differences in national private saving rates between LAC and United States/Korea due to differences in demographic distribution? We assume that the age population distribution of each LAC country is equal to that of USA/Korea but that the group saving behavior and the income distribution remains at the levels of a LAC country. The counterfactual national saving rate for each LAC country is:                           * * *ˆ N n N Y y y y c S i i i i LA i i pop pop (4) 3. To what extent are differences in saving rates between LAC and United States/Korea due to differences in income distribution? We assume that the income distribution by age bracket in LAC is the same as in United States/Korea but that the saving behavior by groups and the age distribution remains the same as that of each LAC country. The counterfactual national saving rate for each LAC country is:                           N n N Y y y y c S i i i i LA i i inc inc * * * *ˆ (5) 2.3 Household vs. Individual Savings It is important to define whether we treat individuals or households as the decision-makers. Ex ante there are pro and cons for both options. First, empirically it is easier to work at the household level since consumption is not reported at the individual level. To compute individual savings rates we need to allocate household consumption among household members using some more or less ad hoc rule. Second, economic theory in general, and life cycle theory in particular, is constructed assuming individual and not household decision makers. Third, there are differences among household members in some of the variables of interest like age and education. Computing household saving rates forces us to classify households’ savings by the characteristics of the household head, which may or may not be demographically representative of his household. In the next sections we will show that some of our results are more reasonable using individual savings rates, but for completeness and robustness analysis we perform our analysis at both the household and individual level. In computing individual saving rates we follow the methodology proposed by Kirsanova and Sefton (2007) to allocate household consumption (and when necessary also income) within individuals. The starting point is the division of household members into three groups: 1. Dependent children: individuals younger than 18; 2. Principal adults: the head of the household and his partner (if any); and 3. Dependent adults: other adults. The consumption level of a newborn baby is assumed to be 30 percent of that of an adult, and this proportion is assumed to increase linearly until age 18, when the person is considered an adult. After allocating consumption in this way, the consumption of dependent children is reallocated equally between the principal adults. For example, consider a household composed of a couple, a newborn baby and one dependent adult. The household consumption level is 100. The preliminary assignment of consumption consists of 0.3 units to the baby, 1 to the father, 1 to the mother and 1 to the other adult. The 0.3 of the baby is later re-allocated to both parents, each ending up with 1.15 units of consumption. The total consumption of 100 is divided between 34.8 (100*1.15/3.3) for each principal adult and 30.3 (100*1/3.3) for the dependent adult. In general, the information on income provided by household surveys is less problematic since the major sources of income (e.g., labor income) are generally well identified at the individual level. When such identification cannot be done (e.g., a housing government subsidy) this income is divided like consumption. ##### 3. Data We work with micro data for 17 LAC countries (Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay), the United States and Korea. The databases for Nicaragua present data only at the household level. Countries perform income and expenditure surveys every decade or so as an input in the construction of the Consumer Price Index.
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How a family office should hold Caribbean property, if at all — InvestCARICOM Skip to content Updated 16 September 2026 Edition 01 · in compilation Independent. Privately owned, for-profit, and no part of any government. Search Reference · Real estate How a family office should hold Caribbean proper...
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How a family office should hold Caribbean property, if at all — InvestCARICOM Skip to content Updated 16 September 2026 Edition 01 · in compilation Independent. Privately owned, for-profit, and no part of any government. Search Reference · Real estate How a family office should hold Caribbean property, if at all The asset is illiquid, unpriced, catastrophe-exposed and in several jurisdictions hard to get money out of. Held deliberately it can still earn its place. Held by accident, it becomes the problem the next generation inherits. Original reporting InvestCARICOM Financial Services Desk 30 August 2026 Photograph · slot not yet licensed article-family-office-real-estate A masonry house stripped to its roof purlins, sheeting peeled back over the wall plate, a ladder leaning against the gable. Caribbean property arrives in family portfolios in a particular way: someone buys a house because they like the island, it is held personally or in an ad hoc structure, and twenty years later it is a significant asset with no reporting, unclear title, a lapsed insurance position and three beneficiaries who disagree about it. This page is about holding it deliberately instead. The four structural risks, stated once Our reference on Caribbean real estate funds sets these out at length; in a family office context they read as follows: Illiquidity. Marketing periods are measured in years in most of these markets. Any assumption that the asset can be realised on a schedule is wrong. No reliable pricing. No comparable-sales databases, thin transaction records, and in programme real estate no arm’s-length market at all — the price is set by a statutory threshold. A valuation in this asset class is an opinion , and the family should know whose and on what basis. Correlated catastrophe exposure. A single weather system can damage assets across several jurisdictions in one week. Irma and Maria struck two weeks apart in September 2017; Beryl crossed the southern Grenadines on 1 July 2024, hitting Grenadian and Vincentian islands in one pass. Repatriation. Barbados operates exchange control and requires inward foreign currency investment to be registered on arrival to support later repatriation. The Bahamas runs a two-tier system where residence status changes the position. Trinidad and Tobago rations foreign exchange in practice. These are exit problems created at entry , and families discover them at the worst moment. Diversify by hazard, not by flag This is the single most useful correction to how these portfolios are usually built. Holding houses in four eastern Caribbean islands is not diversification against the risk that actually matters. Genuine diversification means hazard geography : the southern islands and Barbados, which sit outside the main track, against the northern arc, which does not. Barbados records about 0.17 major hurricane passes within 100 km per decade , against 1.17 for Jamaica and 2.00 for The Bahamas ; Trinidad, Guyana and the ABC islands are lower still. Those figures, carried from our Barbados residence page , belong in the family’s risk reporting rather than in a brochure. And insurance is the second-order correlation: after a regional event, premiums rise and capacity withdraws across the whole market, including for assets that were not damaged. Holding structure Four questions, in order, and the answers differ by jurisdiction: What does the acquisition regime require? Alien landholding licences in most of the independent eastern Caribbean; Non-Belonger licences with development conditions in the British Overseas Territories; a permit from the Investments Board in The Bahamas for anything beyond a small single-family residence. Some conditions attach to the holder , which constrains later transfers into a trust. What happens on death? Property is governed by the law of the place it sits. Forced heirship, probate in a foreign jurisdiction, and the cost and delay of a second grant are all real. A structure that avoids a foreign probate is frequently worth more than a tax saving. What does the structure cost to run, and does it have substance? Economic substance requirements across the territories mean a holding entity is not free and not automatic. Our BVI reference sets out what the regime asks. Transfer tax on restructuring. Moving a property into a structure later is frequently a taxable event. Decide the structure before the purchase , not after. The reporting that is usually missing A family office holding Caribbean property should be able to produce, on request: A current insurance schedule for every asset — cover, deductibles, wind and surge sub-limits, business interruption — and the date each was last reviewed. Replacement cost, not historic cost. Island construction runs at a large multiple of mainland cost, per our construction reference , and insured values set on mainland assumptions are shortfalls waiting for an event. A repatriation note per jurisdiction , including whether inward investment was registered. Title status , including any licence conditions and whether they have been complied with. Programme restrictions where relevant — the statutory resale locks of seven years in St Kitts and Nevis, five in Antigua and Barbuda, three in Dominica . When it earns its place When the family actually uses it, when the jurisdiction is chosen for institutional quality rather than for a rate, when the hazard exposure is deliberate, and when it is small enough relative to the portfolio that its illiquidity does not constrain anything else. When it does not: when it is held because someone once liked a beach. What we have not sourced for this page No figure appears on this page except the hurricane pass rates and the programme resale periods , carried from our residence and programme pages, which cite the sources. Acquisition regimes, succession law, transfer taxes and exchange control differ by jurisdiction and must be confirmed with counsel. This page is reference, not legal, tax or investment advice. Reference published by InvestCARICOM. Corrections: see our corrections log . Evidence and limits This inherited reference article has not yet been migrated to the site's claim-level source model. Treat current legal, tax, immigration and financial statements as orientation only; verify them through the related sourced resource or responsible authority before relying on them. Evidence status: source migration pending. Jurisdictions Barbados The Bahamas Cayman Islands British Virgin Islands St Kitts & Nevis Dominican Republic Filed under Financial Services Desk Real estate Sourced records Bahamas company formation The Bahamas tax guide — consumption taxes, business licence and Pillar Two The Barbados foundation The Barbados society with restricted liability The BVI Non-Belonger Land Holding Licence Reference published by InvestCARICOM. Attribution is to the desk that did the work; this publication carries no individual bylines. Corrections . Next step Verify and continue This inherited analysis still has an explicit source-migration gap. Continue through the sourced records below before relying on it. Open the Real estate sector guide Related markets, projects, reporting and source records. Browse sourced reference records Start from statutes, regulators and dated source-of-record links. Search the published catalogue Find a market, institution, programme or rating evidence record.
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Building wealth isn’t about income level… It’s about behaviour | Business | trinidadexpress.com # Building wealth isn’t about income level… It’s about behaviour - By David Paul - Portfolio Manager, JMMB Investments - Oct 15, 2025 - Oct 15, 2025 - Comments - 2 min to read There is often ...
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Building wealth isn’t about income level… It’s about behaviour | Business | trinidadexpress.com # Building wealth isn’t about income level… It’s about behaviour - By David Paul - Portfolio Manager, JMMB Investments - Oct 15, 2025 - Oct 15, 2025 - Comments - 2 min to read There is often the misconception in society that to build wealth an individual must be a high-income earner; this is very far from the truth. While income is a factor that can assist in building wealth, it is by no means a barrier to wealth creation. Everyone loves a “Rags to Riches” story. In fact, when these stories are publicised, people tend to feel a sense of pride and admiration for the individual involved. These stories are often shrugged off as “one in a million”. “Wow, what a smart man/woman” and “he/she is really lucky” are phrases that are often used when discussing these stories. Alternatively, there have been numerous publicised situations where individuals who were high earners over a period have encountered financial hardship. Whether you are in the high- or low-income bracket, the wealth building formula is the same: start early; live below your means; consistently pay yourself first; and reinvest your returns. Start early – The best time to start investing is right now. It matters not how small you start; an investment of TT$500 per month can grow into a meaningful sum given time. Time is one of the most valuable tools at your disposal when building wealth as it amplifies the power of compounding. You are not too young or old to start investing. However, the truth is, the longer you wait, the more difficult the task becomes. Start by building an emergency fund of 3-6 months of your expenses by investing in low-risk investments like money market funds. Transition to more aggressive investments (stocks, bonds, other mutual funds etc.) once you have accumulated that buffer. Live below your means – Whether you are a high or low-income earner, this is sound advice. Income from employment isn’t a perpetual stream. You want to retire someday, and you may also want to leave an inheritance when you pass. To understand how you spend your income, you need to create a budget. Budgeting is the foundational step to understanding how your income is allocated and identifying opportunities to cut unnecessary expenses. Once these said expenses are identified, you can reallocate income to investing. Consistently pay yourself first – Discipline and consistency are the bedrock of wealth building. Treat investments as a priority deduction from your income. Just as you need to pay your electricity bill every month or risk getting your power cut off, if you don’t invest your budgeted amount every month you will lose power over your financial future. Reinvest your returns – Investing often provides returns in other forms apart from capital appreciation. For example, some stocks pay dividends, some bonds pay interest/coupons, and some mutual funds pay distributions. Instead of spending these gains, reinvest them. Reinvesting enables compounding to accelerate, transforming modest investment amounts into significant wealth over time. At just age 25, investing TT$850 a month with an average annual return of 5.15% could turn into TT$1 million by age 60. The secret isn’t luck; it’s time and consistency. That’s how compounding quietly builds your fortune while you live your life. Low income doesn’t disqualify anyone from wealth generation; you can be one of those “Rags to Riches” stories. It takes discipline, sacrifice and consistency. To the high-income earners, don’t become a statistic: live below your means; and invest early and often. Building wealth is for everyone.
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SOMA Mayreau Promises Jobs and Sustainability - The Caribbean Edit Home Entertainment Business INTERVIEWS Exclusive Features Lifestyle News Now Reading: SOMA Mayreau Promises Jobs and Sustainability 1 01 SOMA Mayreau Promises Jobs and Sustainability Light Dark Home // Entertainment // Business // IN...
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SOMA Mayreau Promises Jobs and Sustainability - The Caribbean Edit Home Entertainment Business INTERVIEWS Exclusive Features Lifestyle News Now Reading: SOMA Mayreau Promises Jobs and Sustainability 1 01 SOMA Mayreau Promises Jobs and Sustainability Light Dark Home // Entertainment // Business // INTERVIEWS // Exclusive Features // Lifestyle // News // Home Business SOMA Mayreau Promises Jobs and Sustainability SOMA Mayreau Promises Jobs and Sustainability Author Business 11 hours ago 68 Views Share A proposed US$100 million eco-resort development on the Grenadine island of Mayreau is expected to create employment opportunities, support local businesses and introduce new sustainability initiatives as part of a major private-sector tourism investment. Invest SVG and Luxembourg-based real estate developer Nativo Group have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to advance SOMA Mayreau, a hospitality and environmental conservation project designed to combine luxury tourism with community development. The agreement was formalised on September 30, 2026, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, establishing a framework for collaboration between the investment promotion agency and the international developer. SOMA Mayreau to Feature More Than 100 Accommodation Units The proposed resort will feature more than 100 accommodation keys, including guestrooms and hotel villas, alongside wellness facilities, restaurants and marine-based activities. The development is intended to strengthen Mayreau's position within the Grenadines' tourism market while attracting visitors seeking hospitality experiences connected to the island's natural environment. According to the project outline, SOMA Mayreau will be financed entirely through private investment, combining international private capital with commercial bank financing. No government funding is required for the proposed US$100 million development. Construction is planned to take approximately 24 months, although a specific commencement date has not been announced. Local Employment and Business Opportunities at the Centre of Development Beyond expanding Mayreau's accommodation offerings, the project is designed to generate economic opportunities for residents and businesses. During construction, the developer intends to prioritise local employment, workforce training and procurement from businesses operating within the community. Once operational, the resort is expected to create ongoing demand for services across several sectors, including transportation, marine excursions, food and beverage supply, and other tourism-related activities. These opportunities could extend the project's economic impact beyond the resort itself, supporting businesses throughout Mayreau and the wider Grenadines. The development also includes proposed apprenticeship programmes aimed at helping residents acquire skills relevant to the hospitality and tourism industries. Environmental Conservation and Infrastructure Improvements Proposed Environmental management is another component of the SOMA Mayreau development. Nativo Group has outlined a strategy addressing water use, waste management and resource efficiency, with an emphasis on reducing waste generation and keeping reusable materials on the island. The developer has also identified several potential community projects intended to strengthen local infrastructure and preserve Mayreau's heritage. Among the proposals is the restoration of the historic Mayreau Parish Church complex. Other initiatives under consideration include improvements to water and energy infrastructure, village enhancement projects, support for local food production and environmental restoration. The developer has indicated that priorities for these initiatives will be established through consultation with residents, allowing the community to participate in determining which projects should move forward. Government Emphasises Protection of Mayreau's Identity Minister of Foreign Investment Dwight Fitzgerald Bramble, who has oversight of Invest SVG, stressed that major tourism developments must consider the needs of the communities in which they operate. “Mayreau is one of the treasures of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Any significant investment on the island must respect its character, its environment and, above all, the interests of its people,” Minister Bramble stated. “What is encouraging about the SOMA Mayreau proposal is the attention being given to the responsibilities that come with developing on a small island. Reliable infrastructure, responsible waste and water management, jobs and training, while providing a meaningful voice for residents that must be part of that work.” His comments highlighted the importance of balancing investment opportunities with environmental protection and community participation, particularly on smaller Caribbean islands. Nativo Group Outlines Long-Term Vision for Mayreau Danny Germaine, Chief Executive Officer of Nativo Group, said the developer's ambitions extend beyond constructing a hospitality property. “The measure of success cannot simply be the hotel we create. If we are going to build and operate here for the long term, the investment has to create meaningful opportunities for the people already living and working on Mayreau,” Germaine noted. “We want SOMA to contribute positively to the island, economically, environmentally and as part of the community.” The proposed development reflects growing interest in tourism investments that incorporate environmental considerations and community benefits alongside commercial objectives. For Mayreau, the project could represent a significant addition to its tourism infrastructure, with the potential to create new opportunities for residents while attracting investment to the island. However, SOMA Mayreau remains a proposed development, with the recently signed MOU establishing a framework for cooperation rather than confirming the completion of the project. Further details regarding construction timelines and implementation are expected as planning progresses. Upvote 0 Points Downvote 0 Votes: 0 Upvotes, 0 Downvotes (0 Points) 0 Like 0 Dislike 0 Love 0 Laugh 0 Surprised 0 Sad 0 Angry Caribbean Hotel Development Caribbean Sustainable Tourism Grenadines Luxury Resorts Invest SVG Mayreau Community Development Mayreau Eco Resort Mayreau Tourism Investment Nativo Group SOMA Mayreau St Vincent and the Grenadines Tourism US$100 Million Resort Development Share Leave a reply Cancel reply Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment. 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(PDF) Credit, Identity, and Resilience in the Bahamas and Barbados - Academia.edu Outline Title Abstract Key Takeaways Methods and Assumptions Discussion References FAQs # Credit, Identity, and Resilience in the Bahamas and Barbados Kathleen Van Vlack 14 pages ## Abstract People of the ...
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(PDF) Credit, Identity, and Resilience in the Bahamas and Barbados - Academia.edu Outline Title Abstract Key Takeaways Methods and Assumptions Discussion References FAQs # Credit, Identity, and Resilience in the Bahamas and Barbados Kathleen Van Vlack 14 pages ## Abstract People of the Caribbean have maintained social networks that provide security in the face of human and natural perturbations. Rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) constitute one such system, which probably came to much of the Caribbean with African people and persisted through slavery. As a foundation of creole economic systems throughout the Caribbean, ROSCAs are time-tested dimensions of traditional culture and a source of pride and identity. This analysis of the history and contemporary functions of ROSCAs in Barbados and the Bahamas is based on more than a thousand extensive and intensive first-person interviews and surveys. This article argues that ROSCAs continue, much as they did in the past, to provide critical human services, social stability, and a source of African-ancestor identity in these two nations. (Women's power, rotating credit, Bahamas, Barbados) Key takeaways AI 1. ROSCAs are vital for social stability and cultural identity in Barbados and the Bahamas. 2. Over a thousand interviews reveal ROSCAs' historical roots in African traditions. 3. Meeting turns in Barbados and asu in the Bahamas function as informal savings and credit systems. 4. ROSCAs provide resilience against economic crises and personal emergencies for participants. 5. Gender roles in ROSCAs show women predominantly lead these community-saving initiatives. ## References (40) 1. Yasmin Skinner. Similar assistance was provided by faculty and students from the University of Arizona. Dr. Trevor Purcell (1945-2007), born in a rural Jamaican village, stimulated much of this research. BIBLIOGRAPHY 2. Adderley, R. 2006. New Negroes from Africa: Slave Trade Abolition and Free African Settlement in the Nineteenth-Century Caribbean. Indiana University Press. 3. Alleyne, M. 2002. The Construction and Representation of Race and Ethnicity in the Caribbean and the World. University of the West Indies Press. 4. Ardener, S. 1964. The Comparative Study of Rotating Credit Associations. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 94:201-29. 5. Ardener, S., and S. Berman. 1995. Money-Go-Rounds: The Importance of Rotating Credit Associations for Women. Berg. 6. Barrow, C. 1992. Family Land and Development in St. Lucia. Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies. 7. Beckles, H. 1999. Centering Woman: Gender Discourses in Caribbean Slave Society. Ian Randle Publishers. 8. Besson, J. 1987. A Paradox in Caribbean Attitudes to Land. Land and Development in the Caribbean. Besson, eds. J. and J. Momsen, pp. 13-45. The MacMillan Press. 9. Bouman, F. J. A. 1995. ROSCA: On the Origin of the Species. Savings and Development, Vol. XIX, no.2. (http://www.fgda.org/pubblicazioni_schedarivistauk.php?Id=489). 10. Browne, K. 2004. Creole Economics: Caribbean Cunning under the French Flag. University of Texas Press. 11. Comitas, L. 1964. Occupational Multiplicity in Rural Jamaica. Proceedings of the American Ethnological Society, eds. E. Garfield and E. Friedl, pp. 41-50. University of Washington Press. 12. Craton, M. 1982. Testing the Chains: Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies. Cornell University Press. 1987. White Law and Black Custom: The Evolution of Bahamian Land Tenures. Land and Development in the Caribbean, eds. J. Besson and J. Momsen, pp. 88-115. The Macmilliam Press. 13. Craton, M., and G. Saunders. 2000. Islanders in the Stream: A History of the Bahamian People, Vol. Two: From the Ending of Slavery to the Twenty-first Century. University of Georgia Press. 14. Forte, M. 2000. The Contemporary Context of Carib "Revival" in Trinidad and Tobago: Creolization, Developmentalism, and the State. Kacike 1(1):18-33. 15. Frank, H. A. 1920. Roaming through the West Indies. Blue Ribbon Books. 16. Geertz, C. 1962. The Rotating Credit Association: A "Middle Rung" in Development. Economic Development and Cultural Change 10(3):241-63. ETHNOLOGY 17. Gmelch, G., and S. Gmelch. 1997. The Parish Behind God's Back: The Changing Culture of Rural Barbados. Waveland Press. 18. Greenfield, S. 1966. English Rustics in Black Skin. Yale University Press. 19. Hall, S., and P. Dugay (eds.). 1996. Questions of Cultural Identity. Sage Publications. Herskovits, M. J., and F. S. Herskovits. 1947. Trinidad Village. Knopf. 20. Holling, C. 1973. Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 4:1-23. 21. Howard, R. 2002. Black Seminoles in the Bahamas. University of Florida Press. 22. Identities. 2008. Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power. A Journal Published by Routledge. http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/1070289x.asp. 23. Johnson, H. 1996. The Bahamas from Slavery to Servitude, 1783-1933. University Press of Florida. 1999. National Identity and Bahamian Culture. YINNA: Journal of the Bahamas Association for Cultural Studies 1:13-20. 24. Laguerre, M. 1990. Urban Poverty in the Caribbean French Martinique as Social Laboratory. MacMillan. Payne-Jackson, A., and M. Alleyne. 2004. Jamaican Folk Medicine: A Source of Healing. University of the West Indies Press. 25. Purcell, T. 1997. Indigenous Knowledge and Applied Anthropology. Human Organization 57(3):258-72. 1999. Local Institutions in Grass Roots Development: The Rotating Credit Association. Journal of Social and Economic Studies 49(1):143-81. 26. Rubino, M., and R. Stoffle. 1990. Who Will Control the Blue Revolution? Economic and Social Feasibility of Caribbean Mithrax Crab Mariculture. Human Organization 49(4):386-94. 27. Sheridan, R. B. 1976. The Crisis of Slave Subsistence in the British West Indies during and after the American Revolution. The William and Mary Quarterly 33:615-41. 28. Small Axe. 2008. Small Axe: A Caribbean Journal of Criticism. A journal published by the Small Axe Project, Columbia University, New York. http://www.smallaxe.net. 29. Stoffle, B. 2001. "We Don't Put All of Our Eggs in One Basket": An Examination of Meeting Turn, a Rotating Savings and Credit Association in Barbados. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of South Florida. 30. Stoffle, B., D. Halmo, R. Stoffle, and C. Burpee. 1999. Folk Management and Conservation Ethics among Small-scale Fishermen of Buren Hombre, Dominican Republic. Folk Management in the World's Fisheries, eds. C. Dyer and J. McGoodwin, pp. 115-38. University of Colorado Press. 31. Stoffle, B., and R. Stoffle. 2007. At the Sea's Edge: Elders and Children in the Littorals of Barbados and the Bahamas. Human Ecology 35(5):547-58. 32. Stoffle, R. 1977. Industrial Impact on Family Formation in Barbados, West Indies. Ethnology 16(3):253-67. 33. Stoffle, R., D. Halmo, T. Wagner, and J. Luczkovich. 1994. Reefs from Space: Satellite Imagery, Marine Ecology, and Ethnography in the Dominican Republic. Human Ecology 22(3):355-78. 34. Stoffle, R., and J. Minnis. 2007. Marine Protected Areas and the Coral Reefs of the Traditional Settlement in the Exumas, Bahamas. Coral Reefs 26(4):1023-32. 35. Tax, S. 1963. Penny Capitalism. University of Chicago Press. 36. Trollope, A. 1860. The West Indies and the Spanish Main. Harper & Brothers Publishers. 37. Watts, D. 1994. The West Indies: Patterns of Development, Culture, and Environmental Change Since 1492. Cambridge University Press. 38. Williams, E. 1944. Capitalism & Slavery. University of North Carolina Press. 39. Wilson, P. 1969. Reputation and Respectability: A Suggestion for Caribbean Ethnology. Man 4:70-84. 1973. Crab Antics: A Caribbean Case Study of the Conflict between Reputation and Respectability. Waveland Press. 40. Yelvington, K. 1993. Trinidad Ethnicity. University of Tennessee Press. 1995. Producing Power: Ethnicity, Gender, and Class in a Caribbean Workplace. Temple University Press. 2001. The Anthropology of Afro-Latin America and the Caribbean: Diasporic Dimensions. Annual Review of Anthropology 30:227-60. 2006. The Invention of Africa in Latin America and the Caribbean: Political Discourse and Anthropological Praxis, 1920-1940. Afro-Atlantic Dialogues, ed. K. Yelvington, pp. 35-82. School of American Research Press. ## FAQs AI What explains the cultural significance of ROSCAs in Caribbean communities? add The research finds that ROSCAs, rooted in African traditions, embody community resilience and identity, influencing social and economic exchanges. How did the methodology assure representation in the study of ROSCAs? add The study incorporated over 1,000 interviews across urban and rural settings, ensuring gender balance in formal interviews, representing 34% of the population. What role does asu play in modern Bahamian economic practices? add Asu serves as a vital resource for savings and mutual support, enabling individuals to achieve economic stability through cooperative financial efforts. When did ROSCAs first manifest in Barbados and the Bahamas? add Cultural practices resembling ROSCAs likely emerged during slavery, adapting African socioeconomic structures to the cash economy in the 19th century. Why do participants prefer ROSCAs over formal banking institutions? add Participants cite better access to immediate funds, lower travel costs, and social relationships as advantages of ROSCAs compared to traditional banking. I am an assistant professor at Northern Arizona University. I have an interest in Native North America and the Caribbean. I am interested in cultural resource management, critical heritage studies, and social impact assessment.
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The economics of rotating savings and credit associations: evidence from the Jamaican 'Partner' --> --> --> Advanced search Browse Econ Literature Working papers Journals Software components Books Book chapters JEL classification More features Subscribe to new research RePEc Biblio Author registrati...
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The economics of rotating savings and credit associations: evidence from the Jamaican 'Partner' --> --> --> Advanced search Browse Econ Literature Working papers Journals Software components Books Book chapters JEL classification More features Subscribe to new research RePEc Biblio Author registration Economics Virtual Seminar Calendar ConfWatcher NEW! Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/deveco/v60y1999i1p173-194.html My bibliography Save this article The economics of rotating savings and credit associations: evidence from the Jamaican 'Partner' Author & abstract Download 5 References 38 Citations Most related Related works & more Corrections Author Listed: Handa, Sudhanshu Kirton, Claremont Registered: Abstract No abstract is available for this item. Suggested Citation Handa, Sudhanshu & Kirton, Claremont, 1999. " The economics of rotating savings and credit associations: evidence from the Jamaican 'Partner' ," Journal of Development Economics , Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 173-194, October. Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:60:y:1999:i:1:p:173-194 as HTML HTML with abstract plain text plain text with abstract BibTeX RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite) ReDIF JSON Download full text from publisher File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304-3878(99)00040-1 Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only ---> As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it. References listed on IDEAS as HTML HTML with abstract plain text plain text with abstract BibTeX RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite) ReDIF JSON Baydas, Mayada M. & Bahloul, Zakaria & Adams, Dale W., 1995. " Informal finance in Egypt: "Banks" within banks ," World Development , Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 651-661, April. Williamson, Oliver E, 1988. " The Logic of Economic Organization ," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 65-93, Spring. van den Brink, Rogier & Chavas, Jean-Paul, 1997. " The Microeconomics of an Indigenous African Institution: The Rotating Savings and Credit Association ," Economic Development and Cultural Change , University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(4), pages 745-772, July. Handa, Sudhanshu & King, Damien, 1997. " Structural adjustment policies, income distribution and poverty: A review of the jamaican experience ," World Development , Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 915-930, June. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen & Loury, Glenn, 1993. " The Economics of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations ," American Economic Review , American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 792-810, September. Besley, T. & Coate, S. & Loury, G., 1990. " The Economics Of Rotating Savings And Credit Associations ," Papers 149, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Development Studies. Besley, T. & Coate, S. & Loury, G., 1992. " The economics of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations ," Papers 157, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Development Studies. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate & Glenn Loury, 1992. " The Economics of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations ," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 24, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development. Besley, T. & Coate, S. & Loury, G., 1990. " The Economics Of Rotating Savings And Credit Associations ," Working papers 556, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS) Most related items These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one. Kovsted, Jens & Lyk-Jensen, Peter, 1999. " Rotating savings and credit associations: the choice between random and bidding allocation of funds ," Journal of Development Economics , Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 143-172, October. Olivier Dagnelie & Philippe Lemay‐Boucher, 2012. " Rosca Participation in Benin: A Commitment Issue ," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics , Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 74(2), pages 235-252, April. Olivier Dagnelie & Philippe LeMay, 2005. " Rosca Participation in Benin : a Commitment Issue ," Development and Comp Systems 0511026, University Library of Munich, Germany. Olivier Dagnelie & Philippe LeMay-Boucher, 2008. " Rosca Participation in Benin: a Commitment Issue ," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 735.08, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). Olivier Dagnelie & Philippe LeMay-Boucher, 2015. " Rosca Participation in Benin: a Commitment Issue ," Working Papers 339, Barcelona School of Economics. Siwan Anderson & Jean-Marie Baland, 2002. " The Economics of Roscas and Intrahousehold Resource Allocation ," The Quarterly Journal of Economics , President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(3), pages 963-995. Anderson, K.S. & Baland, J-M., 2000. " The Economics of Roscas and Intra-Household Resource Allocation ," Discussion Paper 2000-83, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. Anderson, K.S. & Baland, J-M., 2000. " The Economics of Roscas and Intra-Household Resource Allocation ," Other publications TiSEM dd438092-4ec2-49e3-b824-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management. A. Lasagni & E. Lollo, 2011. " Participation in Rotating Savings and Credit Associations in Indonesia: New Empirical Evidence on Social Capital ," Economics Department Working Papers 2011-EP05, Department of Economics, Parma University (Italy). BOUSALAM, Issam & HAMZAOUI, Moustapha, 2015. " Bank-based investing RoSCA for Islamic finance: a new alternative to drain households savings and reduce financial exclusion ," MPRA Paper 67510, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 30 Oct 2015. Shochrul Rohmatul Ajija & Asif Iqbal Siddiqui, 2020. " Impact of Joining Rotating Savings and Credit Association (ROSCA) on Household Assets in Indonesia ," Economic Growth Centre Working Paper Series 2001, Nanyang Technological University, School of Social Sciences, Economic Growth Centre. Baland, Jean-Marie & Guirkinger, Catherine & Hartwig, Renate, 2019. " Now or later? The allocation of the pot and the insurance motive in fixed roscas ," Journal of Development Economics , Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 1-11. Wang, Shun, 2019. " Social capital and Rotating Labor Associations in rural China ," China Economic Review , Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 243-253. Olivier Dagnelie & Philippe LeMay-Boucher, 2007. " ROSCA Participation in Benin: A Commitment Issue ," CERT Discussion Papers 0708, Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot Watt University. N. S. Chiteji, 2002. " Promises kept: enforcement and the role of rotating savings and credit associations in an economy ," Journal of International Development , John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(4), pages 393-411. Rediet Abebe & Adam Eck & Christian Ikeokwu & Samuel Taggart, 2022. " An Algorithmic Introduction to Savings Circles ," Papers 2203.12486, arXiv.org. Arnaldo Mauri, 2000. " La finanza informale nelle economie in via di sviluppo ," Departmental Working Papers 2000-09, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano. Anderson, Siwan & Baland, Jean-Marie & Moene, Karl Ove, 2009. " Enforcement in informal saving groups ," Journal of Development Economics , Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 14-23, September. Franklin Allen & Meijun Qian, 2025. " Alternative finance in the international business context: a review and future research ," Journal of International Business Studies , Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 56(1), pages 43-61, February. Adnan Shoaib & Muhammad Ayub Siddiqui, 2020. " Why do people participate in ROSCA saving schemes? Findings from a qualitative empirical study ," DECISION: Official Journal of the Indian Institute of Management Calcutta , Springer;Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, vol. 47(2), pages 177-189, June. Geng, Xin & Janssens, Wendy & Kramer, Berber, "undated". " Liquid milk: Cash Constraints and Recurring Savings among Dairy Farmers in Kenya ," 2018 Annual Meeting, August 5-7, Washington, D.C. 273823, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association. Herron, Charles B. & Nilakantan, Rahul & Iyengar, Deepak & Richey, Robert Glenn & Rao, Shashank, 2026. " On social inequality, financial inclusion, and poverty at the bottom of the pyramid: Is financial equity enough? ," World Development , Elsevier, vol. 200(C). Ghatak, Maitreesh & Nien-Huei Jiang, Neville, 2002. " A simple model of inequality, occupational choice, and development ," Journal of Development Economics , Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 205-226, October. Maitreesh Ghatak & Nien-Huei Jiang, 2000. " A Simple Model of Inequality, Occupational Choice, and Development ," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0007, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics. Alejandro Agafonow, 2020. 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US$100 Million Eco-Resort Planned for Mayreau as Invest SVG, Nativo Group Sign Agreement - St. Vincent Tribune – Daily St Vincent And The Grenadines News Local News US$100 Million Eco-Resort Planned for Mayreau as Invest SVG, Nativo Group Sign Agreement 09 October 2026 Support us This content origin...
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US$100 Million Eco-Resort Planned for Mayreau as Invest SVG, Nativo Group Sign Agreement - St. Vincent Tribune – Daily St Vincent And The Grenadines News Local News US$100 Million Eco-Resort Planned for Mayreau as Invest SVG, Nativo Group Sign Agreement 09 October 2026 Support us This content originally appeared on One News SVG . An Invest SVG image. By Admin . Updated 9:50 p.m., Friday, October 9, 2026, Atlantic Standard Time (GMT-4). A proposed US$100 million eco-resort could reshape tourism on the Grenadine island of Mayreau after Invest SVG and Luxembourg-based developer Nativo Group signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to advance the project and other sustainable development initiatives. The agreement, signed on September 30 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, establishes a framework for cooperation on the proposed SOMA Mayreau eco-resort and complementary environmental and community-focused projects. The announcement was made by Invest SVG in a press release issued on Friday. According to the investment promotion agency, the agreement builds on existing master planning and technical studies and supports the government’s objective of promoting sustainable development while expanding the country’s tourism sector. The proposed development would feature more than 100 hotel keys, including guestrooms and villas, alongside wellness facilities, restaurants and marine experiences. Invest SVG said the project is expected to attract approximately US$100 million in private investment and would be financed through a combination of foreign private capital and commercial bank financing, with no government funding earmarked for its construction. If it proceeds as planned, construction is expected to take about 24 months. During that period, the development is expected to generate employment, skills training and procurement opportunities for local businesses. Once operational, it is also aims to increase year-round demand for transportation, marine services, food and beverage suppliers and other tourism-related enterprises across the Grenadines. Minister of Foreign Investment, Dwight Fitzgerald Bramble , who has responsibility for Invest SVG, said any major investment on Mayreau must preserve the island’s identity while delivering tangible benefits to residents. “Mayreau is one of the treasures of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Any significant investment on the island must respect its character, its environment and, above all, the interests of its people,” Bramble said. He added that the proposal places emphasis on responsible development, including reliable infrastructure, waste and water management, employment and training opportunities, while ensuring residents have a meaningful voice throughout the process. Beyond the resort itself, Nativo Group has proposed an integrated strategy for water, waste and resource management designed to reduce waste generation and maximise the reuse of materials on the island. The wider vision also includes potential community projects such as restoring the historic Mayreau Parish Church complex, village enhancement initiatives, strengthening water and energy resilience, supporting local food production, apprenticeship programmes and environmental restoration efforts. Invest SVG said priorities for these initiatives would be determined through community consultation, with appropriate governance and funding arrangements. Danny Germaine, Chief Executive Officer of Nativo Group, said the company’s goal is to create a tourism development that reflects the character of Mayreau while delivering long-term benefits for its residents. “The measure of success cannot simply be the hotel we create. If we are going to build and operate here for the long term, the investment has to create meaningful opportunities for the people already living and working on Mayreau. We want SOMA to contribute positively to the island, economically, environmentally and as part of the community,” Germaine said. Invest SVG described the signing of the MOU as the next milestone in what it said is an already advanced programme of work surrounding the proposed eco-tourism development. The agency said the agreement also reflects its ongoing efforts to facilitate meaningful foreign direct investment in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. END Related Support us Previous post Next post Related News 03 October 2026 3 Drivers rewarded for courtesy, service and safe driving 10 October 2026 SVG Junior Tourism Minister unveils bold Three-Point Plan for Caribbean cultural tourism 30 September 2026 Mayreau Project Marks Six Months of Reef Restoration and Climate-Smart Farming 07 October 2026 Education Ministry, Teachers’ Union at odds over school reopening Looking for something?
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