Co-GP Equity: Luxury Beachfront Resort and Branded Residences in Punta Cana - The Carlton Report Skip to content The Report Search Home Latest Capital Markets Market Insights Industry News Market Reports Archive Subscribe The Carlton Group carltongroup.com Capital Portal Co-GP Equity: Luxury Beachfr...
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Co-GP Equity: Luxury Beachfront Resort and Branded Residences in Punta Cana - The Carlton Report Skip to content The Report Search Home Latest Capital Markets Market Insights Industry News Market Reports Archive Subscribe The Carlton Group carltongroup.com Capital Portal Co-GP Equity: Luxury Beachfront Resort and Branded Residences in Punta Cana Written by Michael Campbell in Capital Markets A Co-GP seat puts an investor inside the general partnership, alongside the sponsor, with a share of the promote rather than a fixed preferred return. Carlton has been exclusively retained to bring in a $25 million Co-GP / Co-Developer partner for a shovel-ready luxury hotel and branded residences on the Caribbean’s fastest-growing luxury coastline. How to access: every opportunity below carries its own reference number. Click View the Deal on the one you want to open its page on the Carlton Capital Portal. Registering takes two minutes, and one of our team reviews every registration personally. Once approved, you can review the opportunity and request the full offering materials. Ref. CG-6776 · $25M of Co-GP / Co-Developer Equity Beachfront Luxury Hotel & Branded Residences Punta Cana, Dominican Republic $25M Co-GP Equity $347M Total Capitalization $980 Projected ADR A Co-Developer seat on a shovel-ready luxury resort and branded residences on the Caribbean’s fastest-growing luxury coastline. ~74 beachfront acres with 400 meters of beach, PGA golf, lagoon, beach club and spa Shovel-ready: full approvals and drawings, with the brand LOI executed $331.4 million projected residential sellout and ~$19.2 million stabilized hotel EBITDA View the Deal · CG-6776 → Carlton is placing capital on more than what is posted. Tell us what you invest in at deals.carltongroup.com and we will send the opportunities that fit. Comments Leave a Reply Cancel reply Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked * Comment * Name * Email * Website Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment. Notify me of follow-up comments by email. Notify me of new posts by email. Δ More posts Co-GP Equity: Luxury Beachfront Resort and Branded Residences in Punta Cana October 9, 2026 Ken Griffin Paid $1.1 Billion in Cash for 30 Acres of Wynwood October 9, 2026 Manhattan Class A Rents Just Hit a Record $85.45 a Foot October 8, 2026 Six Months After a Foreclosure Suit, Mercedes-Benz Miami Closed $860 Million October 7, 2026 October 9, 2026 Capital Markets A Co-GP seat puts an investor inside the general partnership, alongside the sponsor, with a share of the promote rather than a fixed preferred return. Carlton has been exclusively retained to bring in a $25 million Co-GP / Co-Developer partner for a shovel-ready luxury hotel and branded residences on the Caribbean’s fastest-growing luxury coastline.
MOU signed for US$100m investment in Mayreau | WINNFM 98.9 Facebook Instagram X Youtube Home News Local News Regional News International News Press Release Sports Football Cricket Athletics Other Entertainment Weather Digital Newscast Programs Notices About LISTEN LIVE Search 24.1 C Basseterre Satur...
SVG, Nativo Group Sign MOU for $100M Mayreau Eco-Resort Last updated: 9 Oct 2026 | 5:47 PM | AST Times Staff Published: 9 Oct 2026 | 5:47 PM | AST Disclosure: This website may contains affiliate links. Invest SVG and Luxembourg-based real estate developer Nativo Group have signed a Memorandum of Und...
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SVG, Nativo Group Sign MOU for $100M Mayreau Eco-Resort Last updated: 9 Oct 2026 | 5:47 PM | AST Times Staff Published: 9 Oct 2026 | 5:47 PM | AST Disclosure: This website may contains affiliate links. Invest SVG and Luxembourg-based real estate developer Nativo Group have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to advance the development of SOMA Mayreau, a proposed US$100 million eco-resort and environmental conservation initiative on the Grenadine island of Mayreau. The agreement, signed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on September 30, 2026, establishes a formal framework for cooperation between the national investment promotion agency and the developer. - Advertisement - SOMA Mayreau is envisioned as a 100+ key hospitality destination featuring guestrooms, hotel villas, wellness facilities, dining options, and marine experiences. The project will be 100% privately financed through a combination of foreign private investment and commercial bank financing, requiring no government funding. Construction is scheduled across a 24-month duration. Throughout the construction phase, the project is designed to support local employment, skills training, and purchasing from local vendors. Once operational, the resort aims to drive year-round demand for local transport, marine services, food and beverage suppliers, and the broader Grenadines tourism economy. Alongside the resort development, Nativo Group has prepared an integrated water, waste, and resource management strategy aimed at reducing waste at the source and retaining useful materials on Mayreau. The developer has also proposed several community-oriented initiatives, including: Restoration of the historic Mayreau Parish Church complex Infrastructure projects for water and energy resilience Village improvements, local food production initiatives, environmental restoration, and apprenticeship programs Priority actions for these community initiatives will be determined through direct community consultation. The Hon. Dwight Fitzgerald Bramble, Minister of Foreign Investment with oversight of Invest SVG, emphasized the necessity of safeguarding Mayreau’s unique character. “Mayreau is one of the treasures of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Any significant investment on the island must respect its character, its environment and, above all, the interests of its people,” Minister Bramble stated. “What is encouraging about the SOMA Mayreau proposal is the attention being given to the responsibilities that come with developing on a small island. Reliable infrastructure, responsible waste and water management, jobs and training, while providing a meaningful voice for residents that must be part of that work.” Danny Germaine, Chief Executive Officer of Nativo Group, highlighted the long-term intent behind the development. “The measure of success cannot simply be the hotel we create. If we are going to build and operate here for the long term, the investment has to create meaningful opportunities for the people already living and working on Mayreau,” Germaine noted. “We want SOMA to contribute positively to the island, economically, environmentally and as part of the community.” Share This Article Facebook Whatsapp Whatsapp Email Print By Times Staff Our Editorial Staff at St. Vincent Times is a team publishing news and other articles to over 300,000 regular monthly readers in over 110 other countries worldwide. Subscribe! Get Articles Instantly! Email - Advertisement - Welcome Back! Sign in to your account Username or Email Address Password Remember me Lost your password? ×
Caribbean Money | Invest and Build Wealth in the Region You Love PAPERBACK US$20 · HARDCOVER US$25 · PLUS SHIPPING Choose your edition → KALILAH ENRIQUEZ REYNOLDS PRESENTS CARIBBEAN MONEY Invest and build wealth in the region you love. You already love the food, the music and the culture. But do you...
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Caribbean Money | Invest and Build Wealth in the Region You Love PAPERBACK US$20 · HARDCOVER US$25 · PLUS SHIPPING Choose your edition → KALILAH ENRIQUEZ REYNOLDS PRESENTS CARIBBEAN MONEY Invest and build wealth in the region you love. You already love the food, the music and the culture. But do you own any of the businesses, buildings and opportunities shaping the region’s future? SAVE US$10 WITH YOUR PREORDER Paperback preorder US$20 + shipping Launch price will be US$30 + shipping Choose your edition → Explore the book ↓ Practical. Caribbean. And definitely not a textbook. FROM ROOTS TO RETURNS Own a piece of the Caribbean. BOOK LAUNCH NOVEMBER 10, 2026 30 DAYS 22 HOURS 58 MINUTES 24 SECONDS ONE REGION. MANY OPPORTUNITIES. JAMAICA TRINIDAD & TOBAGO GUYANA BARBADOS THE BAHAMAS BELIZE EASTERN CARIBBEAN SURINAME CHOOSE YOUR EDITION Preorder your copy. Paperback US$20 + shipping · Launch price US$30 Save US$10 with your preorder. Preorder paperback → Standard hardcover US$25 + shipping · Amazon price US$34.99 Save US$9.99 compared with the Amazon book price. Preorder hardcover → All prices are in US dollars. Review shipping and your order total at checkout. Hardcover fulfilment begins after stock arrives; launch-day pickup is not guaranteed. The premium launch edition is available only at the launch event. MORE THAN A FINANCE BOOK The Caribbean is more than a place you come from. It is a place worth investing in. From the stock exchanges of Jamaica and Trinidad to Guyana’s extraordinary transformation, from family businesses to affordable housing, the region is filled with opportunities most of us were never taught to see. Caribbean Money: Invest and build wealth in the region you love changes that—with real stories, clear explanations and the perspective of someone who has spent years reporting on Caribbean business from the inside. SAVE US$10 WITH YOUR PREORDER Paperback preorder US$20 + shipping Launch price will be US$30 + shipping Choose your edition → INSIDE THE BOOK View the full chapter outline 01 The Caribbean is investable See the region differently—and understand what ownership can actually look like. 02 Follow the opportunities Move beyond familiar headlines to spot where Caribbean wealth is being created. 03 Understand the markets Learn how Jamaica, Trinidad, Guyana and other regional markets really work. 04 Put your money to work Explore stocks, bonds, funds, property, private businesses and impact investing. CHAPTER BY CHAPTER Inside Caribbean Money. Explore the markets, products and paths to ownership covered in the book. For launch partners, this outline offers a starting point for discussing how your work connects with the themes. CHAPTER 01 The Caribbean Is an Investment Market Why the region belongs in the investment conversation, and what it means to own a piece of its future. CHAPTER 02 Follow the Money The flows of money and the industries creating opportunities across the Caribbean. CHAPTER 03 Read the Economy Before You Buy the Asset Understanding the economic backdrop before choosing an investment. CHAPTER 04 Jamaica: From Crisis to Capital Jamaica’s economic journey and the opportunities shaping its investment market. CHAPTER 05 Trinidad and Tobago: When Energy Builds an Economy The role of energy in Trinidad and Tobago’s economy and investment landscape. CHAPTER 06 Guyana: The Caribbean’s New Growth Engine Guyana’s transformation and what rapid growth means for investors and businesses. CHAPTER 07 The Rest of the Investable Caribbean A wider look at the region’s markets and opportunities beyond Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana. CHAPTER 08 Buying Caribbean Stocks Stock-market investing, listed companies and access to Caribbean exchanges. CHAPTER 09 Bonds, Government Securities and Fixed Income How bonds and other fixed-income investments fit into wealth building. CHAPTER 10 Funds, Pensions and Pooled Investments Unit trusts, pension funds and other ways to invest through pooled portfolios. CHAPTER 11 Private Equity, Venture Capital and Angel Investing Investing in private companies and supporting businesses at different stages of growth. CHAPTER 12 Business Ownership and Direct Investment Building wealth through entrepreneurship, owning businesses and investing directly. CHAPTER 13 Real Estate Investing in the Caribbean Property as an investment and the opportunities and considerations that come with ownership. CHAPTER 14 Impact Investing Investments that seek financial returns alongside positive social or environmental outcomes. Introduction & conclusion Kalilah’s Caribbean story opens the discussion; Own a Piece of the Caribbean brings it together with a call to turn learning into ownership. Discuss a launch partnership “Caribbean people should not only work in, consume from and promote the region—we should own more of it. ” — KALILAH ENRIQUEZ REYNOLDS YOUR READING COMPANION From the page to your next step. Reading about a market or an investment? Find the relevant links on the Book Resources page. Our directory, broker guide, dictionary and investing tools live together on Money Mission. Explore Book Resources → KEEP LEARNING One place for practical tools. Money Mission brings together free courses, investing education and the resources to put your reading into practice. Visit Money Mission ↗ MEET THE AUTHOR From Belize, through Jamaica, for the whole Caribbean. Kalilah Enriquez Reynolds is a Caribbean financial journalist, media entrepreneur and the creator of Taking Stock and The Bottom Line . Born in Belize and based in Jamaica, she has spent years helping Caribbean people make sense of money, markets and the opportunities hiding in plain sight. Caribbean Money brings that reporting, those conversations and her own Caribbean story together. Book Kalilah for speaking or hosting ↗ FOLLOW KALILAH KEEP YOUR MONEY MISSION GOING More from Kalilah. Take your next step with the Money Mission Workbook and practical financial education to help you put what you learn into action. PUT IT INTO PRACTICE Money Mission Workbook Turn your goals into an action plan with practical exercises for budgeting, managing debt and planning your money. Explore the Workbook ↗ KEEP LEARNING Money Mission Build your confidence with free budgeting and debt courses, investing education and practical tools made for Caribbean people. Visit Money Mission ↗ BEFORE YOU GO Questions you might already be asking. Is this book only for people living in the Caribbean? Not at all. It is for Caribbean people at home, across the diaspora and anywhere else someone wants to understand the region’s investment opportunities. Do I need a lot of money to start investing? No. The right starting point depends on the market and investment, but learning your options comes before deciding how much to commit. Where are the resources mentioned in the book? Visit Book Resources for links organised around your reading. The investment directory, broker guide and learning tools are on Money Mission. Where can I preorder the book? Preorder Caribbean Money through our checkout. Paperback preorders are US$20 + shipping (launch price US$30). Standard hardcover preorders are US$25 + shipping, US$9.99 below the Amazon book price of US$34.99. The premium edition is available only at the launch event. Review the shipping charge and order total at checkout. How do I enquire about bulk orders or an interview? Send a book enquiry with your organisation, requested quantity or interview details. Open the Book Enquiry Form → STAY IN THE LOOP Good opportunities don’t always come with a billboard. Get Caribbean business news, investment insights and book updates delivered to your inbox. Get the newsletter → $ Ask the Money Guide
Caribbean Sustainability Bond Launches as Landmark Regional Investment Bond for Resilience and Growth - CARICOM Mr. Rodinald Soomer, CEO of the CARICOM Development Fund (front row, left) with representatives of the JMMB Group and the Climate Bond Initiative at the Caribbean Sustainability Bond Launc...
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Caribbean Sustainability Bond Launches as Landmark Regional Investment Bond for Resilience and Growth - CARICOM Mr. Rodinald Soomer, CEO of the CARICOM Development Fund (front row, left) with representatives of the JMMB Group and the Climate Bond Initiative at the Caribbean Sustainability Bond Launch held in Barbados Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Tumblr Pinterest Reddit Skype WhatsApp Share via Email Print The Caribbean Sustainability Bond, a first-of-its-kind regional investment opportunity seeking to mobilise up to US$250 million for climate resilience, sustainable development and economic transformation across the Caribbean, was officially launched on Wednesday at the Caribbean Investment Forum (CIF) in Barbados. The bond will be issued by Caribbean Sustainability Investments Limited (CSIL), with the CARICOM Development Fund (CDF) serving as Project Sponsor and JMMB Securities Ltd, part of the JMMB Group, acting as Lead Arranger and Broker. Funds raised through the bond are expected to support projects aligned with sustainability and development priorities across the Region, including climate-resilient infrastructure, renewable energy, sustainable water and wastewater management, environmental protection and other initiatives that contribute to long-term economic and social development. The Caribbean is among the world’s most climate-vulnerable regions and continues to face significant financing gaps in the investments needed to support resilience, sustainability and long-term economic development. The Caribbean Sustainability Bond seeks to help address that challenge by creating a pathway for capital to flow into projects that deliver environmental, social and economic benefits across the Region. The launch formed part of the Caribbean Investment Forum, and featured a high-level panel discussion titled “Investing in Caribbean Resilience: Introducing the Caribbean Sustainability Bond”, followed by an official launch ceremony and networking reception. Distinguished speakers included Rodinald Soomer, Chief Executive Officer, CARICOM Development Fund; Karl Townsend, Chief Country Officer, Group Capital Markets Unit, JMMB Group Jamaica; and Meggie Eloy, Global Technical Assistance Lead, Climate Bonds Initiative. The discussion explored the growing importance of climate finance in unlocking opportunities for regional development, and examined ways to mobilise private capital to support sustainable growth and resilience across CARICOM Member States. “For the first time in the region’s history we are launching a bond designed specifically to mobilise capital for growth and resilience – two pillars that will define the Caribbean’s future. Growth, because our economies must expand in ways that create jobs, foster innovation, and open new markets. Resilience, because we must be better prepared to decisively meet the climate, economic and social challenges posed by our present realities,” said Rodinald Soomer, Chief Executive Officer of the CARICOM Development Fund. The initiative is designed to bring together investors, development partners and project sponsors around a shared vision for the Caribbean, creating a platform capable of financing projects that support growth, resilience and long-term sustainability. “The Caribbean Sustainability Bond creates a platform that brings together eligible projects under a single regional financing framework, presenting investors with a compelling Caribbean investment opportunity. Instead of fragmentation, we create scale, unlocking greater access to capital for projects that strengthen resilience, sustainability and long-term economic growth across the region,” said Karl Townsend, Chief Country Officer, Group Capital Markets Unit, JMMB Group Jamaica. The regional financing framework is designed to aggregate eligible projects and connect them with a broader pool of local, regional and international investors seeking opportunities that deliver both financial returns and measurable development impact. “Climate finance is not about the label. It is about what the money does. The Caribbean Sustainability Bond provides an opportunity to direct capital towards investments that strengthen resilience, support sustainable development and help build a more climate-ready Caribbean,” said Meggie Eloy, Global Technical Assistance Lead, Climate Bonds Initiative. The Climate Bonds Initiative provided technical assistance in the development of the bond framework, helping to ensure alignment with recognised international sustainability standards and best practices. The launch comes at a pivotal moment for the Region. Caribbean countries continue to face increasing pressure from climate-related events, infrastructure needs and development financing gaps. The bond is expected to advance projects that support the achievement of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), while helping to build a stronger, more resilient and more prosperous Caribbean. To learn more about the Caribbean Sustainability Bond and Caribbean Sustainability Investments Limited (CSIL), visit https://csilcaribbean.com ( CARICOM Development Fund Press Release ) About CARICOM Development Fund (CDF) – The CDF established in 2008 is a regional financial institution in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) mandated to provide technical and financial assistance to disadvantaged countries, regions and sectors participating in the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME). The CDF is committed to providing effective, efficient and sustainable solutions that address the challenges faced by its member countries by delivering innovative solutions aimed at reducing intra-regional disparities through effective partnerships and the provision of tailor-made solutions aimed at building resilience and accelerating sustainable economic development in the Caribbean Community. The CDF is based in Barbados. About JMMB Group – JMMB Group is one of the leading financial services groups in the Caribbean, serving individual and business clients across Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, the Dominican Republic and Barbados. The Group provides a comprehensive suite of financial solutions, including investments, banking, remittances and insurance brokering. Driven by its core value of love, JMMB Group is committed to helping individuals and businesses achieve their financial goals with integrity, transparency and excellence. About Climate Bond Initiative – Climate Bonds is a leading international non-governmental organisation mobilising global capital for climate action. They drive the growth of the green and sustainable debt market through science-aligned frameworks including taxonomies and standards, certification, data and insights, and provision of expert policy and technical advice. Climate Bonds helps ensure the quality of these bonds, and provides investors, issuers and others with the information they need to participate in the market. They are the technical assistance advisor to JMMB Securities Limited. Tags caribbean investment forum climate resilience renewable energy sustainable development Show More Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Tumblr Pinterest Reddit Pocket WhatsApp Share via Email Print News Letter Subscribe to our mailing list to get the new updates! Enter your Email address Related CARICOM Parties Prepare for Key Biodiversity Negotiations Ahead of COP17 October 8, 2026 CARICOM, India commit to continued cooperation October 5, 2026 New Ambassador of Saint Lucia Accredited to CARICOM October 2, 2026 CARICOM, OPEC Fund sign MoU on Sustainable Development Cooperation October 1, 2026 Check Also Close Economic Integration CARICOM Secretariat to Host Webinar on Innovative Financing for Renewable Energy Projects September 28, 2026 Facebook Twitter LinkedIn WhatsApp Back to top button Close Facebook Twitter YouTube Search for: Close Search for
CONSTRAINTS AND
OPPORTUNITIES FOR
EMPLOYMENT AND
ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE
CARIBBEAN REGION
Strengthening Caribbean Economic Growth (SCEG)
August 2025
Authored by Sasha Muench and Deborah Gordon
## Contents
1. Introduction ... 3
2. Methodology and Limitations of Findings ... 4
2.1 Market C...
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CONSTRAINTS AND
OPPORTUNITIES FOR
EMPLOYMENT AND
ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE
CARIBBEAN REGION
Strengthening Caribbean Economic Growth (SCEG)
August 2025
Authored by Sasha Muench and Deborah Gordon
## Contents
1. Introduction ... 3
2. Methodology and Limitations of Findings ... 4
2.1 Market Constraints Research ... 4
2.2 Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices (KAP) Survey ... 4
3. Key Findings ... 6
3.1 Small Island Economies ... 6
3.2 Tourism ... 8
3.3 Labor Force Participation ... 10
3.4 Education and Workforce Skills Gap ... 11
3.5 Enterprise Challenges ... 14
3.6 Limited Access to Finance ... 16
3.7 Lack of Mobile Internet Utilization ... 19
3.8 Weak Business Resilience Capacities ... 21
3.9 Limited Business Development Services (BDS) ... 22
4. Potential for Change ... 24
5. Conclusion ... 25
Annexes ... 27
Annex A: Emigration Data for 11 of the 12 Jurisdictions ... 27
Annex B: Obstacles to Business Innovation – Perception of Enterprises in the Caribbean ... 28
Annex C: Detailed Information on Caribbean Credit Unions ... 29
Annex D: Other Relevant Programs ... 30
Annex E: KAP Survey Participant Demographics ... 33
Annex F: KAP Correlation Analysis ... 35
Annex G: KAP Survey Questions ... 36
References ... 38
## 1. Introduction
Figure 1: Map of the Caribbean
The U.S. Department of State-funded program, Strengthening Caribbean Economic Growth (SCEG),
aims to build the economic strength and job skill sets of individuals aged 16 and older so they may
better pursue employment, entrepreneurship, and economic well-being. To achieve this goal, the
SCEG program will launch a small grant challenge to identify and implement solutions that
measurably improve job skills
training, employment
opportunities, and livelihood
outcomes within 12 jurisdictions
in the Caribbean: Antigua and
Barbuda, Barbados, the
Bahamas, Dominica, the
Dominican Republic, Grenada,
Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis,
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and
the Five Grenadines, Suriname,
and Trinidad and Tobago.
Establishing a small-grant
challenge grounded in evidence
based research is vital to
providing tangible and effective solutions. To achieve this, the SCEG program conducted two
complementary assessments to identify the constraints and opportunities facing individuals seeking
employment and micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) interested in growing and hiring
more workers: a survey of macro-level market constraints and an assessment of individuals’
knowledge, attitudes, and practices (KAP).
Table 1: Jurisdictions’ Populations and GDPs as of 2024 The 12 jurisdictions offer varied
| Country | Population | GDP (in billions) | GDP per economies, with populations capita ranging from 47,000 in Saint |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Antigua & Barbuda | 93,772 | 2.2 | $ 23,726 Kitts and Nevis to 11.3 million |
| Bahamas | 401,283 | 15 | $ 39,455 in the Dominican Republic, all |
| Barbados | 282,467 | 7.2 | $ 25,366 of which are either stable or |
| Dominica | 66,205 | 0.7 | declining. Annual Gross $ 10,405 |
| Dominican Republic | 11,427,557 | 124 | Domestic Products (GDPs) $ 10,876 |
| Grenada | 117,207 | 1.4 | range from US$700 million in $ 11,872 |
| Jamaica | 2,839,175 | 20 | Dominica to US$124 billion in $ 7,020 |
| St Kitts & Nevis | 46,843 | 1.1 | the Dominican Republic, with a $ 22,771 |
| St. Lucia | 179,744 | 2.6 | median GDP of US$3.65 billion $ 14,182 and median GDP per capita of |
| St. Vincent & the 5 Grenadines | 100,616 | 1.2 | $ 11,501 US$12,027 (compared to a |
| Suriname | 634,431 | 4.7 | GDP per capita of US$85,810 $ 7,431 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 1,368,333 | 26 | in the United States, according $ 19,315 |
to the World Bank). Tourism is the dominant economic sector in some jurisdictions (e.g., Antigua and Barbuda) but a minor one in
MERCY CORPS Constraints and Opportunities for Employment and Entrepreneurship in the Caribbean Region 4 others (e.g. Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago). Some jurisdictions are heavily oriented toward supply chains and economic linkages with the United States (e.g. Jamaica and Barbados) while others are more connected to Latin America (e.g. Dominican Republic).
Given the economic diversity across the region, the research summarized in this report focused on cross-cutting constraints that are common across the region and can potentially be addressed with small-scale interventions and/or investments. The report briefly explains the methodology used and then outlines the key findings as well as the potential opportunities for change.
## 2. Methodology and Limitations of
## Findings
### 2.1 Market Constraints Research
The research on market constraints utilized a literature review of relevant reports, as well as an analysis of data sets from the International Labor Organization (ILO), the World Bank, and the Inter American Development Bank (IDB). An independent consultant hired by Mercy Corps conducted the research.
It is important to note there are significant information gaps in the region. For some jurisdictions, especially the smaller ones, there is little recent localized data, and they are generally not included in the data sets mentioned above (or the data included is from 2016 or earlier). In addition, the multilateral agencies include different countries in their definitions of the Caribbean region, so regional summaries are not fully comparable. For example, some reports include Belize, Haiti, and/or Guyana and omit the Dominican Republic or Suriname. Summary information that includes the entire Latin American and Caribbean region (LAC) was omitted from this report as the Caribbean is a relatively small portion of that region and notably different from other Latin American countries. Where feasible, the raw data was explored and results extrapolated for the 12 jurisdictions included in the SCEG Program. Additionally, some papers included in this literature review narrowed their focus to a few of the larger jurisdictions, usually the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. As a result, conclusions on specific jurisdictions based on findings presented in the SCEG report should not be formed at this stage without additional micro and site-specific research. However, the main themes and findings are applicable to the region, and broad conclusions can be drawn about overlapping constraints, as well as promising sectors and opportunities.
### 2.2 Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices (KAP) Survey
The KAP survey was conducted to supplement the analysis of macro-level constraints with additional context and depth at the individual level regarding knowledge, attitudes, and practices related to economic empowerment. The KAP survey was designed by the SCEG Program Manager and the Measurement, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) Manager, with input from Mercy Corps’ Program Quality Advisor and Economic Development teams. The team researched aspects of economic development and designed questions to assess:
• Financial Literacy
• Economic Empowerment
• Access to Resources
• Income Generation
• Workforce Participation
• Entrepreneurship/Business Knowledge
Mercy Corps utilized the OnaData platform to build the survey and collect data. To launch the KAP survey, Mercy Corps leveraged three modes of outreach to survey participants: 1) Mercy Corps’ Caribbean Resilience Initiative Facebook page; 2) Existing community-based organization (CBO) networks; and 3) CBOs identified in each jurisdiction during a stakeholder mapping exercise that occurred in December 2024. The survey was launched on June 29, 2025, and remained open for responses until July 14, 2025. Participants were also made aware that the survey would be anonymous. (See Annex E and G for participant demographic details and survey questions, respectively.)
The KAP findings summarized in this report indicate a variety of trends across demographic factors and economic determinants. Mercy Corps set a target sample size of 385 respondents; 191 individuals completed the survey, which is not a large enough sample to be statistically representative of the Caribbean population. Therefore, findings are not statistically generalizable across the entire region. Furthermore, the demographic makeup of the KAP participants differs from the Caribbean in several aspects. For example:
• 81% (157) of participants identified as female, compared to 51% in the Caribbean at large. 1
• 82% (159) of participants were over the age of 35, while only 42% of the overall region’s total population is over 35. 2
• Most of the participants were educated, with 86% (164) having a secondary education or above, compared to 54% of individuals in the Caribbean. 3
• Of the 12 jurisdictions where Mercy Corps solicited participation in the survey, the Dominican Republic and Jamaica have the largest populations, and therefore it was expected that roughly 73% of the sample would come from those two jurisdictions. However, these two countries only comprised 6% of the survey sample, while Trinidad and Tobago, St. Lucia and Dominica comprised 56% of the respondents, despite comprising only 8.5% of the region’s total population.
For these reasons, while the KAP findings can identify high-level trends, the results must be interpreted within the context of existing data and its limitations.
1 Regional figure taken from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.MA.ZS?locations=S3
2 Regional stats taken from https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/.
3 Beuermann, D. W., et. al. eds., Are we there yet? The path toward sustainable private sector development in the Caribbean, IDB,
2024, pg. 58.
## 3. Key Findings
### 3.1 Small Island Economies
All 12 jurisdictions in the SCEG program fall into the grouping of Small Island Developing States (SIDS), sharing the common characteristics that they depend on imports for key food, fuel, and manufactured goods, and thus are vulnerable to global price fluctuations, and tariffs, and have experienced overall low private sector investment and growth. 4 The Caribbean SIDS are also marked by high transportation and connectivity costs, despite their proximity to the North and South American land masses.
The jurisdictions all have small populations and economies, except for the Dominican Republic, which is the eighth largest economy in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). 5 Economic growth has been relatively slow for decades and the region is marked by high government debt. While the region receives high foreign direct investment, local economic growth returns are low, which suggests the region suffers from low productivity, low rates of technological change within the private sector, and an inability to turn that investment into innovative economic activity. 6
Exacerbating this situation, the Caribbean has one of the highest emigration rates in the world for skilled workers, with assessments calculating that up to 68% of the population with post-secondary education leaves the region to pursue better job opportunities, primarily in the US and the UK. 7 Not only does this lead to an undersupply in skilled workers (as explained more below), “but the net effect of migration and remittances on growth tends to be negative for the Caribbean, which has been characterized by brain drain and relatively small remittance receipts.” 8 Additionally, the Caribbean population is aging, as annual population growth fell from 0.61% in 2000 to 0.37% in 2023, leading to an ever-smaller working age population. 9 (See Annex A for emigration data by jurisdiction).
Recent data on primary economic sectors cannot be found for all 12 jurisdictions, but the ILO collected data on primary employment sectors for the Dominican Republic, St. Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago. 10 Figures 2-4 show wholesale and retail trade and vehicle repair as the largest employment sectors in all three countries, ranging from 14% (Trinidad and Tobago) of the working population to 20% (Dominican Republic). However, the education sector employs 19% of working women in Trinidad and Tobago, while construction is the largest employer of men at 17%.
4 For more information on SIDS see https://www.un.org/ohrlls/content/about-small-island-developing-states.
5 County Private Sector Diagnostic: Creating Markets in the Dominican Republic, International Finance Corporation, October 2023,
pg. 1.
6 Beuermann, D. W., et. al. eds., Are we there yet? The path toward sustainable private sector development in the Caribbean, IDB,
2024, pg. 36.
7Ibid., pg. 71, 72.
8 Beuermann, D. W., et. al. eds., Are we there yet? The path toward sustainable private sector development in the Caribbean, IDB,
2024, pg. 69.
9 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Population, Development and Rights in Latin America and
the Caribbean: draft second regional report on the implementation of the Montevideo Consensus on Population and Development,
2024, pg. 93.
10 Data taken from ILO Statistics on Sectoral Employment. St. Lucia data collected in 2024; Dominican Republic and Trinidad and
Tobago data gathered in 2023.
Accommodation and food services are significant employers of women in the Dominican Republic (11%) and St. Lucia (16%) (see Figures 2-4).
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
Total Female Male
Figure 3: Saint Lucia Employment Sectors 2024 Wholesale and retail trade; repair of
motor vehicles and motorcycles
Accommodation and food service
activities
Construction
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security Administrative and support service activities Agriculture; forestry and fishing
Transportation and storage
Education
Manufacturing
Human health and social work activities
Household activities for own use
Other service activities
Financial and insurance activities
Professional, scientific and technical activities
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
Total Female Male
Figure 2: Dominican Republic Employment Sectors 2023 Wholesale and retail trade; vehicle &
motorcycle repar Manufacturing
Construction
Accommodation and food service activities Agriculture; forestry and fishing
Other service activities
Education
Transportation and storage
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security Household activity for own use
Human health and social work activities
Arts, entertainment and recreation
Administrative and support service activities Professional, scientific and technical activities
### 3.2 Tourism
Each jurisdiction has a different mix of sectors driving its economy, but tourism continues to be a significant source of employment and contributor to gross domestic product (GDP) across the region. Tourism contributed between 11% and 22% of the region’s GDP in 2023 (depending on which countries are included). 11 Data from 2019 shows the tourism sector directly employed 18% of the region’s labor force and indirectly sustained another 43.1% (see Figure 5). 12
However, there is diversity among the selected jurisdictions in the percentage of their economy that is indirectly sustained by tourism, ranging from less than 10% in Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago, to
11 World Bank. 2025. Rethinking Caribbean Tourism: Strategies for a More Sustainable Future. pg. xii. The 22% estimate includes Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. It omits Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname and adds in Belize and Sint Maarten. 12 Table reprinted from Muhummed, A., Beyond tourism: A policy framework for economic diversification and job creation in the Caribbean, ILO, 21 May 2025. The Dominican Republic is included in the Latin American region in ILO calculations and there is no equivalent data available for that country.
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%
Total Female Male
Figure 4: Trinidad And Tobago Employment Sectors 2023 Wholesale and retail trade; vehicles and
motorcycle repair Construction
Education
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security Other service activities
Information and communication
Manufacturing
Accommodation and food service activities Transportation and storage
Water supply; sewage, waste management Agriculture; forestry and fishing
Financial and insurance activities
Arts, entertainment and recreation
Mining and quarrying
Figure 5: Direct and Indirect Employment in the Tourism Industry as a Percentage of Total Employment (2019)
91% in Antigua and Barbuda. While the Coronavirus (COVID) pandemic devastated the tourism industry in 2020 and 2021, by 2023 and 2024 tourism rebounded to pre-pandemic levels in every jurisdiction, and many were setting records for tourist arrivals.
Tourism is an especially significant employer of women and youth, with women making up “57–70% of workers directly employed in the hospitality as well as food and beverage industries pre pandemic, higher than in all other sectors combined in the Caribbean” (see Figure 6). 13 The sector is also the highest direct employer of youth (aged 15-24), with the Caribbean jurisdictions holding five of the top 10 spots globally for direct youth employment in the travel and tourism sector as a share of total national employment (see Figure 7). 14
Unfortunately, “most jobs in the sector remain precarious, low-paid, informal, and highly gender segregated.” 15 Jobs are also often insecure because of the sector’s seasonal nature and exposure to natural disasters. As a result, “while the tourism sector offers broad employment opportunities, especially for first-time job seekers, the nature of these jobs…makes it difficult for workers to move up the economic ladder or build resilience against shocks. Often, the sector functions as a revolving door: high turnover, low retention, and few long-term career pathways.” 16
In addition, the tourism sector’s contribution to a diverse local private sector is low because of the historical focus on cruises and all-inclusive resorts rather than local experiences. In 2019, the average amount spent locally per individual tourist in the Caribbean (US$712) was half that in the
13 Rethinking Caribbean Tourism: Strategies for a More Sustainable Future, World Bank, 2025, pg. xii. Chart taken from pg. xiii.
14 Both charts reprinted from Rethinking Caribbean Tourism: Strategies for a More Sustainable Future, World Bank, 2025, pg. xiii.
15 Muhummed, A., Beyond tourism: A policy framework for economic diversification and job creation in the Caribbean, International
Labor Organization, 21 May 2025.
16 Llovet Montanes, R., et al., Beyond the Beach Beyond the Beach: Why Job Quality in Caribbean Tourism Matters More Than
Ever, June 26, 2025, World Bank.
Figure 6: Direct Travel & Tourism Sector Employment, as Percentage of Total National
Employment by Age Group (for top 10 countries with highest proportion of young people in2019)
Figure 6: Tourism Direct Employment by Gender in Hotels and Restaurants (2019 or last available year)
Figure 7: Direct Travel & Tourism sector employment, as share of total national employment, top 10 countries for proportion of young people (2019)
Pacific (US$1,428).” 17 To increase the sector’s impact on local jobs, incomes, and profits, it is vital to strengthen local economic linkages by increasing local enterprise engagement directly with tourists and connecting international companies with local supply chains, for example farmers, artisans, and service providers. It is also crucial to increase capacity in local tourism businesses and their workforce, particularly in the areas of digitalization of operations and sustainable tourism. 18
### 3.3 Labor Force Participation
Labor force participation rates in the
region are low, at 64%, although
there is variation among
jurisdictions. 19 An ILO report using
2023-2024 data for nine of the 12
jurisdictions showed labor force
participation ranged from 55% for
Trini
A Comparison of Saving Rates: Microdata Evidence from Seventeen Latin American and Caribbean Countries --> --> --> Advanced search Browse Econ Literature Working papers Journals Software components Books Book chapters JEL classification More features Subscribe to new research RePEc Biblio Author reg...
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A Comparison of Saving Rates: Microdata Evidence from Seventeen Latin American and Caribbean Countries --> --> --> Advanced search Browse Econ Literature Working papers Journals Software components Books Book chapters JEL classification More features Subscribe to new research RePEc Biblio Author registration Economics Virtual Seminar Calendar ConfWatcher NEW! Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/col/000425/014413.html My bibliography Save this article A Comparison of Saving Rates: Microdata Evidence from Seventeen Latin American and Caribbean Countries Author & abstract Download & other version 2 Citations Related works & more Corrections Author Listed: Néstor Gandelman Registered: Nestor Gandelman Abstract Using microdata on expenditure and income for seventeen Latin American and Caribbean countries, this paper presents stylized facts on saving behavior by age, education, income, and place of residence. Counterfactual saving rates are computed by imposing the saving behavior, the population distribution, or the income distribution of two benchmark economies (the United States and Korea). The results suggest that the difference in national saving rates between Latin America and Caribbean and the benchmark economies can mainly be attributed to differences in saving behavior of the population and, to a lesser extent, to differences in the distribution of the population by education levels. Other demographic or income distribution differences are not quantitatively important as explanations of saving rates. Suggested Citation Néstor Gandelman, 2016. " A Comparison of Saving Rates: Microdata Evidence from Seventeen Latin American and Caribbean Countries ," Economía Journal , The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA, vol. 0(Spring 20), pages 201-258. Handle: RePEc:col:000425:014413 as HTML HTML with abstract plain text plain text with abstract BibTeX RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite) ReDIF JSON Download full text from publisher File URL: http://economia.lacea.org/contents.htm Download Restriction: no ---> Other versions of this item: Gandelman, Néstor, 2016. " A comparison of saving rates: microdata evidence from seventeen Latin American and Caribbean countries ," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 123245, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library. Citations Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project , subscribe to its RSS feed for this item. as HTML HTML with abstract plain text plain text with abstract BibTeX RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite) ReDIF JSON Cited by: Néstor Gandelman, 2017. " Do the rich save more in Latin America? ," The Journal of Economic Inequality , Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 15(1), pages 75-92, March. Néstor Gandelman, 2017. " Do the rich save more in Latin America? ," The Journal of Economic Inequality , Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 15(1), pages 75-92, March. Gandelman, Néstor, 2015. " Do the Rich Save More in Latin America? ," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 6914, Inter-American Development Bank. Nestor Gandelman, 2015. " Do the rich save more in Latin America? ," Documentos de Investigación 102, Universidad ORT Uruguay. Facultad de Administración y Ciencias Sociales. More about this item Keywords Saving rates ; Latin America ; All these keywords JEL classification: C81 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Microeconomic Data; Data Access D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis D14 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Saving; Personal Finance D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth Statistics Access and download statistics Corrections All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. 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#### Caribbean Development Dynamics 2026 Investing in Sustainable and Resilient Development
Caribbean Development
Dynamics
2026
INVESTING IN SUSTAINABLE AND RESILIENT
DEVELOPMENT
This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD and the Inter-American
Devel...
71
ETHNOLOGY vol. 48, no.1, Winter 2009, pp. 71–84.
ETHNOLOGY, c/o Department of Anthropology, The University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh PA 15260 USA
Copyright 2010 by The University of Pittsburgh. All rights reserved.
## CREDIT, IDENTITY, AND RESILIENCE IN THE BAHAMAS AND BARBADOS 1
Brent W. S...
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71
ETHNOLOGY vol. 48, no.1, Winter 2009, pp. 71–84.
ETHNOLOGY, c/o Department of Anthropology, The University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh PA 15260 USA
Copyright 2010 by The University of Pittsburgh. All rights reserved.
## CREDIT, IDENTITY, AND RESILIENCE IN THE BAHAMAS AND BARBADOS 1
Brent W. Stoffle National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Trevor Purcell University of South Florida Richard W. Stoffle Kathleen Van Vlack University of Arizona Kendra Arnett Jessica Minnis College of the Bahamas
People of the Caribbean have maintained social networks that provide security in the face of human and natural perturbations. Rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) constitute one such system, which probably came to much of the Caribbean with African people and persisted through slavery. As a foundation of creole economic systems throughout the Caribbean, ROSCAs are time-tested dimensions of traditional culture and a source of pride and identity. This analysis of the history and contemporary functions of ROSCAs in Barbados and the Bahamas is based on more than a thousand extensive and intensive first-person interviews and surveys. This article argues that ROSCAs continue, much as they did in the past, to provide critical human services, social stability, and a source of African-ancestor identity in these two nations. (Women’s power, rotating credit, Bahamas, Barbados)
Identity is a central debate for the peoples of the Caribbean (Alleyne 2002; Hall and DuGay 1996; Identities 2008; Small Axe 2008), with questions of “Where did we come from, and are those biological roots tied in any important way to how we live and who we are today?” (Yelvington 2001) asked by locals and university scholars alike. This analysis aims to answer these questions about perceived identities and origins of Barbadians and Bahamians. Caribbean people, regardless of their phenotype, are choosing to attach cultural origins to key aspects of their culture, and thus privilege them over other origins and cultural patterns. Main labeling trends attribute European, African, Asian, or local origins to the development of contemporary culture, including society and language (Forte 2000; Howard 2002). Once any of these broad cultural lineages is chosen, then localizing cultural roots in space and time adds authenticity to the identity (Payne Jackson and Alleyne 2004:57–78). Rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) are a source of perceived identities and origins for Barbadians and Bahamians. ROSCAs—variously known as
72 ETHNOLOGY meeting turn, sou sou, asu, box hand, and partner—are savings and credit patterns that exist throughout the Caribbean and are typically attributed to African origins. ROSCAs also tend to be a source of ethnic pride and are central in contemporary discussions of identity. The use of ROSCAs exemplifies the resilience of people always adapting to the boom and bust economies of the Caribbean. This article compares ROSCAs in Barbados (known as meeting turn) and the Bahamas (known as asu), both islands of former African-ancestry slave-based plantation colonies of Great Britain. They are independent countries whose citizens are struggling to choose which of the various available identity streams should be privileged at the national level. Over a thousand direct interviews document that people in these two nations generally attribute their systems of rotating credit to Africa (especially West Africa), and believe that rotating credit persisted during slavery because it was widely understood among the slaves and could not be controlled by the dominant society. Bahamians and Barbadians also stipulate that rotating credit became a foundation of social and economic exchanges because it could be totally controlled by the participants, thus giving them agency, and maintain that rotating credit persists in modern times because it continues to make positive contributions to community resilience and pride, both of which are key aspects of identity. These findings document the complexity of asking the question “Why are ROSCAs so culturally central?” METHODS AND ASSUMPTIONS The analysis is informed by more than 30 years of research conducted among the residents of coastal communities in the Caribbean. These research projects occurred in urban and rural areas in Barbados, The Bahamas, Antigua, St. Lucia, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the Dominican Republic (Rubino and Stoffle 1990; B. Stoffle et al. 1999; B. Stoffle and R. Stoffle 2007; R. Stoffle et al. 1994). This research report is primarily based on more than a thousand quantitative and qualitative interviews collected in Barbados and the Exuma Islands and Cays in the central Bahamas. The Barbados interviews were conducted during a three-year study of traditional microeconomic systems of exchange, especially those focused on rotating savings and credit associations. During five field sessions in Barbados, 500 interviews were con ducted; of these interviews, 120 were with the people of the rural Bath Plantation area. The remaining interviews were of those living in urban Bridgetown. Interviews collected data on microeconomic systems that contribute to a creole economy. The Bahamian study involved 572 interviews with 193 people from six traditional communities in the Exumas. Gender balance was approached in the 352 formal inter views but an imbalance towards males occurred in the 221 informal interviews. During these five field sessions, approximately the same percentage of each community was formally interviewed with an overall sample size of 34 percent of the census recorded population. The Bahamas research is inductive, iterative, mixed methodologically, collaborative, and consultative. The broadest research goal was to understand how potential Marine Protected Areas (MPA) could affect local communities and which of these would best
ROSCAs 73 predict local community responses to the MPAs. Conducted over six years, the eight field sessions permitted an iterative cycle of collecting data, analyzing findings, and returning to the field with new and revised data collection instruments. During these interviews, Exumian people noted that the Bahamian rotating credit association (asu) was and continues to be an essential aspect of how people work together to strengthen their communities and make them resilient. The study team conducted interviews spe cifically about asu. This article assumes that broader patterns of Caribbean life, especially those occurring over the life cycles of individuals and through traditional patterns established over many generations, can be understood through interviews and a few typical stories from a single settlement. These thousand-plus interviews documented the cultural centrality of ROSCAs.
ROSCAS IN THE CARIBBEAN ROSCAs are a system for compulsory saving and microcrediting that involves people who come together based on interpersonal knowledge and trust. In many cases members tend to belong for life, thus making well established ROSCAs multi generational. The behavior of members reflects on past, present, and future generations and affects an individual’s social status in the community and to some degree in their society at large. A ROSCA, for example, that is run on an annual cycle may be struc tured to involve 12 members, each of whom places a sum of money in a common pool, the total of which is given each month to a member based on a predetermined order and rotating schedule. The cycles for many of the “meeting turns” persist, with members continuing to participate even though a cycle may have ended. In some cases, there are meeting turns that have existed for over 65 years, replacing members as necessary. In Barbados, each ROSCA is led by an “organizer” (B. Stoffle 2001) or “meeting holder” (Gmelch and Gmelch 1997). The “meeting holder” is almost always an older woman, something that is common throughout the Caribbean. It is possible that this relates to the idea that saving money is a woman’s responsibility and probably even more specifically tied to the roles of women in the Caribbean as expressed in Barrow’s (1992) work on the matrifocal family. Even though women are the predominant leaders of ROSCAs, members vary regarding age, ethnicity, and gender (Yelvington 1995:217). The key is to be of good standing in the community and able to meet the financial responsibilities of participation. Shifting cycles or the inability to make a payment involves a significant change and is negotiated by the organizer, who hears a request to change a hand rotation and then explains it to the members. A change can only be made with the approval of the members. Stability results in predictable amounts of money being available to individuals at agreed times. Flexibility of the ROSCA to meet unanticipated crises makes individuals and communities more resilient to social and cultural turbulence. Determining the origin of Caribbean ROSCAs is difficult because there is little direct evidence that identifies a place, group, or time as the point of origin. Similarities in linguistic and organizational structure and ideology suggest a link between Caribbean ROSCAs and those from West Africa and Asia (Ardener 1964; Ardener and Berman
74 ETHNOLOGY 1995; Geertz 1962). Ardener (1964) states that while no one knows precisely how ROSCAs began in Africa, indications are that the institution in West Africa is indige nous. People in Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and Cameroon are said to have had rotating funds that predated the arrival of European currency and were operated in kind. Among the Yoruba of Nigeria, contributions were made in cowries (Ardener 1964). Purcell (2000) suggests, without speculating on the specific institutional roots of ROSCAs, that the elements of co-operation, communality, and reciprocity are characteristic of many indigenous African social organizations. For this reason many believe that historical and contemporary Caribbean ROSCAs are based on traditional African cultural organi zations. Linguistic comparisons further support the argument that some Caribbean ROSCAs are linked to African ROSCAs. For example, the susu in Trinidad (Herskovits and Herskovits 1947), the sousou in Martinique (Laguerre 1990), and asu (esu) in the Bahamas (Craton and Saunders 2000) are all linguistically similar to the esusu, susu, and isusu in West African countries. In Africa, 33 countries are recorded as having rotating credit associations, but only names from West Africa match those used in the Caribbean (Bouman 1995). Names for rotating credit associations from 20 Asian countries do not match linguistically. The combination of linguistic similarities and dissimilarities, as well as the fact that many of the people in the Caribbean were from African ethnic groups, suggests that meeting turn in Barbados (which is also called sou sou) and asu in the Bahamas are derivatives of traditional West African associations. Creole economics (Browne 2004) is a term used to describe the informal economic systems of exchange developed in situ by the people of the Caribbean. Such systems generally were experimented with during slavery and have subsequently been carried into modern times because they still serve average people better than colonially estab lished economic systems and because people prefer them. Browne argues that the people of Martinique drew on African cultural practices during slavery to make economic systems that were invisible and largely uncontrollable because such exchanges were illegal. People carried these African-based creole economic systems forward in time because they function well and are in opposition to formal economic systems of the colonial nation. Men who operate the creole economic systems are called debrouillards, who use cunning to succeed, and so become trickster folk heroes. National and ethnic identity debates are never neutral in the Caribbean (Yelvington 1993, 2006). They are hotly argued in the streets, the newspapers, and even in parlia ment. Basic to all these debates is their emergence since the end of the nation’s colonial status. Under a colonial government one’s identity as a citizen was imposed. The colonial government, usually based in Europe, determined the proper language, family system, education, religion, economy, and even the colony’s flag. With independence, the former colonies had the power to redefine aspects of their culture. Tensions arose when the former colonies were unable to control the credibility and authenticity of potential changes. Is marriage by an Obeah priest legal? Are generational land title claims equal to fee simple titles? Should the national language be Ashanti? Educational content and school leaving exams, for example, were set by Oxford and Cambridge Universities for English colonies in the Caribbean, and this continued for decades after
ROSCAs 75 independence because these standards were widely recognized while local standards were not. Identity debates tend to focus initially on the question of who the people genuinely are. Biculturalism is the outcome of societies made to serve a European colonial nation but whose workers are primarily composed of unfree laborers from many cultures forced to work for others (Williams 1944:7). The most robust model of bicultural societies was presented by Wilson (1969, 1973) who maintained that two mirror-oppositional cultures exist in each colonial society and in the minds of its citizens. The official culture (called respect or colonial) was defined and legally imposed by Europeans and the oppositional culture (called reputation or creole) was developed by the people of the colony and hidden from the ruling gaze. Most people can code-switch in a moment between colonial and creole language, legal and creole economics, pronouncements on appropriate family practice, and what constitutes an appropriate religious practice. The biculturalism of the Caribbean is the only robust explanation of widespread creole economics in Martinique (Browne 2004) and the persistence of the creole family system in Barbados (R. Stoffle 1977). Resilience is a term used to describe the ability of a society and its natural environment to recover from social and natural distresses (Holling 1973). Recovery is defined as returning to a similar, but not necessarily identical, state which involves almost the original number of people and their physical distribution, but also their funda mental social structure, quality of life, and key components of their core culture that are central to well being and identity. Key dimensions of resilience in Caribbean societies involve having redundant natural and social connections “occupational multiplicity” (Comitas 1964) or “environmental multiplicity” (Stoffle and Minnis 2007). MEETING TURN IN BARBADOS Barbados is a small island, approximately 166 square miles, located in the extreme eastern Caribbean, which was claimed by the British in 1625 and settled shortly there after. Bridgetown, the capital of Barbados, is located in the protected west-coast harbor, and Bath is a rural settlement on the rugged northeast coast. The first unfree laborers in Barbados were Scottish and Irish prisoners of war sent by Lord Cromwell between 1650 and 1660 and sold to planters (Frank 1920:372–373). This practice of importing political prisoners as unfree laborers continued until 1746. By the mid-1600s, sugar replaced cotton, African people replaced the Scots-Irish as the major source of labor, and large plantations supplanted small farmers (Watts 1994:176–231). By the third quarter of the seventeenth century there were more people in Barbados than in any of the mainland English colonies. Origins of Meeting Turn A cultural practice hidden during slavery usually remains undetected, so it is not surprising that meeting turn does not appear in the early historic records of Barbados. Survey and documented data suggest that its roots are of West African cultural and
76 ETHNOLOGY socioeconomic practices adapted to a cash economy dominated by slaves and free African-ancestry women. The most obvious source of cash for slaves was female huckstering—taking some product, whether grown, traded, or stolen, to sell for cash. According to Beckles (1999:140–155) slaves, particularly females, participated in the market economy as producers and distributors, with and without their owners’ permission. After the 1816 slave revolt, the official inquiry reported that “each negro cultivates a garden of his own in which he raises, with great facility, corn, ocros, yams, etc. A great part of the ginger exported is raised in these gardens. They also raise hogs, goats, and poultry and the market is chiefly supplied by the negros” (Craton 1982:257). African-ancestry people so dominated the domestic market that a series of laws was passed to regulate, tax, or prevent huckstering. These laws were largely unsuccessful. The persistence of Barbadian internal marketing demonstrates that male and female slaves struggled against laws and regulations to achieve an economic life of their own. Cash from these exchanges had to be hidden, and based on interviews, it seems that meeting turn was one feature of this invisible economy. Barbados settlement patterns changed little after emancipation in the early 1830s. Former slaves, lacking access to new lands and jobs, continued to live on and engage in wage work for the plantations that had enslaved them. The Land Purchase laws required that large quantities of land be bought at very high prices, propelling purchases beyond the means of former slaves. Trollope (1860:199) wrote, “When emancipation came there was no squatting ground for the poor Barbadian. He had still to work and make sugar —work quite as hard as he had done while yet a slave. He had to do that or to starve.” There were few positive changes in the lives of newly freed slaves. After emancipation, plantation owners would no longer provide former slaves with subsistence, provisions, housing, clothing, and medical support. Especially important was the loss of salted fish, which tended to be the only source of animal protein. Now almost totally on their own in the search for food and shelter, former slaves increasingly depended on house gardens, local small scale farming, animal husbandry, fishing, and huckstering. Because meeting turn and other matters of money are rarely discussed, there is little to document its existence. Ethnographic research using interviews and oral histories document the perception that meeting turn has been a part of everyday life in Barbadian culture for over a century. Some might argue that such associations only became preva lent in more modern times as people were increasingly integrated into the informal economy, but it is important to note that slaves controlled a remarkable proportion of the cash on the island through the sale of certain products and wares at the markets. Meeting Turn as Still Useful Meeting turn has contemporary relevance in the lives of rural and urban Barbadian people. Though in the urban setting some of the principles of participation have changed, where trust and personal knowledge have been replaced by proximity and regularity, the primary aspect of compulsory savings still exists—participation is based
ROSCAs 77 on social relationships and one’s reputation. Access to a meeting turn hinges on one’s standing as a person. In the office setting, where many meeting turns are operated, the notion of trust and social standing is replaced by the fact that participants are in prox imity to each other on a daily basis and that their paydays occur at the same time. Still, compulsory savings allow people to utilize the benefits associated with participation in meeting turn as opposed to formal banking operations. In fact, for some it is because of the meeting turn that they are actually able to participate in formal banking systems, thus bridging the gap between
Invest in Brantridge Spring Water Dominica’s Ltd. Purest Natural Resource — Water – Dominica Classified
# Invest in Brantridge Spring Water Dominica's Ltd. Purest Natural Resource — Water
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Invest in Brantridge Spring Water Dominica’s Ltd. Purest Natural Resource — Water – Dominica Classified
# Invest in Brantridge Spring Water Dominica's Ltd. Purest Natural Resource — Water
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Amenties: Electricity, Road, Water
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## How to Raise Household Savings in LAC:
### Constraints and Best Practices
#### Verónica Frisancho
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Department of Research and Chief Economist
TECHNICAL NOTE Nº
April 2016
## How to Raise Household Savings in LAC:
### Constraints and Best Practices Verónica Frisancho
Inter-Ameri...
Caribbean AI Readiness Report 2026 - Ian Khan | AI Keynote Speaker for Hire | Futurist, Author, Thinkers50 Caribbean AI Readiness Report 2026 Caribbean AI Readiness Report 2026 Regional Intelligence · AIRS Assessment · 2026 A comprehensive diagnostic of artificial intelligence readiness across the C...
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Caribbean AI Readiness Report 2026 - Ian Khan | AI Keynote Speaker for Hire | Futurist, Author, Thinkers50 Caribbean AI Readiness Report 2026 Caribbean AI Readiness Report 2026 Regional Intelligence · AIRS Assessment · 2026 A comprehensive diagnostic of artificial intelligence readiness across the Caribbean region, measuring seven critical pillars from strategy to security. By Ian Khan, The Futurist · Published 2026 · 8 min read · Regional report Key takeaways The region records an average AIRS score of 47.4%, placing it in the Emerging readiness band. 62% of assessed leaders score below the 50% threshold. AI Strategy is the second-weakest pillar at 49.4%: AI investment exists but is not governed by coherent architecture. Data Readiness and Operations lead, reflecting the financial sector's regulatory-compliance discipline. Assessment at a glance 500+ leader interviews Caribbean professional cohort 47.4% average AIRS score Emerging band 62% score below the 50% threshold Readiness gap 7 pillars measured Strategy to Security All seven pillars at a glance Pillar Regional score Note Operations & Resilience 57.9% Highest-scoring pillar Data Readiness & Governance 57.8% Regional competitive advantage Execution & Integration 57.6% Small advanced cohort exists Security & Risk 56.9% Most evenly split responses AI Governance & Compliance 54.9% Oversight forming, not formalized Innovation & Use Cases 50.0% Critical innovation gap AI Strategy & Alignment 49.4% Second-weakest pillar No pillar scored above 58%. Every dimension of AI readiness measured in this assessment has meaningful room for improvement. This is not a technology gap; it is a leadership and organizational capability gap. The technology exists. The will to build the organizational infrastructure around it is what separates the leaders from the rest. Readiness bands across the cohort Band Score range Share Count Critical 0 to 25% 11% 17 orgs Emerging 25 to 50% 51% 81 orgs Developing 50 to 70% 23% 36 orgs Capable 70 to 85% 9% 15 orgs Advanced 85 to 100% 6% 10 orgs The organizations that will lead the Caribbean's AI transformation are not necessarily the largest or the best-funded. They are the ones that move with deliberate urgency: assessing honestly, prioritizing intelligently, and executing consistently. Future Shift Labs, Caribbean AI Readiness Report 2026 The readiness roadmap The report closes with a phased action framework mapped to readiness band. Phase 1, Foundation, spans days 1 to 90 for Critical and Emerging bands: run the assessment, appoint an AI strategy owner, run a data quality audit, and launch a first governed pilot with audit logging. Phase 2, Build, covers months 4 to 6 for the Developing band: a 12-month roadmap, MLOps setup, a use-case review committee, and API-first integration. Phase 3, Scale, covers months 7 to 12 for Capable and Advanced bands: an AI center of excellence, vendor risk assessment, and annual reassessment. Frequently asked questions What is the Caribbean AI Readiness Report? The Caribbean AI Readiness Report 2026 is a regional diagnostic of AI readiness across the Caribbean, based on 500+ leader assessments using the AIRS seven-pillar framework. The region records an average AIRS score of 47.4%, placing the collective cohort in the Emerging readiness band. What are the seven pillars of the AIRS framework? The AI Readiness Score measures seven pillars: AI Strategy and Alignment, Innovation and Use Cases, Data Readiness, AI Governance, Execution and Integration, Operations and Resilience, and Security and Risk. Each is scored on a four-point scale producing an overall percentage from 0 to 100. How ready is the Caribbean region for AI? With an average AIRS score of 47.4%, the region sits in the Emerging band: AI awareness is present, but the strategic architecture, governance infrastructure, and execution capability required to deploy AI at scale are largely absent. 62% score below the 50% threshold. The strongest pillars are Operations at 57.9% and Data Readiness at 57.8%; the weakest is AI Strategy at 49.4%. Who produced the Caribbean AI Readiness Report? The report was produced by Future Shift Labs, part of The Futurist Global ecosystem created by Ian Khan, using the AIRS framework. It draws on the UNDISRUPTED methodology and the seven pillars of future readiness. Executive Leadership · Strategy Decision Velocity: How the Fastest-Deciding Organizations Win the AI Decade The speed and quality of your decisions is now your real competitive edge. Ian shows leaders how to measure their organization’s decision velocity, expose the bottlenecks slowing them down, and build the systems that let teams decide faster without deciding worse. Transformation · Leadership Future-Ready: Building the Wall Against Disruption Disruption is not the risk; being unready for it is. Using the Future Readiness Score, Ian turns transformation from a vague ambition into a measurable, benchmarked state, giving leaders a clear roadmap to make their organization resilient to whatever comes next. AI Strategy · Operations The Year of ROI: Turning AI Pilots Into Payoff Everyone ran the pilots; almost no one is getting the return. Ian moves audiences past experimentation to an honest, audit-grade view of what actually blocks AI value, and the concrete moves that convert AI investment into measurable business results. Future of Work · Operating Model The Agentic Enterprise: Leading a Workforce of Humans and AI Agents AI agents are joining the org chart. Ian shows leaders how work, roles, and decision-making change when autonomous agents operate alongside people, and how the organizations that redesign first will define the next decade of their industry. Bestseller Keynote · Fortune 500 Undisrupted: The Seven Pillars of Companies That Refuse to Be Left Behind Drawn from Ian’s USA Today and Publishers Weekly bestseller, this keynote lays out the seven-pillar framework that Fortune 500 teams use to stay ahead of change, giving every leader in the room a practical system to future-proof their people, culture, and strategy. Designed for Your Audience Custom Keynote Experience A bespoke keynote tailored to your industry, audience, and strategic priorities, supported by pre-event stakeholder interviews and content customization. How to cite this research This analysis is free to cite and reference. Attribution to Ian Khan, The Futurist, is requested. Khan, I. (2026). Caribbean AI Readiness 2026. Ian Khan / The Futurist Global. https://iankhan.com/insights/caribbean-ai-readiness-2026/ Author: Ian Khan, Global Top 25 Futurist and Thinkers50 Distinguished Award Finalist, 2025. Source URL: https://iankhan.com/insights/caribbean-ai-readiness-2026/ Citable data points from this report Each item has its own page, built to be quoted and cited by search and AI engines. What is the Caribbean's AI readiness score? (47.4%) What share of Caribbean organizations score below the AI readiness threshold? (62%) What are the seven pillars of the AIRS AI readiness framework? (7) What is the weakest AI readiness pillar in the Caribbean? (49.4%) What is the strongest AI readiness pillar in the Caribbean? (57.9%) What percentage of AI projects fail to reach production? (85%) What is the AI Readiness Score (AIRS)? (0-100) What is FutureSHIFT? How much will AI add to global GDP by 2030? ($13T) How much are AI regulatory penalties reaching? ($4.5B) How did Caribbean leaders access the AI readiness assessment? (66%) Related research Benchmark The Readiness Gap 1,159 assessments; 48% sit in the Red Zone. Quarterly Intelligence Q1 2026 State of Technology The quarter the future stopped being theoretical. Trends Top 50 Technology Trends 2026 The constraint era, mapped across 50 trends and nine chapters. Book Ian × Check availability Book Ian Khan Share your event details and Ian’s team will respond as soon as possible. Your Name * Email * Company / Organization Phone (Optional) Event Type Select… Keynote Executive Workshop Board / Advisory Panel / Moderation Other Key Dates City of Engagement Audience # Attendees Your Requirement * Send Inquiry → Bring Future Readiness to Your Next Event Share your audience, date, and goals. Ian’s team will respond with availability and the right keynote or workshop format. Check Availability Start a conversation Bring clarity to what comes next. Share your event, audience, and goals. 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Caribbean Citizenship and Family Office Strategy 2026 | Mirabello
# Caribbean Citizenship and Family Office Strategy 2026: UHNW Planning Guide
Vito Magagnino· CEO· Updated September 2026· 9 min read
The short answer
Caribbean citizenship by investment (programmes from around $200,000, processed ...
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Caribbean Citizenship and Family Office Strategy 2026 | Mirabello
# Caribbean Citizenship and Family Office Strategy 2026: UHNW Planning Guide
Vito Magagnino· CEO· Updated September 2026· 9 min read
The short answer
Caribbean citizenship by investment (programmes from around $200,000, processed in roughly three to seven months) lets UHNW families add a second citizenship to family-office architecture, diversifying jurisdictional risk and supporting lawful, transparent multi-generational wealth planning. All structures remain CRS and FATCA reportable. This is general information, not tax or legal advice; consult qualified advisers.
Source: Mirabello Immigration Intelligence · Verified by Mirabello Consultancy · reviewed September 2026. Figures are time-sensitive; a specialist confirms your case. Machine-readable data via our MCP.
### Key Takeaways
- Caribbean CBI programmes cost between $200K and $250K and can be processed in as little as 45 days, making them the most efficient citizenship planning tools available to family offices.
- Grenada's citizenship is the only Caribbean CBI programme offering access to the US E-2 investor visa treaty, a critical consideration for families with American business interests.
- The new ECCIRA regulatory body (established December 2025 and expected to begin operating later in 2026) is set to harmonise due diligence across five Caribbean CBI nations, adding institutional credibility to family office compliance frameworks.
- Multi-passport strategies combining Caribbean citizenship with Golden Visa residency programmes create layered jurisdictional diversification for succession planning.
- Family offices that integrate CBI into their wealth structuring can achieve tax-neutral domicile options, enhanced global mobility (up to 157 visa-free destinations), and ring-fenced asset protection.
- Mirabello Consultancy has processed 250+ Caribbean CBI cases with a 99% approval rate, providing the Swiss-standard advisory family offices require.
## Caribbean Citizenship and Family Office Strategy 2026: UHNW Planning Guide
A well-structured Caribbean citizenship family office strategy enables UHNW families to secure second citizenships from $200K, diversify jurisdictional risk, and optimise multi-generational wealth planning, all within three to seven months. In 2026, with regional regulatory harmonisation planned under ECCIRA, integrating citizenship by investment into family office architecture is becoming both more structured and more strategically valuable than ever before.
### Key Takeaways
- Caribbean CBI programmes cost between $200K and $250K and can be processed in as little as 45 days, making them the most efficient citizenship planning tools available to family offices.
- Grenada's citizenship is the only Caribbean CBI programme offering access to the US E-2 investor visa treaty, a critical consideration for families with American business interests.
- The new ECCIRA regulatory body (established December 2025 and expected to begin operating later in 2026) is set to harmonise due diligence across five Caribbean CBI nations, adding institutional credibility to family office compliance frameworks.
- Multi-passport strategies combining Caribbean citizenship with Golden Visa residency programmes create layered jurisdictional diversification for succession planning.
- Family offices that integrate CBI into their wealth structuring can achieve tax-neutral domicile options, enhanced global mobility (up to 157 visa-free destinations), and ring-fenced asset protection.
- Mirabello Consultancy has processed 250+ Caribbean CBI cases with a 99% approval rate, providing the Swiss-standard advisory family offices require.
## What Is a Caribbean Citizenship Family Office Strategy?
A Caribbean citizenship family office strategy is the deliberate integration of citizenship by investment programmes into a family office's broader wealth management, succession planning, and risk mitigation framework. Rather than treating second citizenship as an isolated transaction, sophisticated family offices in 2026 view CBI as a structural component of multi-generational planning, alongside trusts, private investment vehicles, insurance wrappers, and international real estate portfolios.
This approach recognises that citizenship is not merely a travel document. For UHNW families, a second passport represents jurisdictional optionality: the ability to relocate, bank, invest, educate children, and pass wealth across borders with greater freedom and fewer constraints. Caribbean CBI programmes, with their relatively modest investment thresholds, rapid processing times, and absence of physical residency requirements, are uniquely suited to this strategic function.
### Why 2026 Is a Pivotal Year
The establishment of the Eastern Caribbean Citizenship by Investment Regulatory Authority (ECCIRA) in December 2025, with operations expected by the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank to begin later in 2026, marks a watershed moment. For the first time, five Caribbean CBI nations, Antigua and Barbuda, St. Kitts and Nevis, Dominica, Grenada, and St. Lucia, are set to operate under a unified regulatory umbrella headquartered in Grenada. This harmonisation is expected to elevate the institutional credibility of Caribbean citizenship, making it easier for family office compliance teams to conduct due diligence on the programmes themselves and to justify CBI investments within regulated wealth structures.
## The Strategic Case for Caribbean CBI in Family Office Planning
Family offices typically manage assets exceeding $100 million and serve multi-generational families whose wealth, businesses, and personal lives span multiple jurisdictions. For these families, the question is not whether to diversify citizenship, it is how to do so most effectively. Caribbean CBI programmes offer several distinct advantages within this context.
### Jurisdictional Risk Diversification
Political instability, regulatory overreach, capital controls, and sudden changes in tax policy can threaten concentrated wealth. A second citizenship in a stable, common-law Caribbean jurisdiction provides an emergency exit and a planning foundation. Families from the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America have long recognised this value; increasingly, European and North American families are doing the same as geopolitical uncertainty intensifies.
### Global Mobility for Principals and Dependants
Caribbean passports provide visa-free or visa-on-arrival access to between 91 and 157 destinations, including the United Kingdom, the Schengen Area (for most programmes), Singapore, and Hong Kong. For family office principals who need to attend board meetings, inspect assets, or relocate family members at short notice, this mobility is operationally critical. The St. Kitts and Nevis programme, with 157 visa-free destinations, offers the strongest Caribbean passport in this regard.
### Tax-Neutral Domicile Options
Several Caribbean CBI nations impose no personal income tax, capital gains tax, wealth tax, or inheritance tax on worldwide income. Whilst citizenship alone does not automatically confer tax residency, and families must structure their affairs carefully with qualified tax advisers, the availability of tax-neutral domiciles provides significant planning flexibility, particularly for families restructuring ahead of generational wealth transfers.
### Speed and Discretion
Unlike European residency programmes, which can take years and require physical presence, Caribbean CBI programmes can be completed in as little as 45 to 60 days (Vanuatu) or three to six months (most Caribbean nations). There is no requirement to reside in, visit, or even disclose the citizenship publicly in many jurisdictions. This speed and discretion are precisely what family offices value when executing time-sensitive restructuring.
## Comparing Caribbean CBI Programmes for Family Office Use
Each Caribbean CBI programme offers distinct advantages depending on the family's strategic objectives. The following comparison highlights the key parameters that family offices should evaluate when selecting a programme, or, as is increasingly common, selecting multiple programmes simultaneously.
Caribbean CBI Programme Comparison for Family Office Planning (2026)
| Programme | Minimum Investment | Visa-Free Destinations | Processing Time | Key Strategic Advantage |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Antigua & Barbuda | $230,000 | 154 | 3-6 months | Family-friendly; includes dependants up to 30 |
| St. Kitts & Nevis | $250,000 | 157 | 4-6 months | Oldest programme (est. 1984); strongest passport |
| Dominica | $200,000 | 145 | 4-6 months | Most cost-effective Caribbean option |
| Grenada | $235,000 | 147 | 5-7 months | Only Caribbean CBI with US E-2 treaty access |
| St. Lucia | $240,000 | 144 | 4-10 months | Government bond option for conservative investors |
| Vanuatu | $130,000 | 90 | 45-60 days | Fastest processing globally; no EU visa-free access |
For a comprehensive analysis of all available programmes, visit our citizenship by investment hub.
## Integrating CBI into Multi-Generational Wealth Structures
The most sophisticated family offices do not simply acquire passports, they embed citizenship into the architecture of their wealth structures. This integration can take several forms, each requiring careful coordination between immigration counsel, tax advisers, fiduciary service providers, and the family office's in-house team.
### Succession Planning and Generational Transfers
Caribbean citizenship can be passed to dependants, including children born after the principal's application is approved. For family offices managing dynastic wealth, this creates a permanent jurisdictional option for future generations. Several programmes, notably Antigua and Barbuda, allow inclusion of dependant children up to age 30 and dependent parents, making single applications remarkably family-inclusive.
When combined with trust structures domiciled in favourable jurisdictions, Caribbean citizenship allows beneficiaries to receive distributions in a tax-neutral environment, potentially reducing the overall tax burden on generational transfers. This must be structured carefully with reference to both the family's home jurisdiction and the receiving jurisdiction's tax treaties.
### Corporate Structuring and International Holding Companies
Caribbean citizens can establish and direct companies in their country of citizenship, which may serve as holding vehicles for international investments. Whilst this is not the primary motivation for most UHNW families, it adds a layer of structural optionality that family offices can deploy when appropriate. Grenada's CBI programme, with its US E-2 treaty access, is particularly relevant for families establishing American subsidiaries or seeking treaty-based investor visas for the United States.
### Banking and Financial Access
A second citizenship can facilitate international banking relationships, particularly for families whose primary passport restricts access to certain financial centres. Caribbean citizenships, issued by stable Commonwealth nations with established regulatory frameworks, are generally well-received by international banking compliance departments, a position that ECCIRA's planned harmonisation of due diligence standards is expected to reinforce.
## ECCIRA and What It Means for Family Office Compliance
Family offices operate within stringent compliance environments. Every investment, every new jurisdiction, and every structural change must satisfy internal governance standards, external regulatory expectations, and the reputational risk appetite of the family. The establishment of ECCIRA is set to address several compliance concerns that have historically given family offices pause regarding Caribbean CBI.
### Harmonised Due Diligence Standards
ECCIRA is set to introduce unified background check protocols across all five participating Caribbean CBI nations once it begins operating. This would allow family offices to evaluate CBI programmes against a single, consistent due diligence standard rather than navigating five separate regulatory frameworks. For compliance officers, this simplification would be significant, as it would reduce the cost of internal programme evaluation and increase confidence in the integrity of approved applicants.
### Shared Intelligence and Continuous Monitoring
Under ECCIRA, participating nations will share intelligence on flagged applicants and maintain ongoing monitoring of approved citizens. This addresses one of the most persistent criticisms of CBI programmes, that post-approval oversight was insufficient. For family offices, the existence of a centralised regulatory body provides a defensible rationale when presenting CBI investments to boards, trustees, or external auditors.
### Alignment with International Standards
ECCIRA's proposed framework is designed to align with recommendations from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on transparency and beneficial ownership. This alignment strengthens the position of Caribbean CBI programmes within the global regulatory landscape and reduces the risk of adverse regulatory action against programme participants.
## Multi-Passport Strategies: Layering Caribbean CBI with Golden Visas
Increasingly, family offices are not choosing between citizenship and residency programmes, they are layering both to create comprehensive jurisdictional portfolios. A Caribbean citizenship provides immediate global mobility and a tax-neutral domicile option, whilst a European or Middle Eastern Golden Visa provides long-term residency rights in a major economic zone.
### Common Layering Strategies
A typical multi-passport strategy for a UHNW family might include:
- Caribbean citizenship (immediate): Acquired within three to six months for emergency mobility, jurisdictional diversification, and tax planning optionality.
- European Golden Visa (medium-term): Portuguese, Greek, or Spanish residency for Schengen access, eventual EU citizenship eligibility, and real estate portfolio diversification.
- UAE Golden Visa (complementary): Ten-year renewable residency for access to Dubai's financial infrastructure, zero personal income tax, and strategic Middle Eastern positioning.
This layered approach ensures that the family has immediate optionality (Caribbean), medium-term strategic positioning (Europe), and a complementary business and lifestyle hub (UAE). Each layer serves a different function within the family office's broader mandate.
### Coordinating Across Programmes
Multi-programme strategies require careful coordination to ensure that citizenship and residency applications do not create unintended tax residency triggers, conflict-of-law issues, or compliance complications. This is precisely the type of advisory work where a specialist consultancy with deep programme knowledge adds the greatest value. Mirabello Consultancy's team advises across seven languages and maintains direct relationships with CBI units and government officials in every programme jurisdiction.
## Practical Considerations for Family Office Advisers
For family office professionals evaluating Caribbean CBI as a planning tool, several practical considerations warrant attention beyond the headline investment figures and processing times.
### Cost Structure Beyond the Minimum Investment
The minimum investment thresholds quoted for Caribbean CBI programmes represent government contribution or real estate investment minimums. Additional costs include due diligence fees (typically $7,500-$10,000 per adult applicant), government processing fees, passport issuance fees, and professional advisory fees. For a family of four, total all-in costs for a contribution-based application typically range from $250,000 to $350,000 depending on the programme. Family offices should budget accordingly and request fully transparent fee schedules from their advisory firm.
### Dual Citizenship Disclosure and Home Jurisdiction Considerations
Not all countries permit dual citizenship, and some require disclosure of additional citizenships to tax authorities, immigration agencies, or security services. Family offices must evaluate the implications of acquiring Caribbean citizenship within the context of each family member's existing citizenship, tax residency, and regulatory obligations. This analysis should be conducted before an application is submitted, not after.
### Ongoing Obligations and Passport Renewals
Caribbean citizenships are generally permanent, but passports must be renewed periodically (typically every five years or ten years). Some programmes require minimal visits to the country (Antigua and Barbuda requires five days within the first five years). Family offices should diarise renewal dates and visit obligations within their operational calendars. Mirabello Consultancy manages over 1,500 passport renewals annually, ensuring continuity and compliance for families long after the initial citizenship is granted.
### Reputational Risk Management
For families with public profiles, the acquisition of a Caribbean citizenship may attract media or political scrutiny. Family offices should develop a communications framework in advance, including clear narratives around diversification, business flexibility, and family security. Working with an Investment Migration Council (IMC)-certified adviser, as Mirabello Consultancy is, provides additional reputational assurance.
## Frequently asked questions
What Is the Most Cost-Effective Caribbean CBI Programme for Family Offices?
Dominica offers the most cost-effective Caribbean citizenship at $200,000 minimum contribution, with 145 visa-free destinations and processing in four to six months. For family offices prioritising value, Dominica provides strong returns relative to the investment. However, if US market access is a priority, Grenada's E-2 treaty access at $235,000 may deliver greater strategic value.
Can Multiple Family Members Apply Under a Single CBI Application?
Yes. All Caribbean CBI programmes allow inclusion of spouse, dependent children, and in most cases dependent parents and grandparents within a single application. Antigua and Barbuda is particularly generous, permitting dependant children up to age 30. This family-inclusive approach makes Caribbean CBI exceptionally efficient for multi-generational family office planning.
How Does ECCIRA Affect Existing Caribbean Citizenships?
ECCIRA is not yet operating and none of its measures is in force; the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank expects ECCIRA to begin operating later in 2026, and no start date has been announced. Its proposed harmonisation is expected to apply primarily to new applications once in force, while its planned continuous monitoring mandate is set to extend to all CBI citizens. For existing holders, this would mean enhanced programme integrity and reputational strength, both positives for family offices that have already invested in Caribbean citizenship.
Do Caribbean CBI Programmes Require Physical Residency?
No Caribbean CBI programme requires the applicant to live in the country as a condition of obtaining citizenship. Antigua and Barbuda has a minimal visit requirement of five days within the first five years. All other Caribbean programmes, Dominica, St. Kitts and Nevis, Grenada, and St. Lucia, impose no residency or visit obligations whatsoever, making them ideal for family offices managing globally mobile principals.
Can Caribbean Citizenship Be Integrated with Existing Trust Structures?
Caribbean citizenship itself cannot be held by a trust, as citizenship is a personal status. However, the jurisdictional optionality that citizenship provides can be leveraged within trust structures, for example, by enabling a settlor or beneficiary to establish tax residenc
Return to Africa and the Caribbean: A Pragmatic Plan A return to Africa and the Caribbean is a capital allocation decision before it is anything else. Most diaspora returnees price the flight and the shipping container, then stop. The costs that break a budget arrive later: a vehicle duty rule, a ta...
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Return to Africa and the Caribbean: A Pragmatic Plan A return to Africa and the Caribbean is a capital allocation decision before it is anything else. Most diaspora returnees price the flight and the shipping container, then stop. The costs that break a budget arrive later: a vehicle duty rule, a taxed retirement account, a three-month gap between landing and income. This guide gives you a phased framework for a return to Africa and the Caribbean, the failure points that sink returnees, and the specific tools that test each decision with numbers before you commit money. It is built for people planning a diaspora repatriation plan, a bi-continental lifestyle strategy, or Pan-African business investment at SME scale in Africa or the Caribbean. Why a Return to Africa and the Caribbean Fails on Arithmetic, Not Intent Intent is rarely the problem in a return to Africa and the Caribbean. Diaspora capital is already moving. Kenya's diaspora remittances reached a record USD 4.95 billion in 2024, per statements by President Ruto reported by AllAfrica . The IDB estimates the Caribbean received about US$20.9 billion in remittances in 2025, with Jamaica alone taking a record US$3.49 billion, roughly 15% of GDP, as summarized by MetricSuite . That money moves as household transfers. It rarely converts into structured investment or residency, and the reason is mostly structural. CRDEA documents what it calls the $500,000 Wall : formal investor-residency thresholds across the continent typically sit between USD 100,000 and USD 500,000, while the typical diaspora SME investor deploys USD 30,000 to 60,000. Sierra Leone's Heritage Naturalization route, built for applicants of African descent, still requires USD 100,000. Kenya's Class G investor permit sits at the same figure. Three market realities shape every plan: Entry thresholds are set for large capital. If your plan depends on an investor residency category, check the threshold first. Many SME-scale returnees will not qualify, and the policy work to create an SME tier (CRDEA's ADSII proposal asks for USD 30,000 to 50,000) is still pending. Trade frameworks are signed, not fully executed. Nearly all 55 African Union states have joined the African Continental Free Trade Area, but implementation is uneven. In the Caribbean, CSME duty-free status depends on the specific tariff line. Treat both as upside to verify, not as a base case. Rules change. Duty schedules, residency clocks, and withholding rates all move. A shipping-company blog from three years ago is not a source. If a plan for a return to Africa and the Caribbean survives these three facts, it is worth building. If it only works under optimistic assumptions about all three, it is a lifestyle wish, not a plan. The Four-Phase Framework for a Return to Africa and the Caribbean Run your return to Africa and the Caribbean as four gated phases. Do not enter the next phase until the current one produces documented numbers. Phase Core question Exit gate 1. Preparation Am I legally and financially able to go? Eligibility confirmed, relocation cost and runway calculated 2. Capital and business validation Does the money and the business model work locally? Positive unit economics in local currency, verified partners 3. Execution Can I deploy capital in controlled stages? Entity registered, first stage funded, reporting in place 4. Long-term integration Does the structure hold without me micromanaging it? Self-funding operations, tax position settled, exit options defined Phase 1: Preparation (Months 0 to 6) The goal is to establish what you are legally allowed to do and what your return to Africa and the Caribbean will cost. Confirm returning-resident eligibility before anything ships. Concessions on a return to Africa and the Caribbean are not automatic. Most destinations require a minimum period abroad: three consecutive years for Jamaica, twelve months for Ghana, nine months for Nigeria, per CRDEA's analysis of repatriation costs . Run your dates through the Returning Resident Eligibility Checker , which covers Jamaica and Ghana, and read the Returning Resident Customs Rules guide for the four-country comparison. Then confirm with the destination customs authority in writing. Check access before choosing a country. If you hold a Caribbean passport and are considering an African destination, the Caribbean Visa Access Checker shows where entry is visa-free and on what terms. Visa-free entry is not residency. It is the first filter only. Price the full return to Africa and the Caribbean. Use the Repatriation Cost Calculator to model one-time relocation cost, the monthly cost-of-living shift, and your savings runway. It covers moves from the UK, US, or Canada to Jamaica, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, or Trinidad and Tobago. The runway output is the number that matters most: how many months your savings cover the gap between destination costs and income you retain. Map what happens to your retirement accounts. This is the line item most people discover too late. Per CRDEA's sourced summary, a US 401(k) or IRA stays taxable by the IRS wherever you live, and early withdrawal before 59 and a half adds a 10% penalty. A Canadian RRSP faces 25% non-resident withholding, reduced to 15% in some cases if converted to a RRIF first. A UK pension generally stays in the UK and is drawn down remotely. Get a cross-border tax adviser to confirm your specific position before you move any account. Decide the vehicle question early in any return to Africa and the Caribbean. Jamaica currently offers no duty exemption on vehicles for returning residents. Kenya exempts one replacement vehicle under strict conditions. Trinidad and Tobago waives customs duty and motor vehicle tax but still charges VAT. The gap is a five-figure swing on the same car. Model it with the Kenya Vehicle Import Duty Calculator or the Jamaica Import Duty Calculator before deciding to ship. Phase 2: Capital and Business Validation (Months 3 to 12) Phase 2 tests whether the capital and the business model behind your return to Africa and the Caribbean survive contact with local costs. Do this from abroad, while you still have income. Compare destinations on cost, not feeling. The Business Destination Comparator lines up African markets on setup cost and operating conditions. Pair it with the African Business Registration Cost Estimator or the Caribbean Business Registration Cost Estimator so you know registration costs before an agent quotes you. Validate unit economics in local currency. If your plan is agricultural, benchmark it before you send money. The Crop Profit Calculator gives input costs, yield, and gross profit per hectare, and the Livestock Profitability Calculator does the same per head. Their main use is as an independent check on what a farm manager or partner reports to you. For any business, run the Break-Even Calculator and use the Business Destination Comparator results to set a realistic volume target. Cost the labour properly. Payroll is more than wages. Use the African Employee True Cost Calculator or the Caribbean Employee True Cost Calculator to include statutory contributions and employer levies. If you plan to take a salaried role instead, the African PAYE Calculator and Caribbean PAYE Calculator show take-home pay after local tax. Verify land and assets independently. If land is part of the plan, use the Ghana Land Purchase Cost Calculator to see stamp duty, legal, search, and registration costs. Verify tenure through an independent lawyer and the relevant land registry. Never rely on a seller's or intermediary's documents alone. CRDEA's ADSII framework itself requires independent asset valuation and verification of land tenure, which is a sound standard for private buyers as well. Gate: you have a return to Africa and the Caribbean business case that is profitable in local currency, with the cost of power, labour, registration, and logistics included, and with a partner or operator you have checked independently. Phase 3: Execution (Months 9 to 24) Deploy capital for your return to Africa and the Caribbean in stages tied to evidence, not in a single transfer. Stage the money. Release tranches against milestones: entity registered, land secured with clean title, equipment delivered, first revenue. Hold a reserve outside the project. Register properly. Operate through a registered local entity. CRDEA's framework assumes a registered Kenyan company, documented partnerships, and tax compliance. Treat that as the baseline for any investor, whether or not a residency category depends on it. Set up reporting. Track income, expenses, and currency in one place. The Small Business Bookkeeping Workbook is built for income, expenses and monthly totals in one Excel file, and the Free Invoice Generator covers billing. Budget for power. Run the Generator vs Grid Power Cost Calculator for any site where outages are likely. Backup power is an operating cost, not an exception. Phase 4: Long-Term Integration (Year 2 and Beyond) Integration in a return to Africa and the Caribbean means the structure works without constant intervention and your tax and residency position is stable. Confirm what residency status you actually hold and what renewal conditions apply. Settle your tax residency position in both countries with a qualified adviser. Define an exit path: how you would sell, transfer, or wind down the operation if you needed to. Review quarterly against the numbers from Phase 2. If actuals diverge by more than your buffer, adjust before adding capital. The Traps That Break a Return to Africa and the Caribbean These are the recurring failure points in a return to Africa and the Caribbean. Each has a specific countermeasure. Trap 1: Underestimating Operating Costs and Bureaucratic Friction Friction is not a moral failing of any country. It is the normal operating condition of markets still building formal institutions, and it has a cost. Approvals take longer. Power is less reliable. Some processes depend on relationships as much as procedure. Countermeasure: price friction into your return to Africa and the Caribbean plan. Add time to every approval. Budget for backup power. Build a six to twelve month cash buffer beyond the calculator runway. Hire a local lawyer and accountant before you buy anything, and pay them to find problems, not to confirm your plan. For customs, confirm every figure with the revenue authority, because clearing agents add charges no calculator can see in advance. Trap 2: Importing a Western Business Model Unchanged A model that works in Toronto, London, or Atlanta assumes reliable power, formal credit, card payments, and predictable permitting. Many markets in a return to Africa and the Caribbean run on cash, mobile money, informal credit, and relationships. MetricSuite's analysis of diaspora entrepreneurship makes the useful point: the businesses that work solve one specific, expensive, everyday problem, and they are built for the market as it exists. M-KOPA's pay-as-you-go asset financing in Kenya and mobile payment tools for Ghanaian smallholders are examples of fitting a model to local rails rather than importing one. Countermeasure: before building, check how customers actually pay and what it costs. The Mobile Money Fees tool shows what M-Pesa, MTN MoMo, and Airtel Money charge once money lands. Talk to operators currently running businesses in your target market, not only people who left it. Trap 3: Mismanaging Capital Flow, Currency Risk, and Cross-Border Tax Three separate leaks sit in this trap, and each one erodes a return to Africa and the Caribbean funded from abroad. Transfer cost. The fee is only part of it. The exchange-rate margin and the cash-out fee usually cost more. Compare corridors with the Africa Remittance Comparison or the Caribbean Remittance Comparator before every large transfer, and see the spread you are being charged against the Currency Converter . Currency depreciation. If you earn or hold capital in USD, CAD, or GBP and spend in a local currency, a weak currency helps your purchasing power. If you import inputs, it hurts. The Cedi Depreciation Buffer Calculator shows how to price imports to survive a weaker cedi, and the same logic applies to any import-dependent business. Price in a currency buffer, and avoid holding all working capital in one currency. Cross-border tax. US citizens remain taxable by the IRS regardless of residence. Retirement withdrawals trigger the penalties and withholding described above. Treat the tax position as a design input, not an afterthought, and get written advice from someone who works in both jurisdictions. Family support is also a capital flow. If you send money to relatives, put a number on it. The Black Tax Calculator gives you the annual figure and its effect on your own savings position. An unbudgeted obligation is one of the most common ways a runway shortens. Trap 4: The Lifestyle Trap (Emotional Bias Over Feasibility) The return is often driven by legitimate frustration with stalled careers, rising rent, and a sense of ceiling in the West. That frustration is useful as information about where there are unmet needs. It is a poor basis for a go or no-go decision on a return to Africa and the Caribbean. The lifestyle trap shows up as: choosing a destination by sentiment instead of cost; skipping a scouting visit; accepting a partner because of shared identity rather than verified track record; and treating a low cost of living as proof the business will be profitable. Countermeasure: write down the conditions under which you will not go, before you are emotionally committed. Examples: runway under 12 months after all costs; no verified title on the land; no operator with a checkable record; projected break-even beyond 24 months. If a condition triggers, you stop. Set the rules while you are still objective. Building a Bi-Continental Lifestyle Strategy Not every return to Africa and the Caribbean needs to be permanent. Diaspora policy conversations in 2026 have shifted toward circulation, where skills, networks, and capital move back toward the continent without requiring full physical relocation. The African Union's proposed "Coming Home to Invest" corridor, discussed at a July 2026 dialogue, is framed as a coordination framework connecting diaspora investors with governments, institutions, and vetted projects. It does not replace national residency rules. A bi-continental lifestyle strategy for a return to Africa and the Caribbean keeps income and legal status in one jurisdiction while building assets and operations in another. It reduces the risk of a single point of failure and keeps your runway intact. The practical version: Keep a stable income base in the origin country while the destination business proves itself. Use the cost calculators in reverse. Run the Repatriation Cost Calculator with retained income entered, so the result shows surplus or shortfall. Set a review date. At 12 and 24 months, compare actuals to plan and decide whether to deepen the move, hold, or exit. Check trade corridors. If your business exports, the AfCFTA Tariff Lookup and the Africa Export Readiness Checker test whether continental trade preferences apply to your goods. For Caribbean goods, the CSME Tariff Lookup checks CARICOM duty-free status. Repatriation Financial Planning: A Decision Checklist Use this before committing capital to a return to Africa and the Caribbean. Eligibility: returning-resident status and visa terms confirmed in writing with the destination authority. Relocation cost: one-time cost modeled, vehicle decision made, retirement account treatment confirmed with a tax adviser. Runway: at least the calculator figure plus a 6 to 12 month buffer, held in accessible funds. Unit economics: profitable in local currency with power, labour, registration, and logistics included. Currency plan: import exposure identified, buffer priced, transfer corridor compared. Legal structure: registered local entity, documented partnership, independently verified land and assets. Reporting: bookkeeping and invoicing in place before the first tranche is released. Exit conditions: written list of triggers that stop the project, and a defined exit route. If any line is blank, your return to Africa and the Caribbean plan is incomplete. Frequently Asked Questions How much money do I need to return to Africa and the Caribbean? The cost of a return to Africa and the Caribbean depends on destination, household size, shipping method, and whether you bring a vehicle. A single average is not useful. Use the Repatriation Cost Calculator for your specific move, then add a buffer for the costs no calculator sees. Do I need to have lived abroad for a set period to qualify for returning-resident benefits? For a return to Africa and the Caribbean, usually yes, and it varies by country. Jamaica requires three consecutive years, Ghana twelve months, and Nigeria nine months. Trinidad and Tobago and Kenya have their own residency and documentation rules. Confirm with the destination's customs authority before shipping. Can small investors get residency through investment? Most formal investor categories for Pan-African business investment start at USD 100,000 or higher, which excludes many SME-scale investors. CRDEA's ADSII proposes a USD 30,000 to 50,000 SME tier with asset-based recognition and performance metrics. It is a proposal, not an established pathway, so plan around the rules that exist today. Is a return to Africa and the Caribbean permanent? It does not have to be. A bi-continental structure, with income and status in one place and operations in another, is a legitimate strategy and lowers risk during the first two years. What is the biggest mistake returnees make? The biggest error in a return to Africa and the Caribbean is assuming the market they left years ago is the market that exists today, and committing capital before testing the numbers. Verify current conditions through local business press and operators in-market. Next Step Start your return to Africa and the Caribbean with the numbers. Run your household through the Repatriation Cost Calculator , then work through the full Diaspora Tools hub for remittance, duty, land, farm, and payroll checks. For the policy side of diaspora return, read CRDEA's work on the African Diaspora SME Investment Initiative . This guide to a return to Africa and the Caribbean is for planning purposes and is not legal, tax, or financial advice. Duty rates, residency rules, and withholding rates change. Confirm figures with the relevant authority and a qualified adviser before committing money. Sources CRDEA: The Real Cost of Coming Home CRDEA: The African Union's New Diaspora Investment Corridor CRDEA: African Diaspora SME Investment Initiative MetricSuite: Diaspora Tools hub MetricSuite: Repatriation Cost Calculator MetricSuite: Diaspora Entrepreneurship in Africa MetricSuite: Caribbean Diaspora Investing 2026 AllAfrica: Kenya diaspora remittances in 2024 Jamaica Customs Agency: Returning Residents Kenya Revenue Authority: Guidelines for Returning Residents Ghana Revenue Authority: Passengers' Obligations at Customs Trinidad and Tobago Customs and Excise: Returning Nationals Julius Nyerere Previous Article An Open Letter to President Mahama, From a Jamaican Coming Home Next Article One Sky Africa: The Single African Air Transport Market and Why It's Needed Now Recent Posts How to Plan a Successful Return to Africa and the Caribbean: A Pragmatic Blueprint for the Diaspora by Julius Nyerere An Open Letter to President Mahama, From a Jamaican Coming Home by Julius Nyerere Ghana Dropped the DNA Rule for Diaspora Citizenship. Now What? by Julius Nyerere The African Union's New Diaspora Investment Corridor: What It Gets Right, and What It Still Misses by Julius Nyerere The Real Cost of Coming Home by Julius Nyerere You may also like Blog Pamoja AFCON 2027: The Diaspora Inve
Overview: Caribbean Development Dynamics 2026 | OECD
# Caribbean Development Dynamics 2026
17 April 2026
The Caribbean stands at a pivotal moment. Realising the region’s substantial development potential will require mobilising investment at far greater speed and scale. Caribbean Development Dy...
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Overview: Caribbean Development Dynamics 2026 | OECD
# Caribbean Development Dynamics 2026
17 April 2026
The Caribbean stands at a pivotal moment. Realising the region’s substantial development potential will require mobilising investment at far greater speed and scale. Caribbean Development Dynamics 2026: Investing in Sustainable and Resilient Development examines how Caribbean countries can strengthen sustainable and resilient growth by increasing both the quantity and the quality of investment amid heightened climate risks, fiscal constraints and enduring structural vulnerabilities. The report focuses its analysis – with different levels of data availability – on 16 Caribbean countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, The Bahamas, Belize, Cuba, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. These 16 countries are part of the 39 SIDS. The report analyses them alongside the Latin America and OECD averages. When relevant, the analysis also incorporates the perspective of the “Greater Caribbean”, including other countries and territories in the Caribbean basin.
### The Caribbean faces a complex set of environmental and socio-economic challenges
#### The region is increasingly exposed to climate hazards, although its contribution to global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is among the lowest worldwide
Climate vulnerability in the Caribbean remains high. All Caribbean countries 1 on average, are more exposed to climate-related risks than OECD Member countries, and a majority also display higher vulnerability than Latin American peers, according to standard vulnerability indicators. Caribbean countries experienced 357 climate-related extreme weather events between 1980 and 2024, an 84% increase between 2004 and 2024, relative to the previous 20 years (Figure 1, Panel A). Over 24 million people were affected in the last four decades. Moreover, annual climate-related damages have accounted for an average of 2.13% of gross domestic product (GDP) across Caribbean countries during that period. Climate disasters in Dominica (2015) and Grenada (2004) resulted in losses equivalent to 225% and 200% of their respective GDPs (Ötker and Srinivasan, 2018[1]). The impact of Hurricane Melissa (October 2025) was estimated at USD 12.2 billion in Jamaica, representing 56.7% of the country’s GDP (Jamaica Information System, 2026[2]). It also caused severe damage in The Bahamas, Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Haiti (IBRD/World Bank, 2025[3]). Meanwhile, regional GHG emissions were 8.1 Mt CO 2 e in 2023, 45 times lower than the OECD average and 24 times lower than Latin America, even when accounting for differences in population, land area and GDP (Figure 1, Panel B). This disparity underscores the continued relevance of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities in global climate action.
The share of renewables in the Caribbean’s electricity matrix remains low, and there is potential to develop these sources of energy. The low share of renewables is associated with structural economic vulnerabilities (including small and fragmented energy grids or a lack of economies of scale), and the low capacity of many governments to implement and scale up projects quickly. Moreover, high water stress and inefficient water use remain key environmental challenges, although some countries are making notable progress towards more effective water management. In 2022, the average water-stress level for the Caribbean stood at 20%, similar to the OECD average and 12 percentage points higher than in Latin America. Nonetheless, most water-stressed Caribbean nations, such as Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, are also among the most efficient users. This highlights the importance of combining strong national policy with targeted international investments to address water security and management.
Figure 1. Climate-related extreme weather events and GHG emissions in the Caribbean Copy link to Figure 1. Climate-related extreme weather events and GHG emissions in the Caribbean
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Note: Panel A: Disasters are considered as events that overwhelm local capacity, necessitating a request to the national or international level for external assistance; an unforeseen and often sudden event that causes great damage, destruction and human suffering. The graph considers only climate-related events such as droughts, floods, storms, extreme temperatures and wildfires. Geophysical events (earthquakes and volcanoes), technological events (industrial accidents), and biological events (including epidemics, insects, or animals) are recorded in EM-DAT but are excluded from the scores because they are not directly associated with climate change. Panel B: Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are measured in million tonnes of CO 2 equivalent (Mt CO 2 e). It includes emissions from fossil CO 2, methane (CH 4), nitrous oxide (N 2 O) and fluorinated gases (F-gases). Sectors shown are agriculture, energy (includes buildings, fuel exploitation and power industry), industry (including industrial combustion and processes), transport and waste. Indirect emissions are not shown due to their minimal contribution at the aggregate level.
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on data from EM-DAT (2025[4]), EM-DAT Database, https://doc.emdat.be/ (Panel A); and EDGAR (2025[5]), Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research, https://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ (Panel B).
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#### Macroeconomic conditions are characterised by modest potential growth and low productivity
Over the past decades, Caribbean countries have struggled to sustain high growth rates in potential GDP per capita, averaging an estimated 1.4% in 2025 (Figure 2). This is below the level observed in advanced economies (which, on average, recorded a potential GDP per capita growth of 1.8%) but above the Latin American average of 1.1%. However, while potential growth has shown modest, gradual improvement in Latin America in recent years, it has shown a decreasing trend in the Caribbean. Structural weaknesses such as low productivity gains, elevated public debt levels, high rates of labour informality, and limited investment in innovation and infrastructure explain this pattern.
The Caribbean’s average labour productivity during the last three decades stagnated at less than half of OECD levels (42.5%) but above the Latin American average (36.4% of OECD levels). The region’s performance varied widely across countries compared to the OECD level. While Haiti was the least productive economy throughout the period, the most productive economies alternated between The Bahamas (1991-2007 and 2009), Trinidad and Tobago (2008 and 2010-2020), and Guyana (since 2021). Moreover, accurately measuring productivity in the Caribbean is complex, as aggregate figures can be disproportionately skewed by volatile sectors, such as commodities (OECD/IDB, 2024[6]).
Figure 2. Potential GDP per capita growth in the Caribbean, Latin America and advanced economies Copy link to Figure 2. Potential GDP per capita growth in the Caribbean, Latin America and advanced economies
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Note: Potential GDP per capita growth is the growth rate the economy can sustain over the long run after controlling for population growth, excluding short-term effects linked to a difference between demand and the potential supply level. The variable denotes the growth in potential output per capita, defined as the maximum per-capita output an economy can attain without putting strain on production factors that translate into inflationary pressures. Average growth is a simple average of growth in all countries for each region, over the period analysed. Caribbean countries considered are Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. HP=the Hodrick-Prescott filter, which was used as an alternative model due to its resilience to short-term shocks to create a smoothed curve (lambda 100); AR = autoregressive model, which uses GDP per capita growth data. The number of lags (one) was determined by analysing the autocorrelation function and choosing the model that maximised the log-likelihood.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IMF (2025[7]), World Economic Outlook, https://www.imf.org/en/publications/weo/weo-database/2025/april.
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#### High public debt levels remain a challenge in many Caribbean economies, constraining fiscal space
In 2024, the region’s average central government debt reached 68.6% of GDP, which represents an increase of almost four percentage points compared to 2014. Public debt stood 14.5 percentage points above the average of Latin America in 2023, at 54.1% (Figure 3). Public debt has been above 60% of GDP for a prolonged time in the Caribbean, representing serious fiscal constraints for public expenditure. The debt landscape across the region is marked by significant heterogeneity (Figure 3), with some countries having recently undergone significant fiscal consolidation.
Figure 3. Central government total public debt as a percentage of GDP, selected Caribbean countries and regional averages, 2014 and 2024 Copy link to Figure 3. Central government total public debt as a percentage of GDP, selected Caribbean countries and regional averages, 2014 and 2024
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Note: The average for Latin America excludes Venezuela and Ecuador due to data availability constraints and considers the latest available data: 2023 for Colombia and 2022 for Peru.
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on IMF-WEO (2025[8]) World Economic Outlook Database, International Monetary Fund, https://www.imf.org/en/publications/weo/weo-database/2025/april.
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#### Trade patterns show limited diversification, with most countries relying on services and a few on commodity exports
Services trade in Caribbean countries averaged 45.7% of GDP in 2024 (Figure 4, Panel A). Eleven Caribbean countries are predominantly service exporters. In 2023, services exports surpassed 50% of GDP in Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, Saint Lucia, and Saint Kitts and Nevis, largely due to tourism and financial services. Travel is by far the largest services trade sector in the Caribbean, making up 72% of the region’s total services trade in 2023 (Figure 4, Panel B). In contrast, merchandise corresponded to the largest share of exports relative to GDP in Trinidad and Tobago (30% of GDP), Suriname (66.8%), and Guyana (78.1%) in 2023, representing over 80% of their total exports.
Exports of goods in the Caribbean remain concentrated in primary products (38.7%) and resource-based manufactures (20.6%), which collectively accounted for nearly 60% of the region’s total goods exports in 2023. The dominant export categories are energy products, notably crude and refined petroleum. Agricultural goods, such as cereals, tobacco products, fish and processed foods (OECD/IDB, 2024[6]), tend to be exported towards other Caribbean countries.
Figure 4. Trade basket composition in the Caribbean, 2024 and 2023 Copy link to Figure 4. Trade basket composition in the Caribbean, 2024 and 2023
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Note: Trade refers to the sum of exports and imports of services. Panel A shows trade in services of Caribbean countries for 2024 as a percentage of GDP (World Bank, 2025). Panel B shows the services trade basket composition of Caribbean countries for 2023, with colours indicating Travel (blue), Transport (orange), and Other services (green). Other services include Construction, Insurance, Financial Services, Intellectual Property, Telecommunication, Other Businesses, Cultural Services and Government Goods and Services.
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on World Bank (2025[9]), World Development Indicators, https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators; UNCTAD (2025[10]), International Trade, https://unctadstat.unctad.org/datacentre/.
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#### Despite advancements, poverty, inequality and informality remain important challenges to social inclusion
Social challenges remain pronounced. On average, approximately one-quarter of the population in the region lives below the poverty line (Figure 5). Poverty levels vary widely across countries. In Haiti and Belize, more than half of the population lives in monetary poverty, according to the latest available poverty surveys. Conversely, in Jamaica and The Bahamas, the poverty rate reached 8.2% and 12.5%, respectively. Due to data limitations, it is difficult to identify clear trends in the evolution of poverty over time, except for a few countries (World Bank, 2025[11]).
Figure 5. Monetary poverty in Caribbean countries, latest year available Copy link to Figure 5. Monetary poverty in Caribbean countries, latest year available Headcounts poverty, percentages of total population
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Note: The average for the Caribbean refers to the simple mean of the latest available years of reference for the whole sample of countries. The recent average for the region refers to the simple mean of the sub-sample of countries with reference years no earlier than 2016. The previous period is 2010 for Barbados, 2014 for the Dominican Republic, 2008 for Grenada, 2010 for Jamaica and 2006 for Saint Lucia. People living in poverty are defined as those living in households with income (or consumption) levels below the national poverty lines. National poverty lines are defined using country-specific methodologies. They represent the minimum amount of income or, more commonly, consumption expenditure an individual or household requires to satisfy their basic needs for a given period (usually a month) within a specific country. It is calculated using the Cost of Basic Needs approach, which explicitly incorporates both food and non-food expenditures. National poverty lines are generally positively correlated with the level of development, as basic needs shift with countries' average incomes, largely due to higher non-food expenditures. Comparing national rates in the context of highly heterogeneous stages of development, as in the Caribbean, has the advantage of showing country-specific monetary vulnerabilities of households.
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Statistical Institute of Belize (SIB) (2018[12]), Poverty Analysis Main Findings, https://sib.org.bz/wp-content/uploads/PovertyInfographic.pdf; ECLAC (2023[13]), Social Panorama of Latin America 2023, https://repositorio.cepal.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/7ddf434a-6073-4f1e-8b71-a6639e4586d5/content; World Bank (2025[9]), World Development Indicators, https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators; World Bank (2025[14]), Macro Poverty Outlook: Latin America and the Caribbean, https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/macro-poverty-outlook/mpo_lac.
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Inequality is high across the Caribbean, mirroring trends in Latin America (OECD et al., 2025[15]; World Bank, 2025[11]), and exceeding levels observed in OECD Member countries. The average Gini coefficient for the Caribbean is 0.4, based on the latest available data since 2015 from seven countries (Belize, Barbados, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, Saint Lucia and Suriname). This is higher than the OECD (0.32) and slightly lower than the Latin American average (0.45) (ECLAC, 2023[13]).
More than six out of ten people live in households that depend solely or partially on informal work, on average. High levels of labour informality are intrinsically linked to poverty and inequality across the Caribbean. Informal employment is more than twice as prevalent among the poorest households compared to the wealthiest households in the region (Figure 6). On average, nearly half of individuals in the lowest income quintile in the Caribbean (47.1%) lived in households where all members worked informally (compared to 72.3% in Latin America). For the highest quintile, 23.6% lived in such households (20.3% in Latin America). The remainder lived in mixed households (23%), where at least one member works formally, and in completely formal households (29.8%), where all members work formally.
Figure 6. Distribution of the population by household informality and welfare quintile, latest available year Copy link to Figure 6. Distribution of the population by household informality and welfare quintile, latest available year
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Note: Household types are defined according to the formality status of a household’s principal earners. If all earners are either formal or informal, the household is classified as completely formal or completely informal. If at least one earner is informal while the other is formal, the household is defined as mixed. The welfare distribution refers to the distribution of either household per capita income or consumption. The first quintile refers to the lowest income in the income distribution, while the fifth quintile refers to the highest income quintile in the income distribution.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on The Household Expenditure Survey (HES) 2013 for The Bahamas; The Trinidad and Tobago Survey of Living Conditions (TT-SLC) 2014; The Barbados Survey of Living Conditions (BSLC) 2016; The Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions (JSLC) 2019; The Suriname Survey of Living Conditions (SSLC) 2022; OECD (2024[16]), Key Indicators of Informality based on Individuals and their Households for the Dominican Republic, https://shorturl.at/IZXl5.
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### Mobilising more and better investments can unlock the development potential of the Caribbean
#### Total investment has grown in the last decade, but still fails to meet the required levels for development
Total investment in the Caribbean has increased over the past decade, growing from 20.5% of GDP in 2014 to 28% in 2023, above the OECD (23%) and Latin American (20.7%) averages (Figure 7). Still, investment levels, composition and sustainability remain insufficient to meet the region’s large development needs. Investment growth was largely driven by short-term or externally financed projects, including post-disaster reconstruction. 2 The private sector is the main driver of investment in the Caribbean, accounting for nearly 80% of total investment, on average. This was above the Latin America average (75.7%) but below the OECD (84.2%).
Public investment is fundamental for providing the foundational infrastructure that private actors often undersupply due to limited profitability. This is particularly true in technology-intensive sectors. Public investment accounts for around 20% of total investment, on average, with Guyana reaching 54%, mainly driven by investments in the oil sector (IMF, 2025[7]). Moreover, government spending on infrastructure is low, reinforcing infrastructure gaps across the region, although limited data availability constrains a comprehensive regional assessment. During 2015‑2021, average public infrastructure investment was just above 1% of GDP, except for Belize, which invested nearly 5% of GDP (the only Caribbean country with available data exceeding the Latin American average of 2%) (Infralatam, 2021[17]).
Figure 7. Total investment in the Caribbean as a percentage of GDP, 2023 Copy link to Figure 7. Total investment in the Caribbean as a percentage of GDP, 2023
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Note: Data for each region correspond to simple averages. Investment, defined as gross capital formation, is measured by the total value of gross fixed capital formation and changes in inventories and acquisitions less disposals of valuables for a unit or sector [SNA 1993]. Investment is expressed as a ratio of total investment in the current local currency and GDP in the local currency. The Caribbean includes 14 Caribbean countries, except for Trinidad and Tobago. Latin America includes Argentina,
How Caribbean families in Florida grow generational wealth Advertisement E-Paper | Contact Business How Caribbean families in Florida grow generational wealth By Joy Crawford · Tuesday, April 14, 2026 · 2 min read Key Points ( 5 ) You already work hard, but the real question is this: are you buildin...
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How Caribbean families in Florida grow generational wealth Advertisement E-Paper | Contact Business How Caribbean families in Florida grow generational wealth By Joy Crawford · Tuesday, April 14, 2026 · 2 min read Key Points ( 5 ) You already work hard, but the real question is this: are you building something that lasts beyond your time? Many Caribbean families in South Florida today, for example, earn well, yet struggle to turn income into lasting wealth even after quite some time. It is an alternative asset management company focused on longevity-based financial strategies and life settlement investments. Talk openly about money, involve your children in basic financial decisions, and encourage saving and investing habits early. Studies from Cambridge University show that money habits form as early as age seven. Start small, stay disciplined, and make decisions that your future family will thank you for. You already work hard, but the real question is this: are you building something that lasts beyond your time? Many Caribbean families in South Florida today, for example, earn well, yet struggle to turn income into lasting wealth even after quite some time. Here are some must-dos you may start working on and shift from short-term survival to long-term financial legacy for your loved ones. Start with a Clear Wealth Blueprint You need more than making your bank account fat; you need a more determined direction towards promising investment doors . So, define what wealth means for your family today, whether it is owning property in Miami, funding education, or supporting relatives back home. Data from the US Federal Reserve shows that families with written financial plans accumulate significantly more wealth over time than those without one. When you set specific goals like reaching a 750 credit score or owning two income properties, your decisions become sharper and more consistent. Build Strong US Credit and Cash Flow Habits Your credit profile is one of your most powerful tools in the US system. You should focus on paying bills on time, keeping credit utilization below 30 percent, and avoiding unnecessary debt. According to Experian, the average US credit score reached 715 in 2024, yet many immigrant households still fall below this due to thin credit history. More often, strengthening your score opens doors to better mortgage rates, business funding, and investment opportunities in Florida’s competitive market. Diversify into Smarter Investments A more balanced approach involves diversifying into other types of investments beyond property ownership, helping improve long-term portfolio growth and flexibility. This is where firms like Abacus can come in. It is an alternative asset management company focused on longevity-based financial strategies and life settlement investments. It incorporates data and actuarial insights into its approach to structuring and managing long-term investment solutions. This type of structure may appeal to individuals who are thinking in terms of long-term planning and building portfolios that extend beyond traditional asset allocations. Protect Wealth Through Estate and Cross-border Planning If you’re supporting a family in Jamaica, Haiti, or Trinidad, your financial life is already of international scope. You need estate planning that reflects this reality, including wills, trusts, and a clear beneficiary blueprint. A 2025 report from Caring Resource Center found that there’s a declining number of US adults who have a will, which puts family assets at risk of going outside their control. Proper planning, therefore, can make sure your wealth transfers smoothly to your heirs and assigns and helps your estate avoid costly legal complications later. Teach the Next Generation Early You can't build generational wealth without preparing the next generation on how to manage it. Talk openly about money, involve your children in basic financial decisions, and encourage saving and investing habits early. Studies from Cambridge University show that money habits form as early as age seven. When your children understand credit, investing, and ownership early, they are far more likely to preserve and grow what you build. Your Legacy Starts with Your Next Move You don't need perfect conditions to begin; you need consistent action. Start small, stay disciplined, and make decisions that your future family will thank you for. 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Entertainment News A weekly update on all things entertainment Subscribe Free Related Stories Business BSJ strengthens workforce competence to boost business competitiveness Business Bank of Jamaica raises policy rate to 6% as inflation pressures persist News Rising prices, falling growth put Jamaica’s economy under pressure Business Royal Caribbean Group buys 50% stake in Sandals Resorts for US$3 billion
Valerie Lacarte
Jordi Amaral
Diego Chaves-González
Ana María Sáiz
Jeremy Harris
March 2023
### Migration, Integration, and Diaspora
### Engagement in the Caribbean
#### A Policy Review
## Contents
Foreward ... i
Executive Summary ... 1
1 Introduction ... 3
2 The Immigration Landscape ....
Show more ▾
Valerie Lacarte
Jordi Amaral
Diego Chaves-González
Ana María Sáiz
Jeremy Harris
March 2023
### Migration, Integration, and Diaspora
### Engagement in the Caribbean
#### A Policy Review
## Contents
Foreward ... i
Executive Summary ... 1
1 Introduction ... 3
2 The Immigration Landscape ... 4
A. Intraregional Migration among Caribbean Nations ... 6
B. Immigrants from Countries Outside the Caribbean ... 8
C. Refugee Populations and Movements ... 12
3 Migratory Institutions ... 14
A. Asylum and Refugee Protection ... 17
B. Border Management ... 19
4 Free Mobility Pathways and Multilateral Agreements ... 19
A. Labor Migration ... 24
B. Educational Migration ... 29
C. Other Migration Pathways ... 30
D. Pathways to Permanency ... 32
5 Climate Change, Natural Disasters, and Migration ... 34
The Region’s Response to Climate-Related Displacement ... 35
6 Immigrant Integration ... 37
A. Regularization Measures ... 37
B. Access to Education ... 39
C. Access to Health Care ... 41
D. Social Cohesion ... 42
7 Leveraging Diaspora for Development ... 44
A. Remittances ... 45
B. Diaspora Engagement and Private-Sector Development ... 47
8 Recommendations ... 51
Appendix. Diaspora Populations for Selected Caribbean Countries, 2020 ... 54
About the Authors ... 57
Acknowledgments ... 59
| i
##### Foreword
International mobility has always been a feature of life in the Caribbean, but intraregional migration has increased noticeably in recent years. Mobility agreements have reshaped the pathways for international movement, while crises, sometimes tied to natural disasters and climate change, have created further incentives for movement across borders. Some Caribbean countries are also receiving significant arrivals of migrants from other parts of the world, and many have sizeable diasporas in other regions, notably North America and Europe.
To provide governments, stakeholders, and external partners interested in strengthening the region’s capacity to accommodate changing patterns of migration, the Inter-American Development Bank and the Migration Policy Institute have partnered to produce this report, which provides a policy review on migration in the Caribbean.
Since the creation of its Migration Unit, the IDB has provided countries of Latin America and the Caribbean with knowledge, technical cooperation, and support to achieve the integration of the migrant population as a driver for the social and economic development of host communities.
MPI is an independent research organization that provides data, analysis, and policy ideas for managing migration across the world, including a particular commitment to Latin America and the Caribbean.
This document provides those interested in the Caribbean with a general overview of the region’s migratory trends, institutional frameworks, and the challenges and opportunities that new migration flows present for its development and regional integration.
FELIPE MUÑOZ GÓMEZ Chief of the Migration Unit at IDB
ANDREW SEELE President of MPI
##### Executive Summary
Migration has long been part of the fabric of Caribbean nations. But while Caribbean migration is often discussed in the context of out-migration to the United States, Canada, and European countries, movement to and within the Caribbean is an equally important part of this story. In recent decades, due in great part to climate change, natural disasters, and shifts in global mobility patterns, the migration landscape in the Caribbean has also changed significantly. There were an estimated 859,400 intraregional and 745,700 extraregional immigrants living Caribbean countries in 2020. And the intraregional share of immigrants has grown over the years, increasing from 46 percent in 2000 to 56 percent in 2020.
The intraregional share and origins of immigrants
vary across countries. In the nine primary countries
studied in this report—The Bahamas, Barbados,
Belize, the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti,
Jamaica, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago—
immigrants from other Caribbean nations made up
63 percent of all immigrants in 2020. Intraregional
migration was most common in countries such
as the Dominican Republic, Barbados, and The
Bahamas, and Haitians were by far the largest group of immigrants across these study countries, followed
by Guyanese immigrants. In some countries, there are notable populations of immigrants from outside the
region, with Venezuelans representing the second largest immigrant population across the nine countries
of study and present in particularly large numbers in the Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, and
Guyana. Immigrants from the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and Canada were also present in
many of these nine countries.
Similar to patterns of migration worldwide, migrants within the Caribbean tend to originate in countries with lower standards of living and fewer opportunities and move to more advanced economies with more employment opportunities. As such, countries and territories with thriving tourism industries and higher incomes, such as The Bahamas, the British and U.S. Virgin Islands, the Turks and Caicos Islands, and Saint Kitts and Nevis, tend to attract nationals from Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Guyana, and Jamaica. Moreover, a smaller number of high-skilled workers from countries such as Jamaica, Cuba, and Trinidad and Tobago tend to migrate to countries where they will have greater employment opportunities and receive higher incomes.
Climate change and natural disasters have been important drivers of internal, intraregional, and extraregional displacement in the Caribbean, and experts have expressed concerns that the frequency and impact of climate-related events are only likely to grow in the years to come. In recent decades, the region has experienced several devastating hurricanes, which are likely the most impactful type of natural disaster in the region. For example, between 2017 and 2019, Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, Maria, Matthew, and Dorian wreaked havoc and caused the displacement of millions of Caribbean nationals, mostly Haitians, Dominicans, and Bahamians. Since 2000, the region has also experienced earthquakes, tropical storms, floods and drought, and—more rarely—volcanic eruptions, all of which have forced people to leave their homes. These disasters are among the contributing factors to the increased migration of Caribbean nationals, particularly Haitians, to both South and North America.
While Caribbean migration is often discussed in the context of out migration to the United States, Canada, and European countries, movement to and within the Caribbean is an equally important part of this story.
Regional agreements and other forms of cooperation have also emerged as prominent features of mobility in the region. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), established in 1973 and 1981, respectively, have each created important pathways for intraregional migration. For instance, enhanced mobility and integration has taken place under CARICOM’s Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) and the OECS’ Eastern Caribbean Economic Union (ECEU). Nationals of CSME Member States benefit from six-month stays without a visa in other Community countries. While these six-month stays do not come with work authorization, the CSME also includes a Skills Certificates regime that provides free mobility and work authorization for specific categories of workers. Regional commitments and coordination through the 2018 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration and the Caribbean Migration Consultations, established in 2016 and launched in 2019, have also facilitated cooperation and exchange on issues ranging from migration governance to natural disasters. And finally, the region’s public university system, the University of the West Indies, has facilitated migration for educational purposes, mainly within the anglophone Caribbean.
The region’s unique free mobility regimes have to some extent been helpful for facilitating the movement of displaced people and response workers during times of environmental crisis. Yet a closer look at the Caribbean’s migratory systems indicates that, in most of the countries of study, these migratory regimes are out of date, and this limits societies’ capacity to manage migration and successfully integrate new immigrants. For example, there is a notable lack of institutions and regulatory frameworks for asylum and refugee protection throughout the region. Caribbean countries have instead tended to adopt an ad hoc approach in response to massive movements of people, as exemplified by the temporary measures and regularization plans put in place for Haitians after the 2010 earthquake, nationals of Dominica following Hurricane Maria in 2017, and Venezuelans fleeing political and economic upheaval in more recent years. In addition, the existence of mechanisms for regular migration and free mobility within the Caribbean—while valuable—has not prevented irregular migration from countries outside of the region. In recognition of this fact, Belize, Curaçao, the Dominican Republic, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago have all enacted special regularization measures to convey status to certain groups of irregular migrants living within their borders.
In Caribbean countries—as in countries around the world—equitable rights and access to basic services constitute important steps toward the integration and well-being of immigrants and the vitality of the broader communities in which they live. Yet, universal access to primary and secondary education and to basic health care is far from guaranteed in practice, even when it is granted by laws or policies. Social cohesion is another important aspect of immigrant integration, and one requiring an inclusive approach that accounts for receiving communities’ needs and perceptions of migrants. Data on discrimination and xenophobia in the region are scarce, but some studies conducted in the past decade have drawn conclusions from qualitative research, such as interviews and focus groups. With the more recent arrivals of intraregional migrants, there is a need for up-to-date public polling data to gauge receiving communities’ willingness and capacity to integrate immigrants and to inform government policies and programs.
A final, crucial dimension of migration policy in the Caribbean is diaspora engagement in efforts to further the region’s economic development. Emigrants and their descendants are well-recognized for their role in channeling much-needed financial support to their families in the Caribbean through remittances, but their engagement with their countries of origin or ancestry can also take the form of business development and job creation, direct investments, and the strengthening of social and professional networks. Moreover, the
Caribbean diaspora has contributed to the region via the transfer of knowledge and skills, including through targeted initiatives that seek to counter the decades-old problem of brain drain.
As Caribbean nations continue to face important migration and development challenges, dialogue through the region’s established institutions provides a path towards adapting Caribbean migratory systems, while ensuring that migration policies account for the concerns of sending and receiving countries.
##### 1 Introduction
The Caribbean is commonly viewed as a region of emigration to North America and the United Kingdom, and rightly so: the diasporas of countries such as Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Suriname represent more than one-third of the population in their respective countries. 1 Yet, immigration—particularly from other countries within the region—is also part of the Caribbean’s ethos and has evolved with time. Long before most Caribbean countries became independent, the region was characterized by intraregional migration and close connections, and efforts towards regional integration and free mobility have existed for decades. Following independence, the 1973 Treaty of Chaguaramas, which established the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the 1981 Treaty of Basseterre, which established the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), created new mechanisms for regional integration and coordination that remain strong to this day and that have continued to develop over the years. Migration has also moved up the region’s list of priorities in recent years, as demonstrated by growing free mobility and integration under CARICOM’s Caribbean Single Market and Economy and the OECS’ Eastern Caribbean Economic Union and by regional commitments and coordination through the 2018 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration and the Caribbean Migration Consultations, established in 2016.
Historically, labor migration was the prevailing form
of movement in the Caribbean, but the landscape
has become more complex in recent years,
particularly since 2015. Climate change and natural
disasters have spurred migration and will likely
continue to do so with growing intensity in the years
to come. In addition, dual economic and political
crises in Venezuela have driven many from the country to migrate into the region. The Caribbean also serves
as a point of transit—such as for migrants traveling through The Bahamas to the United States, through
Guyana and Suriname to Brazil and other South American countries, and more recently for extracontinental
migrants traveling through South America and toward the United States.
While research on Caribbean migration has typically focused on emigration, it is crucial to strengthen understanding of intraregional migration and the region’s migration systems and trends, given the changing patterns and composition of people on the move. Furthermore, understanding migration within the region is important for identifying and cultivating opportunities for Caribbean countries to harness both high- and low-skilled migration for development. In this, it is important to consider legal pathways for immigration, institutional design, and policies and programs that promote immigrant integration.
1 See Section 7 and Appendix of this report for more on diaspora size and engagement.
Historically, labor migration was the prevailing form of movement in the Caribbean, but the landscape has become more complex in recent years.
This report offers a panoramic view of migration in the Caribbean. It is based on a review of documents, data, and other resources from regional governments, multilateral organizations, and academia, as well as semi-structured interviews with ten stakeholders and experts on the region. The primary countries of study are The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. To a more limited extent, the study also covers Aruba, Curaçao, the OECS, and the remaining
CARICOM Member States. The report begins with an overview of immigrant populations, legal pathways, institutional arrangements, and other key features of migration in the region. It then explores different countries’ efforts to integrate their resident immigrant populations as well as to leverage their diasporas and remittances for development. The report closes with recommendations for key Caribbean stakeholders and external partners interested in strengthening the region’s capacity to accommodate changing patterns of migration.
##### 2 The Immigration Landscape
Both intra- and extraregional migration are prevalent across the Caribbean. Looking at the most recent data available, there were an estimated 859,400 intraregional and 745,700 extraregional immigrants in Caribbean countries in 2020 (see Figure 1). The intraregional share of immigrants has increased substantially in the last two decades, from 46 percent in 2000 to 56 percent in 2020. This trend reflects the recent growth in regional integration and free mobility regimes as well as increased movement caused by natural disasters. FIGURE 1 Number and Share of Intra- and Extraregional Immigrants in the Caribbean, 2000–20
46% 48% 51%
56%
56%
54%
52%
49%
44%
44%
0
200,000
400,000
600,000
800,000
1,000,000
1,200,000
1,400,000
1,600,000
1,800,000
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Extraregional Immigrants Intraregional Immigrants
1,397,116
1,483,785 1,522,366
1,709,209
1,605,148
Note: For the purpose of this report, “intraregional” means intra-Caribbean, with the Caribbean region composed of Anguilla, Antigua
and Barbuda, Aruba, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Bonaire, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cuba, Curaçao, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, French Guiana, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Martinique, Montserrat, Puerto Rico, Saba, Saint Kitts and Nevis,
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sint Eustatius, Sint Maarten, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands,
and U.S. Virgin Islands.
Source: Tabulation of data from United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, “International Migrant
Stock 2020—Destination and Origin,” accessed October 25, 2020.
In 2020, a total of 625,700 intraregional immigrants were living in the nine core countries of study—The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago—representing 63 percent of all immigrants in these countries (see Table 1). Six out of the top ten countries of origin for immigrants in the countries of study were other Caribbean countries: Haiti, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Grenada, and Cuba (highlighted in the table).
TABLE 1
Top Countries of Origin for Immigrants in Selected Caribbean Countries, 2020
Countries of Study
The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago
Total number of immigrants: 987,703
Number of intraregional immigrants: 625,728
Intraregional share of immigrant population: 63.35%
Immigrant share of total population: 2.15% Country of Origin Number of Immigrants Share of All Immigrants Haiti 525,833 53.24% Venezuela 164,315 16.64% United States 45,790 4.64% Guyana 32,600 3.30% China 13,872 1.40% United Kingdom 12,932 1.31% Jamaica 11,578 1.17% Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 10,731 1.09% Grenada 9,623 0.97% Cuba 9,253 0.94% Other countries 151,176 15.31% Note: The highlighted rows indicate Caribbean countries. Sources: Tabulation of data primarily from the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), “DataMIG,” accessed October 19, 2022. In the few cases where data are missing from DataMIG, the latest data available were taken from United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, “International Migrant Stock 2020” or United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, “World Population Prospects 2019—Total Population - Both Sexes,” accessed December 20, 2021; World Bank, “The World by Income and Region,” accessed December 20, 2021.
The length of permits granted to migrants in the Caribbean varies by country. Some Caribbean countries facilitate greater access to long-term migration and pathways to permanence, while others limit immigrants to shorter-term, temporary stays. 2 For example, according to a 2021 study by the Inter American Development Bank (IADB) and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), an average of 54 percent of all residence permits granted in Suriname between 2015 and 2019 were permanent, in contrast to an average of 3 percent in Barbados over the same period. 3
2 See Section 4.D. on “Pathways to Permanency” for greater discussion of this topic. 3 Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Migration Flows in Latin America and the Caribbean: Statistics on Permits for Migrants (Washington,
Caribbean Investment Forum 2026 | Caribbean Export
# Grenada Exotic Fruit Production - Soursop-led
Simply Pure Agro-Processing
Investment sought USD 3,000,000
Simply Pure Agro-Processing
Company Simply Pure Agro-Processing Country Grenada Sector Sustainable Agriculture
Simply Pure Agro-Process...
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Caribbean Investment Forum 2026 | Caribbean Export
# Grenada Exotic Fruit Production - Soursop-led
Simply Pure Agro-Processing
Investment sought USD 3,000,000
Simply Pure Agro-Processing
Company Simply Pure Agro-Processing Country Grenada Sector Sustainable Agriculture
Simply Pure Agro-Processing is a Grenadian agribusiness exporting fresh tropical produce to the United States, with soursop as its principal product alongside dasheen, breadfruit and hot peppers. Through the Grenada Exotic Fruit Production and Processing Project, the company plans to acquire and develop a 100-acre estate to expand reliable commercial supply and address constraints created by fragmented production, limited cold-chain capacity and high post-harvest losses.
The proposed development would place 60 acres under cultivation, comprising 50 acres of soursop and 10 acres of other high-value exotic fruits. The investment would also support modern irrigation, upgrades to the company’s existing packhouse, cold-chain logistics and processing capacity. In addition to increasing fresh-fruit exports, Simply Pure plans to develop value-added products such as pulp, teas, juices, powders and nutraceuticals, allowing the business to capture more value from the crop and diversify its revenue base.
The company has operated for six years and reports an existing packhouse, a United States distribution entity serving eight states, research and grower partnerships, and approved vendor status with a major US grocery chain. It also reports annual buyer demand of two million pounds of soursop, compared with the company’s current supply of fewer than 500,000 pounds. Grenada’s status as the only approved source of fresh, non-irradiated soursop for the US market provides a distinctive route to market, while the proposed estate is intended to give the company greater control over production volumes, quality and delivery consistency. The estate development and expanded processing operations remain at the investment stage.
Simply Pure Agro-Processing is seeking USD 3 million in equity and co-financing to support estate acquisition, land development, irrigation, packhouse and cold-chain upgrades, processing infrastructure and working capital. The project aims to reduce post-harvest losses from approximately 40% to below 10%, strengthen the company’s capacity to supply existing buyers and support wider market expansion.
The company projects that the investment could create 22 full-time and more than 40 part-time positions, with at least half targeted toward women and young people. By expanding local production and value-added processing, the project also has the potential to increase agricultural export earnings, strengthen linkages with Grenadian growers and build a more resilient soursop value chain.
## Take the meeting
Simply Pure Agro-Processing will be on the deal floor at CIF 2026. Meetings are scheduled by sector once you have registered.
5 - 7 October 2026 · Hilton Barbados Resort, Bridgetown
Caribbean Export Development Agency
#### Baobab Tower, Warrens, St. Michael, Barbados
P.O. Box 5050 Postal code BB22026 Tel:+1 (246) 436-0578 (+12464360578) Fax:+1 (246) 436-9999 (+12464369999) E-mail: info@carib-export.com
#### Av. Pedro Henríquez Ureña No. 138
Av. Pedro Henríquez Ureña No. 138 Torre Empresarial Reyna II Piso 5 Santo Domingo, República Dominicana
Beyond Financial Literacy: Digital Financial Engagement and Youth Saving Behavior in St. Kitts And Nevis August 2026 Home August 2026 Volume 09 Issue 08 August 2026 Beyond Financial Literacy: Digital Financial Engagement and Youth Saving Behavior in St. Kitts And Nevis 1 YuLu Liao, 2* HuiChen Chiang...
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Beyond Financial Literacy: Digital Financial Engagement and Youth Saving Behavior in St. Kitts And Nevis August 2026 Home August 2026 Volume 09 Issue 08 August 2026 Beyond Financial Literacy: Digital Financial Engagement and Youth Saving Behavior in St. Kitts And Nevis 1 YuLu Liao, 2* HuiChen Chiang, 3 Kevrone Phipps 1,2 Associate Professor, MingChuan University 3 Ming Chuan University DOI : https://doi.org/10.47191/ijsshr/v9-i8-63 Google Scholar Download Pdf ABSTRACT This study examines the determinants of saving behavior among youth aged 18–35 in St. Kitts and Nevis, focusing on financial literacy, financial planning, budgeting practices, cultural and family influence, and modern financial methods. A quantitative cross-sectional survey yielded 202 valid responses. Pearson correlation and multiple regression analyses were conducted using SPSS. Modern Financial Methods showed the strongest bivariate association with Saving Behavior (r = .227, p = .001) and was the only statistically significant predictor in the multivariate model (β = .389, p = .002). The overall regression model was significant, F(5,196) = 2.860, p = .016, but explained only 6.8% of the variance in Saving Behavior. Financial literacy, financial planning, budgeting practices, and cultural and family influence were not significant predictors. Because the Saving Behavior scale showed low internal consistency (α = .437) and several predictors were moderately to strongly intercorrelated, the findings should be interpreted as exploratory rather than causal or definitive. The results nevertheless suggest that digital financial engagement may be an important behavioral channel through which young adults interact with saving mechanisms in a small-island economy. KEYWORDS: saving behavior; youth; financial literacy; financial planning; financial technology; St. Kitts and Nevis REFERENCES 1) Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 50(2), 179–211. https://doi.org/10.1016/0749-5978(91)90020-T 2) Bamforth, J., & Geursen, G. (2007). Categorising the money management behaviour of young consumers. Young Consumers, 8(1), 53–59. https://doi.org/10.1108/17473610710733840 3) Batty, M., Collins, J. M., & Odders-White, E. (2015). Experimental evidence on the effects of financial education on elementary school students’ knowledge, behavior, and attitudes. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 49(1), 69–96. https://doi.org/10.1111/joca.12058 4) Chen, H., & Volpe, R. P. (1998). An analysis of personal financial literacy among college students. Financial Services Review, 7(2), 107–128. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1057-0810(99)80006-7 5) Cude, B. J., Lawrence, F. C., Lyons, A. 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Financial well-being of Malaysian college students. Asian Education and Development Studies, 1(2), 153–170. https://doi.org/10.1108/20463161211240124 20) Saunders, M., Lewis, P., & Thornhill, A. (2019). Research methods for business students (8th ed.). 21) Pearson Education. 22) Sohn, S. H., Joo, S. H., Grable, J. E., Lee, S., & Kim, M. (2012). Adolescents’ financial literacy: The role of financial socialization agents, financial experiences, and money attitudes in shaping financial literacy among South Korean youth. Journal of Adolescence, 35(4), 969–980. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adolescence.2012.02.002 23) Sorgente, A., & Lanz, M. (2017). Emerging adults’ financial management and well-being: A comparison between students and workers. Journal of Adult Development, 24(2), 128–138. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10804-016-9252-x 24) Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2019). Using multivariate statistics (7th ed.). Pearson. 25) Thaler, R. H. (1999). Mental accounting matters. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 12(3), 183– 206. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0771(199909)12:3 3.0.CO;2-F 26) Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2008). Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness. Yale University Press. 27) Wiersma, J. (2023). Financial literacy and saving behavior among youth in Curaçao. Caribbean Economic Review, 15(2), 45–61. 28) World Bank. (2022). Global financial inclusion database 2021: Financial inclusion, digital payments, and resiliencein the age of COVID-19.World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/globalfindex 29) Xiao, J. J., Ahn, S. Y., Serido, J., & Shim, S. (2014). Earlier financial literacy and later financial behaviour of college students. International Journal of Consumer Studies, 38(6), 593–601. https://doi.org/10.1111/ijcs.12122 30) Xiao, J. J., & Porto, N. (2017). Financial education and financial satisfaction. International Journal of Bank Marketing, 35(5), 805–817. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJBM-01-2016-0009 31) Yamane, T. (1967). Statistics: An introductory analysis (2nd ed.). Harper & Row. Cite this Article: Liao, Y., Chiang, H., & Phipps, K. (2026). Beyond Financial Literacy: Digital Financial Engagement and Youth Saving Behavior in St. Kitts And Nevis. International Journal of Social Science and Human Research, 9(8), 7270-7279. https://doi.org/10.47191/ijsshr/v9-i8-63 Volume 09 Issue 08 August 2026 Submit Article Cross Ref SJIF-Impact Factor 2026 Europub Author's Desk Author's Guidelines Call For Paper Online Submission Publication Ethics Reviewer Policy Reviewer Guidelines Plagiarism Policies Withdrawal Policies Latest Submission Open Volume 09 Issue 10 (October 2026) Last Date : 26 October 2026 Join Our Editor Board Send your CV to board@ijsshr.in Downloads Manuscript Templete Copyright form Cover Page Indexed In
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3. /How to Enter the Caribbean: The Complete 2026 Market Entry Guide
# How to Enter the Caribbean: The Complete 2026 Market Entry Guide
Andes Edge Consulting
Publis...
### Final Report: Toward Harmonized AI Policies and Recommendations for the Caribbean
This report is published by the CTU Caribbean AI Task Force (CAITF).
This final report reflects the collective experience and expertise of more than 35 nominated members drawn from Caribbean governments and natio...
Show more ▾
### Final Report: Toward Harmonized AI Policies and Recommendations for the Caribbean
This report is published by the CTU Caribbean AI Task Force (CAITF).
This final report reflects the collective experience and expertise of more than 35 nominated members drawn from Caribbean governments and national agencies, multilateral organizations, the private sector, academia, civil-society organizations, non-profit institutions and non-governmental organizations. The Caribbean AI Task Force was established by resolution at the Caribbean Telecommunications Union’s 31st General Conference of Ministers, with a one-year mandate to develop harmonized regional AI policy recommendations and coordinate the Caribbean AI Forum in 2026. This report represents the culmination of that mandate.
For more comments, information and feedback on the report please contact us at: caitf@ctu.int
This report should be cited as: The Caribbean AI Task Force, “Final Report: Toward Harmonized AI Policies and Recommendations for the Caribbean”, Caribbean Telecommunications Union, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago. July, 2026.
#### Table of Contents
Executive Framing ... 1
1. Introduction ... 3
A. The Global Inflection Point ... 3
B. Scope and Audience of this Report ... 5
C. Approach ... 5
Promise Against a Backdrop of Disparity ... 10
2. The Caribbean AI Landscape ... 10
A. The Caribbean AI Value ... 10
B. The Connectivity Paradox: Structural Realities ... 11
C. The Global AI Governance and where the Caribbean Region Stands ... 13
D. The Inclusion and Information-Integrity Gap ... 15
E. The Labour-Market Exposure ... 16
3. The Governance Deficit ... 20
Why the Caribbean Cannot Wait ... 20
A. The Representation Gap ... 20
B. The Coordination Gap ... 20
C. The Implementation Gap ... 22
D. The Research Gap ... 23
4. Pillars & Policy Recommendations ... 28
Pillar 1: Data, Digital Infrastructure & Compute ... 29
Pillar 2: Governance, Ethics & Standards ... 30
Pillar 3: Economic Transformation, Innovation & Industry ... 33
Pillar 4: Talent & Skills ... 35
Pillar 5: Public Sector AI ... 37
Pillar 6: Natural Disaster & Climate Resilience ... 38
Pillar 7: Regional Leadership, Trade & Global Interoperability ... 39
5. The Task Force ... 40
About the CTU Caribbean AI Task Force ... 41
#### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
• AI – Artificial Intelligence
• ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations
• AU – African Union
• CAF – Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean
• CARICOM – Caribbean Community
• CARDTP – Caribbean Digital Transformation Project
• CDB – Caribbean Development Bank
• CSME – CARICOM Single Market and Economy
• CTU – Caribbean Telecommunications Union
• CXC – Caribbean Examinations Council
• ECCB – Eastern Caribbean Central Bank
• ECLAC – UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
• ECTEL – Eastern Caribbean Telecommunications Authority
• GDC – Global Digital Compact
• GDP – Gross Domestic Product
• HLAB-AI – UN High-level Advisory Body on AI
• ICT – Information and Communication Technology
• IDB – Inter-American Development Bank
• IMPACS – Implementation Agency for Crime and Security
• ITU – International Telecommunication Union
• MIGDIA – Inter-American Framework on Data & AI Governance (OAS)
• MSME – Micro, Small and Medium-sized Enterprise
• NDTS – National Digital Transformation Strategy
• NIST – U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology
• OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
• OECS – Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States
• SIDS – Small Island Developing States
• SoDTIC – School of Digital Transformation and Innovation in the Caribbean
• UNCTAD – United Nations Conference on Trade & Development
• UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
• UNGA – United Nations General Assembly
The Task Force agrees that the diffusion of Artificial Intelligence is occurring in an environment of profound structural asymmetry. The benefits of AI remain heavily concentrated geographically, economically, and technologically, while unfortunately, the systemic risks associated with its deployment, including algorithmic bias, socioeconomic exclusion, and the erosion of information integrity are distributed universally. To compound this, Caribbean citizens, firms and public institutions are becoming intensive users of AI systems without having proportional influence over their design, deployment, governance or value capture.
The global AI market is projected to expand from approximately USD 189 billion in 2023 to USD 4.8 trillion by 2033 1. For Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), AI integration could contribute up to USD 0.5 trillion to the broader economy by 2030, representing a potential 5.4% boost to regional Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 2. Under favourable conditions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects that AI could elevate a developing country's GDP by 2.7% to 3.5% over a single decade 3. Despite generating 6.6% of the global GDP, the LAC region currently captures a mere 1.12% of global AI investment 4. Within the Caribbean sub region, the deficit is even more acute; AI-native enterprises number in the single digits, and the region operates overwhelmingly as a consumer of imported technology rather than a producer of localized innovation.
The Caribbean is currently characterized by a high-intent but low-capacity equilibrium, where policy ambition is consistently outpaced by infrastructural realities, fragmented data governance, and severe human capital attrition.
This is a disaster.
The Task Force, in its analysis, demonstrates that effective AI governance in the Caribbean cannot be achieved through isolated national strategies. This report, which serves as the foundational advisory framework for the Caribbean AI Task Force, articulates seven primary recommendations centered on themes including a unified regional AI policy framework, building sovereign data infrastructure, catalysing commercial innovation, reversing human capital flight, mobilizing targeted regional financing, and embedding AI within climate resilience strategies. Through multilateral cooperation, the interim report has helped shape
1 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Technology and Innovation Report 2025:
Inclusive Artificial Intelligence for Development (Geneva: United Nations, 2025),
https://unctad.org/publication/technology-and-innovation-report-2025
2 PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), Sizing the Prize: PwC’s Global Artificial Intelligence Study—Exploiting the AI
Revolution (2017),
3 Eugenio M. Cerutti, Antonio I. Garcia Pascual, Yosuke Kido, Longji Li, Giovanni Melina, Marina Mendes
Tavares, and Philippe Wingender, The Global Impact of AI: Mind the Gap, IMF Working Paper no. 25/76
(Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, April 2025), https://doi.org/10.5089/9798229008570.001
4 Álvaro Soto et al., coords., Latin American Artificial Intelligence Index (ILIA) 2025: Key Findings, Applied
Artificial Intelligence, and Human Talent, Project Documents LC/TS.2026/1 (Santiago: Economic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean and National Center for Artificial Intelligence, 2026),
https://doi.org/10.65730/maolsdjpr.
## Executive Framing
the UNDP+CARICOM AI Regional Programme 2026-2030 and the UN ECLAC’s SIDS National AI Agenda.
The Caribbean stands as one voice with an agreed set of values, principles and direction.
The choice before the Caribbean is therefore not whether AI will transform the region, but whether that transformation will occur primarily on terms established elsewhere. This report provides the foundation for collective action; implementation must now become the region’s priority.
A. The Global Inflection Point Since the first wave of national AI strategies emerged around 2017, global AI policy has rapidly matured from early phases of strategic posturing, innovation competition, and localized ethical standardization into an era strictly defined by the realities of generative AI advancements, rigorous systemic risk regulation, and intense geopolitical contests over technological sovereignty. What has not happened, across any of these phases, is convergence on a single governance model. Instead, a differentiated landscape has emerged in which countries calibrate AI governance to their own economic structure, institutional capacity, and strategic position.
For most of this period, the Caribbean's engagement with this evolution has been largely indirect; the region has been a consumer of AI tools, an object of global policy discourse, and a participant, when at all, in instruments designed elsewhere, for other contexts. This report is built on the premise that this indirect posture is no longer adequate to the stakes involved, and that the region has the human capacity, the institutional foundation and a closing window of opportunity to change it.
The urgency of this global inflection point was codified by the United Nations with the release of the Preliminary Report of the Independent International Scientific Panel on AI: Evidence based assessment of opportunities, risks and impacts of AI in July 2026. The UN report explicitly warns that current evaluation methods and institutional safeguards cannot keep pace with the exponential growth of AI capabilities, noting that the world cannot effectively govern what it cannot independently evaluate or understand.
Table 1.1- The Seven Key Domains of the UN Independent International Scientific Panel on AI (July 2026)
Domain Focus Area Core Analytical Imperatives Highlighted by the UN Scientific Panel
AI Science, Advances & Trajectories
Tracking the exponential growth of frontier models, emergent autonomous agentic behaviours, and the extreme geographical concentration of global computing power. Societal Applications Evaluating the integration and disparate impacts of AI within foundational societal pillars, including empirical science, public health, educational ecosystems, and agricultural modernization.
Economic Implications
Analysing macroeconomic disruptions, labour market exposure, wealth concentration dynamics, and the specific vulnerabilities of developing economies.
Security, Systems & Environment
Assessing systemic risks introduced by interacting AI agents, cybersecurity vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure, and the massive energy and environmental footprint of data centres.
## 1.1.Introduction Introduction
Human Rights, Information & Democracy
Investigating the erosion of information integrity, the proliferation of synthetic media (deepfakes), authoritarian capture of digital ecosystems, and structural algorithmic discrimination.
Cultural Flourishing & Child Safety
Examining the long-term cognitive and cultural impacts of continuous human-AI interaction, autonomy preservation, and the specific vulnerabilities of minors in digital spaces.
Management, Governance & Reliability
Highlighting the severe underdevelopment of independent risk evaluation methodologies and the fragmented nature of current corporate-led governance instruments.
Crucially for the Caribbean context, the UN Preliminary Report confirms that the so-called “AI divide” is no longer a question of technological access; it is fundamentally an asymmetry in the capacity to influence AI development, shape its design, and govern its deployment. The global evidence base regarding AI's socioeconomic impacts is highly skewed toward high income, English-language contexts, while the underlying AI evaluation infrastructure remains linguistically and geographically concentrated. The overwhelming concentration of computational power, where a few advanced economies and their domiciled corporate entities control virtually all leading general-purpose models, threatens to entrench existing global inequalities and significantly undermine democratic accountability.
The economic stakes are also substantial. UNCTAD projects that the global AI market will expand approximately twenty-fivefold by 2033, increasing from about 7% to 29% of the frontier-technology market. 5It also estimates that the United States and China together hold approximately 60% of AI patents and produce about one-third of AI-related research publications. The Caribbean does not need to compete in frontier-model development. It must, however, determine the terms under which external models, platforms, infrastructure, and standards enter the region.
This requires more than defensive regulation.
The region must engage the market directly, developing systems that meet its own needs, investing in research and building research-to-commercialization capacity, producing tools that can be exported to other markets. The region is not starting from zero. ECLAC’s ILIA 2025 notes that Latin America and the Caribbean account for 14% of global visits to AI solutions and rank third worldwide in downloads of generative AI applications 6, showing that demand and
5 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Technology and Innovation Report 2025:
Inclusive Artificial Intelligence for Development (Geneva: United Nations, 2025),
https://unctad.org/publication/technology-and-innovation-report-2025.
6 Álvaro Soto et al., coords., Latin American Artificial Intelligence Index (ILIA) 2025: Key Findings, Applied
Artificial Intelligence, and Human Talent, Project Documents LC/TS.2026/1 (Santiago: Economic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean and National Center for Artificial Intelligence, 2026),
https://doi.org/10.65730/maolsdjpr.
user adoption are real, but that the region retains weak control over the upstream layers of value creation.
Within this precise global framework, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) has sharply framed the geopolitical stakes for the region. During the high-level dialogue series convened in May 2026 alongside the eLAC Digital Agenda and the EU Global Gateway, the existential digital sovereignty question was posed. Will emerging economies remain perpetual “rule-takers,” or will they evolve into “rule-makers”? Rule-takers are structurally forced to adapt to predetermined, established technological systems and regulations designed by external entities. This reactive posture leaves their fragile economic and social fabrics highly vulnerable to foreign regulatory paradigms and exogenous technological shocks over which they have no agency. Rule-makers, conversely, leverage regional integration to assert digital sovereignty, demanding interoperability, technological localization, and equitable, unified participation in standards-setting forums.
For the Caribbean, delaying proactive, unified governance inevitably increases long-term dependency on external models, foreign computational infrastructure, and imported normative frameworks. We cannot delay any longer.
B. Scope and Audience of this Report This report is addressed to the governments of CARICOM member states, the regional institutions whose mandates intersect with AI policy, to development and financing partners considering support for Caribbean digital transformation, and to the wider public whose engagement will determine whether AI policy in the region is shaped with legitimacy or imposed without it.
There are three things this report deliberately does not attempt to do. First, it does not provide a costed implementation plan, budget allocation, or financing instrument design; these are the subject of work led by the relevant regional and international partners and prescribing them here would substitute the Task Force's judgment for that of the institutions actually responsible for delivery. Second, it does not propose a single uniform model to be adopted identically across all member states; Caribbean states differ materially in population, fiscal space, and institutional capacity, and effective AI policy must be adapted accordingly. Third, it does not attempt to forecast the technology itself; its recommendations are framed to be robust to a range of plausible AI trajectories, rather than contingent on any single technical scenario.
C. Approach This report is the product of a regional advisory process led by the CTU Caribbean AI Task Force. The Task Force brings a Caribbean perspective to the rapidly evolving global AI policy
landscape by consolidating available evidence, examining its implications for small states, and translating that evidence into practical recommendations for CARICOM governments and regional institutions. Its role is not to replace national policymaking or the mandates of implementing agencies, but to provide a shared analytical foundation from which coordinated national and regional action can proceed.
This report draws on prior thematic work which includes the Caribbean-specific findings of UNESCO's Caribbean Artificial Intelligence Policy Roadmap, built on consultation with more than 1,000 stakeholders; ECLAC's exploratory review of Caribbean AI readiness and its companion regional policy brief; the global benchmarking and governance-gap analysis of the UN Secretary-General's High-Level Advisory Body on AI; and current data from UNCTAD, the World Bank, the International Telecommunication Union, the European Investment Bank, and national and regional sources cited throughout.
Where the available evidence is inconsistent, incomplete, or no longer current, the report identifies those limitations explicitly and avoids implying a level of precision that the underlying data cannot support. For example, CARICOM’s Secretary-General has cited a regional food-import bill of approximately US$13.76 billion over 2018–2020, equivalent to roughly 5% of regional GDP alongside estimates that the Caribbean imports more than 60% of the food it consumes 7. Similarly, widely cited estimates of skilled emigration from Caribbean states originate in International Monetary Fund research published in 2006. This report therefore uses those estimates as evidence of a persistent structural challenge, not as a measurement of present-day migration rates, which may have changed materially over the intervening two decades.
The Task Force also treats missing data as a substantive policy finding. Several CARICOM members are absent from, or incompletely represented in, international datasets concerning AI infrastructure, innovation, investment and readiness. Such omissions limit the region’s ability to benchmark progress, identify investment needs and participate effectively in evidence-based international governance. Strengthening national statistical capacity and establishing a comparable regional AI evidence base are therefore integral components of the report’s recommendations, rather than secondary research concerns.
An interim version of the report was released in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, in December 2025 and subsequently circulated for regional review. Its findings and recommendations were examined through conferences, seminars, panels, presentations and stakeholder discussions. Written and verbal feedback from these engagements was consolidated by the Task Force and used to refine the analysis and recommendations presented in this final report. This document should therefore be understood as both an evidence synthesis and a regional policy contribution as it identifies Caribbean priorities while
7 Caribbean Community (CARICOM), “Investment Matters More Than Ever-CARICOM Secretary-General,” e CISTAR, November 10, 2022, https://www.caricomstats.org/E-CISTAR/2022/11/10/investment-matters-more than-ever-caricom-secretary-general/.
recognizing that implementation must be adapted to the institutional capacity, economic structure and development circumstances of individual member states.
### Box 1 AI for Agriculture & Food Security
Although agriculture has a relatively modest direct contribution to output in many Caribbean
##### caribbean ai taskforce final report on ai harmonization
dr craig ramlal chair caribbean ai taskforce
## The Growing AI Market, USD Tn
0.19tn 0.23tn
0.39tn 0.54tn
4.80tn -0.4
0.6
1.6
2.6
3.6
4.6
5.6
2023 2024 2025 2026 2033 (projected)
## Global AI market expansion against Latin Am...
Show more ▾
##### caribbean ai taskforce final report on ai harmonization
dr craig ramlal chair caribbean ai taskforce
## The Growing AI Market, USD Tn
0.19tn 0.23tn
0.39tn 0.54tn
4.80tn -0.4
0.6
1.6
2.6
3.6
4.6
5.6
2023 2024 2025 2026 2033 (projected)
## Global AI market expansion against Latin American and Caribbean capture Projections — indicative
6.6% of global GDP generated by Latin America and the Caribbean 1.12% of global AI investment captured by the same region
• AI integration could add up to USD 0.5 trillion to the LAC economy by 2030 a potential 5.4% boost to regional GDP
• The IMF projects AI could raise a developing country’s GDP by 2.7–3.5% over a decade, under favourable conditions
• Within the Caribbean sub-region the deficit is more acute: AI-native enterprises number in the single digits
One of the starkest investment-to-output mismatches of any major world region
## The connectivity paradox
Appears digitally engaged
~75% of the population of Caribbean SIDS used the Internet in 2023 8.4% annual growth in SIDS Internet use 2014–2023, above the 6.7% global rate
>5% of GNI per capita spent on broadband — against the 2% affordability target
Citizens consume AI-enabled services; almost none of the infrastructure, data governance or value capture happens regionally
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
% of individuals
Individuals Using the Internet, CARICOM Member States (% of population)
Haiti Saint Lucia Belize Grenada St. Vincent and the Grenadines St. Kitts and Nevis Antigua and Barbuda Suriname Barbados Guyana Trinidad and Tobago Jamaica Bahamas
## Labour-market exposure is concentrated exactly
## where the region earns
26–38% of employment across LAC countries studied exposed to generative AI
8–14% in the “augmentation potential” category, where AI could enhance productivity
2–5% in the category presenting potential for full automation >40% of women’s employment exposed in Caribbean and Pacific SIDS
The gender asymmetry
• ~29% of female-dominated occupations were exposed to generative AI, against ~16% of male-dominated occupations
• Exposure is concentrated in formal, urban and relatively higher-income occupations requiring more education
The concentrated sectors
• ~60,000 jobs in global services and business-process outsourcing; ICT/BPO industry estimated at ~US$900 million
• Traditionally concentrated in customer-service, administrative and transaction-processing work; the routine, codifiable functions most susceptible to generative AI
• Workers displaced without a transition mechanism often leave the labour force or the region, intensifying brain drain
The AI Research Gap The one capability that cannot be procured, harmonised or imported
154 validated technology startups mapped across 15 Caribbean countries 15 of 15 assessed ecosystems placed in the earliest “Activation Phase”
60% of surveyed organizations delayed in implementing digital-transformation plans 73% of total R&D expenditure carried by business across the OECD; a risk absorption role absent here
The structural constraint
• Caribbean startup finance is thin: ventures depend on founders’ savings, family and friends; formal angel networks are rare
• Financial systems remain oriented to collateral-based bank lending, not the patient, loss-tolerant equity early-stage ventures require
• The risk is not that inventions become foreign-owned, but that research stays uncommercialized or its value is captured outside the region
It is achievable at Caribbean scale
• Jamaica’s BIGEE programme, backed by an initial US$25 million IDB facility
• The EU / IDB Lab-financed CARIBEquity blended-finance facility for Caribbean private-sector innovation
• Institutional anchors already exist: UWI’s AI Innovation Centre, UTT, University of Guyana, Anton de Kom University, UTech, and emerging OECS nodes
What is missing is not the institutions; it is the partnership, support & financing architecture that converts them into a pipeline
#### Intentionally left blank
## CARICOM is the only comparable bloc with no collective AI instrument
| Body / Bloc | Instrument | Nature |
| --- | --- | --- |
| European Union | EU Artificial Intelligence Act | Binding regulation |
| Council of Europe | Framework Convention on AI | Binding treaty |
| African Union | Continental AI Strategy | Strategic framework |
| Organization of American States | Declaration & Plan of Action on AI (incl. MIGDIA) | Declaratory / guidance |
| Arab League (via ALECSO) | Charter on AI Ethics | Declaratory |
| ASEAN | AI Governance and Ethics Guide | Voluntary guidance |
| OECD | AI Principles | Voluntary principles |
| G7 | Hiroshima AI Process | Voluntary process |
| G20 | AI Principles | Voluntary principles |
| Latin America (20 states, incl. 6 Caribbean) | Declaración de Santiago (Oct. 2023) | Declaratory |
| CARICOM | None | — |
### What harmonized AI policies and recommendations must
### actually do
Institutional Shared regional oversight bodies pooling regulatory talent no single state can afford
Technical Open data standards, API compatibility, data portability to prevent vendor lock-in
Organisational Aligned procurement and algorithmic auditing workflows across ministries
Legal Cross-border regulatory compatibility so an AI service lawful in one state is lawful in another
Ethical Unified values, using the UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethics of AI as the baseline
Semantic Shared regional definitions of “high-risk AI”, “autonomy”, “bias” to prevent legal fragmentation
Armstrong Alexis, Deputy Secretary General, CARICOM
Elvia Smith-Maduro Permanent Secretary, Government of the Virgin Islands
Dave Dowrich Vice President & Chief Financial Officer, Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America
Preetam Maloor
Head of Emerging Technologies,
International Telecommunications
Union
Nicholas Fuller
Vice President, AI & Automation,
IBM
Annie Baldeo Executive Officer, Economics, Telecommunications Authority of Trinidad and Tobago
Michelle Grell-Bereaux Lead of International Digital Development Affairs, The Utilities, Regulation and Competition Authority, Bahamas
Nia Nanan Senior Research Analyst, Caribbean Telecommunications Union
Junior McIntyre
Deputy National Chief Digital Officer,
Trinidad and Tobago
John Lewis
Director, ICT
Government of Trinidad & Tobago
Edmund Burke Digital ICT Director, Government of Grenada
Tracy Hackshaw Chef d’Enterprise, Universal Postal Union, UN
Opal Neil
Former Senior Director Regulatory
Affairs,
Columbus Communications
Michelle Garcia
Marketing & Comms Specialist,
Caribbean Telecommunications
Union
Haley Trott
Deputy Secretary,
Government of the Virgin Islands
Deidre Cousins Chief Information Officer, GraceKennedy Ltd
Sharukh Hussain
Director Innovation Unit,
Office of the Prime Minister,
Guyana
Kurleigh Prescod
Chief Executive Officer,
Telecommunications Authority of
Trinidad and Tobago
Cordel Green
Executive Director,
Broadcast Commission, Jamaica
Amit Uttamchandani Technology Consultant, Caribbean Signal
Vilas Dhar
President, Patrick McGovern
Foundation
Francola John Regional Focal Point, CTU-NoW
Russell Gardiner Director of Technology, Turks and Caicos Islands Telecommunications Commission
Desiree Zachariah
Manager, Business and Data
Analytics,
Ministry of Information
Communications Technologies,
Antigua and Barbuda
Charles Douglas
Director,
CANTO
Tariq Mohammed
Chair,
Caribbean ICT Youth Network
Gary Kalloo
Director, Business Development &
Implementation,
Caribbean Telecommunications
Union
Kirk Sookram
Deputy Chief Executive Officer,
Telecommunications Authority
Trinidad and Tobago
Richard Feveck
IT Specialist,
Caribbean Telecommunications
Union
Sean Thorpe
Dean,
Faculty of Engineering and
Computing, University of Technology,
Jamaica
Shanea Lewis
Policy Analyst,
Caribbean
Telecommunications Union
Leslie Lee Fook Director, INCUS Services
Rick Logan-Stanford
Team Lead – Infrastructure, Policies
and Legislation,
Ministry of Homeland Security,
Trinidad and Tobago
Chair: Craig Ramlal Executive Director, Artificial Intelligence Innovation Centre, UWI-STA
Vice Chair: Christopher Reckord Chairman, National AI Task Force, Jamaica
Coordinator: Shernon Osepa Strategic Advisory, Caribbean Telecommunications Union
• 36 members.
• members serving in their own capacity from private sector, NGOs and public sector (nominates from 7 countries), multilaterals…
• support from ITU, CARICOM secretariat
#### Task Force
## Timeline
COTED-ICT Recognised the work of the Caribbean AI Taskforce as important for the formulation of regionally harmonised AI policies for CARICOM member states
Supported by CARICOM Secretariat and ITU
| Taskforce & Council | Consultations across stakeholder groups as | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| meetings, interviews and | well as media | | |
| documentation | both formal and informal. | | |
Jul 25 Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July 26
Launched
Resolution
Interim Report Final Report CAIF-2026
## Pillar 1: Data, Digital Infrastructure & Compute
WHAT TO D O
Recommendation 1: Pursue a shared, regionally anchored digital and data
infrastructure strategy.
a) Governments should prioritize harmonization of data-protection and cross-border
data-flow frameworks across CARICOM, reducing the current fragmentation that
constrains both regional data-sharing and AI model development.
b) Regional institutions should explore the feasibility of shared, distributed compute
and data infrastructure, modeled on small-state and distributed approaches.
c) Governments should prioritize climate-hardening of any shared digital
infrastructure investment, given the region's exceptional climate exposure.
d) Open-source and open-standard approaches should be prioritized over proprietary
lock-in wherever feasible, to preserve future flexibility and reduce long-run
dependency costs.
## Pillar 2: Governance, Ethics & Standards
WHAT TO D O
Recommendation 2: Establish a harmonized Caribbean AI governance framework, anchored
in existing international norms.
a) CARICOM should develop a regional AI governance framework anchored explicitly in the
UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethics of AI, avoiding duplication of normative work already
settled at the global level.
b) The framework should establish minimum regional standards for algorithmic transparency,
risk classification, and public-sector AI procurement, while allowing member states flexibility in
domestic implementation appropriate to their institutional capacity.
c) Governments should designate or strengthen an existing regional body, rather than necessarily
creating a new one, to provide ongoing oversight and coordination, consistent with the principle
that policy survives longest when anchored in institutions that already outlast political cycles.
d) Member states should expand participation in UNESCO's Readiness Assessment
Methodology and equivalent diagnostic tools, to build a shared, comparable evidence base for
governance design across the region.
e) The regional governance framework should require AI systems deployed in or serving the
Caribbean to be assessed for disparate performance and impact across Caribbean languages,
dialects, and demographic groups before public-sector deployment, and CARICOM should
develop coordinated capacity to detect and respond to AI-generated disinformation.
## Pillar 3: Economic Transformation, Innovation &
Industry WHAT TO D O
Recommendation 3: Sequence economic-transformation policy from foundational adoption toward
higher-value innovation, built on a structured research-to-commercialization pathway, rather than
attempting to leapfrog directly to frontier development.
a) Governments should prioritize policies that lower the cost and complexity of AI adoption for existing micro,
small, and medium enterprises before prioritizing frontier research investment, given the region's current
readiness profile.
b) Regional and national innovation-support mechanisms (sandboxes, challenge funds, accelerator support)
should be designed to draw on patient, blended capital appropriate to the longer innovation cycles AI
ventures require, rather than short-cycle grant funding alone.
c) Governments should evaluate the case for Caribbean-specific language and data resources, including
support for regional languages and Creoles currently underserved by global AI tools, as a distinct strategic
asset rather than a marginal accessibility feature.
d) Trade and investment-promotion bodies should treat AI-related foreign direct investment and outsourcing
opportunities as a distinct strategic category, given the scale of global capital currently being mobilized by
comparator regions.
e) Regional authorities should establish a staged research-to-commercialization financing pathway,
anchored in university-based research institutions, that funds fundamental research (multi-year, patient
capital, evaluated on knowledge and talent outputs) and applied research (shorter-cycle, milestone-based
grants, evaluated on prototype and adoption evidence) under distinct instruments, and that channels a
defined, published share of resulting commercial returns, licensing income, or spin-out proceeds back into
upstream research funding, so that public investment in AI research compounds over time rather than ending
at the pilot or publication stage.
## Pillar 4: Talent & Skills
WHAT TO D O
Recommendation 4: Build a tiered talent pipeline spanning mass digital literacy through to specialist AI
research capacity.
a) Governments should prioritize foundational digital and AI literacy at scale, across the public sector,
education system, and small business community, recognizing that this tier reaches the largest number of
beneficiaries per unit of investment.
b) Regional tertiary institutions, led by the University of the West Indies and equivalent national institutions,
should be supported in developing applied AI and data-science training pathways targeted at practitioner
level public and private sector roles
c) A smaller number of advanced research and specialist scholarships should be maintained to retain a
pipeline of regional AI expertise, recognizing that this tier will necessarily reach far fewer people but is
necessary to sustain the other tiers over time
d) Governments should treat organizational and integration barriers to AI adoption, not only raw technical
skills gaps, as a distinct and addressable category of the talent challenge, consistent with recent regional
survey evidence.
e) Alongside building new AI talent, governments and regional training institutions should design transition
pathways, reskilling toward higher-value analytical, quality-assurance, and AI-supervision roles, for
workers in occupations most exposed to generative-AI displacement.
## Pillar 5: Public Sector AI
WHAT TO D O
Recommendation 5: Use public procurement and public-service delivery as the proving
ground for Caribbean AI governance standards.
a) Governments should pilot AI-enabled public service delivery in a small number of high-value,
low-risk domains (such as routine administrative processing or citizen information services)
before extending to higher-risk domains such as benefits determination or law enforcement.
b) Public procurement standards for AI systems should require basic transparency and
auditability commitments from vendors, consistent with the governance framework proposed
in Pillar 2, so that public-sector adoption itself reinforces regional governance norms.
c) Governments should treat public-sector AI pilots as a deliberate source of regional learning,
with findings shared across CARICOM rather than retained nationally, given the limited
capacity any single member state has to evaluate outcomes alone.
d) Leverage public-private partnerships financed through development finance institutions.
Given SIDS' constrained fiscal space and middle-income ineligibility for concessional finance,
Member States should structure public-sector AI deployments as PPPs blended with DFI
financing using public procurement as the proving ground for Caribbean AI governance
standards.
## Pillar 6: Natural Disaster & Climate Resilience
WHAT TO D O
Recommendation 6: Prioritize AI-enabled early-warning and resilience applications as a
flagship, co-benefit-generating regional investment.
a) Regional disaster-management institutions, led by CDEMA, should evaluate the feasibility of
an AI-enabled multi-hazard early-warning capability for the Caribbean, drawing on
comparable Pacific SIDS models, rather than each member state pursuing separate national
systems.
b) Any shared digital infrastructure built under Pillar 1 should explicitly incorporate disaster
resilience requirements (redundancy, climate-hardening, rapid failover) from the outset,
rather than retrofitting them later.
c) Given that agriculture represents a comparatively small share of regional GDP but a
disproportionately large share of regional employment, governments should evaluate AI
enabled agricultural advisory tools as a resilience and food-security priority, with reference to
comparable yield and resilience gains documented in Kenya and India.
## Pillar 7: Regional Leadership, Trade & Global
Interoperability WHAT TO D O Recommendation 7: Establish CARICOM as a coordinated voice in global AI governance. a) CARICOM should designate a coordinated regional position and representation for the Global Dialogue on AI Governance and related UN processes, rather than allowing member states to engage individually or not at all. b) The region should evaluate the case for a CARICOM-wide AI governance instrument building on, rather than duplicating, the Declaración de Santiago commitments already held by six Caribbean states to close the coordination gap identified in c) Regional bodies (the CTU, CROSQ, and others) should pursue interoperability and mutual recognition arrangements with comparable small-state and regional blocs (the OECS, the Pacific Islands Forum, and others) to share the cost of standards development that no single Caribbean state can bear alone.
Caribbean: Cost of Living Index by Country 2024 Mid-Year
# Caribbean: Cost of Living Index by Country 2024 Mid-Year
| Rank | Country | Cost of Living Index | Rent Index | Cost of Living Plus Rent Index | Groceries Index | Restaurant Price Index | Local Purchasing Power Index |
| --- | --- | --- | ...
Show more ▾
Caribbean: Cost of Living Index by Country 2024 Mid-Year
# Caribbean: Cost of Living Index by Country 2024 Mid-Year
| Rank | Country | Cost of Living Index | Rent Index | Cost of Living Plus Rent Index | Groceries Index | Restaurant Price Index | Local Purchasing Power Index |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | Bahamas | 85.0 | 36.7 | 61.8 | 81.6 | 83.3 | 54.6 |
| | Barbados | 76.6 | 19.0 | 48.9 | 80.8 | 69.4 | 43.5 |
| | Puerto Rico | 63.3 | 19.5 | 42.3 | 64.1 | 53.1 | 103.5 |
| | Jamaica | 53.9 | 14.1 | 34.8 | 62.0 | 38.8 | 32.7 |
| | Trinidad And Tobago | 52.6 | 13.1 | 33.7 | 55.3 | 43.9 | 43.7 |
| | Cuba | 46.7 | 11.8 | 29.9 | 43.0 | 26.0 | 2.3 |
| | Dominican Republic | 37.9 | 10.6 | 24.8 | 37.6 | 33.1 | 28.7 |
Numbeo's Country Rankings:
## A Comparison of Saving Rates:
## Microdata Evidence from Seventeen
## Latin American and Caribbean Countries
ABSTRACT Using microdata on expenditure and income for seventeen Latin American and
Caribbean countries, this paper presents stylized facts on saving behavior by age, education,
incom...
Show more ▾
## A Comparison of Saving Rates:
## Microdata Evidence from Seventeen
## Latin American and Caribbean Countries
ABSTRACT Using microdata on expenditure and income for seventeen Latin American and
Caribbean countries, this paper presents stylized facts on saving behavior by age, education,
income, and place of residence. Counterfactual saving rates are computed by imposing the saving
behavior, the population distribution, or the income distribution of two benchmark economies
(the United States and Korea). The results suggest that the difference in national saving rates
between Latin America and Caribbean and the benchmark economies can mainly be attributed
to differences in saving behavior of the population and, to a lesser extent, to differences in the
distribution of the population by education levels. Other demographic or income distribution
differences are not quantitatively important as explanations of saving rates.
JEL classification: C81, D12, D14, D91, E21
Keywords: Saving rates, Latin America
NÉSTOR GANDELMAN Universidad ORT Uruguay
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This paper is the end product of research conducted under the Inter
American Development Bank’s Latin American and Caribbean Research Network project
Domestic Savings in Latin America and the Caribbean, which explored the low level of domes
tic savings in Latin America and the Caribbean, the poor financial intermediation of that savings,
and its inefficient allocation. Presented here are the results of one of the eight research projects
that made up this study.
The paper benefited from comments from Eduardo Cavallo and Verónica Frisancho. I wish to
thank Braulio Britos for his excellent research assistance. I am indebted to Diether Beuermann,
Javier Beverinotti, Carlos Gustavo Machicado, Marcelo Pérez, Eduardo Pontual Ribeiro, Rocío
Portilla, José David Sierra, Sung Ju Song, and Jorge Tovar for their help in gaining access to the
databases used in this paper.
A
ccording to the World Development Indicators (WDI), gross national savings in Latin America as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) was 20 percent in 2012. This figure is well below East Asia and Pacific (40 percent) and South Asia (30 percent), but about the same as other
202 E C O N O M I A , Spring 2016
regions like Europe and Central Asia (17 percent) and sub-Saharan Africa
(17 percent) and above the United States (12 percent). The comparison between
these regions suggests that there is not an obvious relationship among national
savings, growth, and development. This might be due to significant hetero
geneity within regions. In particular, Latin America and the Caribbean is not
a homogeneous entity in many dimensions, including saving rates. In 2012,
the saving rate was as large as 26 percent in Bolivia and as low as 9 percent
in neighboring Paraguay.
National savings are themselves aggregates of heterogeneous house
holds’ (or individuals’) personal savings decisions. On theoretical grounds,
life-cycle models imply that individuals’ savings behavior differs by age. 1
Alternatively, the permanent income hypothesis suggests that consumption
(and therefore savings) will differ among individuals whose determinants of
permanent income are different. 2 Empirically, Carroll, Rhee, and Rhee test
for cultural effects on saving behavior in the United States. 3
Differences in saving rates among countries can be disaggregated into the
following three categories: differences in saving decisions between similar
individuals living in different countries (for example, young people being
able to spend above their income level in countries where financial restric
tions are less binding or differences in adults’ savings due to alternative
national social security systems); differences in the population distribution
of the relevant groups (for example, differences in the proportion of indi
viduals yet to join the workforce or difference in education levels); and dif
ferences in the income share of groups (for example, countries with income
concentrated in individuals with low saving rates). The goal of this paper is
to address the importance of these differences, with particular interest in the
first cause (differences in behavior among population groups). In particular,
I am interested in addressing how savings patterns differ by age, income,
education level, and area of residence (urban versus rural). To do so, I
apply a common methodology to microdata on income and consumption
of seventeen Latin American and Caribbean countries and two benchmark
economies (the United States and Korea) and compute individual saving rates
for the adult population and household saving rates. It has been repeatedly
1. Aando and Modigliani (1963); Modigliani and Brumberg (1954).
2. Friedman (1957).
3. Carroll, Rhee, and Rhee (1994).
Néstor Gandelman 2 0 3 argued that saving rates in Latin America are low, and this constitutes a constraint on sustained growth. 4 Most studies are based on saving rates constructed from macroeconomic variables. There are two streams in this literature. One is based on individual country studies using time-series esti mations. 5 The other stream evaluates Latin American saving rates within a broader sample of countries. Papers in this latter group use a variety of panel data techniques. Edwards is probably the first in this line of research, followed methodologically by Reinhardt; Pérez-Monteiro, Radusweski, and Cavalcanti; and Lane and Tornell. 6 Other Latin American researchers have an even wider country focus. The World Bank research project “Saving across the World” produced a wide-reaching data set that permitted testing other issues like the relationship between income inequality and aggre gate savings and between other policy and nonpolicy factors and savings. 7 Gutiérrez reviews the empirical literature and finds a positive association of savings with income level and income growth, macroeconomics stabil ity, foreign credit constraints, and demographics. 8 The relations of savings with other variables like the real interest rate, types of pension systems, and financial development are mixed. The literature includes several papers that aim to identify the main styl ized facts of saving rates in particular countries. 9 Poterba’s book, which includes several case studies, is probably the classic citation for this type of research. 10 Deaton; Browning and Lusardi; and Attanasio present com prehensive surveys on consumption and saving that stress the impor tance of looking at microeconomic behavior to understand national saving differentials. 11
4. See, for example, Edwards (1996); Gutiérrez (2007); Reinhardt (2008); Pérez-Monteiro,
Radusweski, and Cavlcanti (2012).
5. For Mexico, see Bulírˇ and Swiston (2006) and Gollás (1999); for Colombia, see López
Mejia and Ortega (1998); for Brazil, see Paiva and Jahan (2003); and for Argentina and Mexico,
see Casillas (1993).
6. Edwards (1996); Reinhardt (2008); Pérez-Monteiro, Radusweski, and Cavalcanti (2012);
Lane and Tornell (1998).
7. Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Servén (2000a, 2000b).
8. Gutiérrez (2007).
9. For Chile, see Butelmann and Gallego (2001); for Spain, see Alegre Martin and Pou
Garcias (2008); for Colombia, see Castañeda Cordy (2001); for the United Kingdom, see
Demery and Duck (2006); for Canada, see Alan, Atalay, and Crossley (2006).
10. Poterba (1994).
11. Deaton (1992); Browning and Lusardi (1996); Attanasio (1999).
204 E C O N O M I A , Spring 2016
This paper contributes to the literature on at least two grounds. First, micro
data homogenization and the application of a common methodology to a large
set of countries are rare in this literature. 12 I go beyond individual case studies
and set out the stylized facts for a wide range of Latin American and Caribbean
countries in a comparative way. The dimensions considered are important for
empirical and theoretical reasons. For example, Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes
report large disparities in saving rates by current income, arguing that the more
meaningful comparison would take lifelong income and proposes a methodol
ogy for doing so. 13 Butelmann and Gallego report disparities in saving rates
by education level as well as by current income: those with higher education
were the only group with a positive median saving rate in Chile. 14 Additionally,
differences in saving rates by age are predicted by life cycle models and have
been reported in several empirical exercises. 15
Second, there is not a natural benchmark for comparing the relative sizes
of saving rates in different countries or regions. I perform a series of counter
factual exercises comparing the structure of savings in Latin America and the
Caribbean with that of the United States and Korea. The exercise shows that,
relative to these countries, Latin American saving rates are indeed low. The
counterfactual exercises point to the main differences in saving determinants
between Latin America and the Caribbean and these two benchmarks. In
choosing the benchmarks, I selected countries with developed financial mar
kets where constraints on saving and borrowing are likely to be lower than
in Latin America. I also wanted to use countries with different cultural traits
that could imply different behavior with respect to consumption and savings.
Latin America, with its historical ties to Spain and Portugal, has many dif
ferences with the Anglo-Saxon background of the United States and Korea’s
Asian culture. Finally, according to WDI, Korean gross savings as a percent
age of GDP are larger than Latin American and Caribbean gross savings,
which are in turn larger than U.S. gross savings.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the methodology,
followed by a description of the data. The paper then reports the descriptive
results on saving rates and the counterfactual exercises.
12. One exception is Kirsanova and Sefton (2007), who work with data from the United Kingdom, the United States, and Italy. 13. Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2004). See Gandelman (2015b) for an application to Latin American and Caribbean countries. 14. Butelmann and Gallego (2001). 15. For the United Kingdom, see Demery and Duck (2006); for Spain, see Alegre Martin and Pou Garcias (2008).
Methodology
Decomposition
National private savings can be decomposed among population groups along
various dimensions. Aggregate private savings are the sum of savings of all
relevant groups in a country, which are indexed by i (for example, age brack
ets). Y and C stand for total private income and consumption, respectively,
while yi and ci represent group income and group consumption, respectively,
and ni is the size of group i. Therefore national saving is
Y C y c i i ni i
(1) . − = ∑( ) −
By some simple algebraic manipulation, this expression can be transformed into the following disaggregation of the national private saving rate:
(2) , = ∑ − =
−
S
Y C Y y c y
y Y
N n N
t
i i i
i i
i
where N is the total population. The first term in the summation is the ith group saving rate. The second and third terms can be seen as how much this group saving rate is weighted for the aggregate. The second term gives a larger weight to groups whose income level is above the average income level. The third term weights the saving rate according to the relative demographic size of the group. Differences in any of these three terms can explain differences in national saving rates.
Counterfactual Saving Rates
I compute counterfactual saving rates considering various dimensions (namely,
age, education, income, and place of residence). For ease of exposition, I
explain the process in terms of age brackets, but the same procedure can be
applied to other disaggregations of the population. For each Latin American
and Caribbean country, one of its characteristics (saving rates, population
distribution, and income distribution by age bracket) is replaced with the
corresponding characteristic of the benchmark economies. This yields the
counterfactual saving rate if the Latin American country had one characteris
tic of the United States or Korea.
206 E C O N O M I A , Spring 2016
Let the superscript * refer to the benchmark countries (the United States or
Korea), while the variables without superscript refer to a given Latin Ameri
can and Caribbean country. There are three exercises to be performed with
respect to each benchmark economy.
First, to what extent are differences in national private saving rates
between Latin America and the Caribbean and the United States or Korea
due to different saving behavior by the population? For this exercise, I
assume that age groups in Latin American countries have the saving behav
ior of the corresponding population in the United States/Korea, but that
the income and demographic distribution remains unchanged. The counter
factual national saving rate for each Latin American and Caribbean country
is then
(3) ˆ .
* * *
* = ∑ −
S =
y c y
y Y
N n N
sav sav
LA i i i i
i i
Second, to what extent are differences in national private saving rates between Latin America and the Caribbean and the United States or Korea due to differences in the demographic distribution? Here, I assume that the age distribution of each Latin American and Caribbean country is equal to that of the United States/Korea, but that the group saving behavior and the income distribution remain at the actual levels. The counterfactual national saving rate for each Latin American country is
(4) ˆ .
* * * = ∑
−
S =
y c y
y Y
N n N
pop pop
LA i i i i
i i
Third, to what extent are differences in saving rates between Latin America and the Caribbean and the United States or Korea due to differences in income distribution? I assume that the income distribution by age bracket in Latin America and the Caribbean is the same as in the United States/Korea, but that the group saving behavior and the age distribution remain unchanged. The counterfactual national saving rate for each Latin American and Caribbean country is
(5) ˆ * *
*
. * = ∑
−
S =
y c y
y
Y
N n N
inc inc
LA i i i i
i i
Household versus Individual Savings
It is important to define whether the decisionmakers are individuals or house
holds. Ex ante, there are pro and cons for both options. First, empirically it is
easier to work at the household level since consumption is not reported at the
individual level. To compute individual saving rates, household consumption
needs to be allocated among household members using some more or less ad
hoc rule. Second, the life cycle theory is constructed assuming individual,
rather than household, decisionmakers. Third, household members differ in
some of the variables of interest, such as age and education. Computing house
hold saving rates requires classifying household savings by the characteristics
of the household head, which may or may not be demographically representa
tive of the household. The next sections show that some of the paper’s results
are more reasonable using individual saving rates. For completeness and
robustness analysis, I perform the analysis at the both household and individ
ual levels, but present them both only when there is an interesting difference. 16
In computing individual saving rates, I follow the methodology proposed
by Kirsanova and Sefton to allocate household consumption (and when nec
essary income) among individuals. 17 The starting point is the division of
household members into three groups: dependent children (individuals under
the age of eighteen); principal adults (the head of the household and his or
her partner, if any); and dependent adults (other adults). The consumption
level of a newborn baby is assumed to be 30 percent of that of an adult,
and this proportion is assumed to increase linearly until age eighteen, when
the person is considered an adult. After allocating consumption in this way,
the consumption of dependent children is reallocated equally between the
principal adults. For example, consider a household composed of a couple,
a newborn baby and one dependent adult. The household consumption level
is 100. The preliminary assignment of consumption consists of 0.3 units to
the baby, 1.0 to the father, 1.0 to the mother, and 1.0 to the other adult. The
0.3 of the baby is later reallocated to both parents, such that each has a final
consumption 1.15 units of consumption. The total consumption of 100 is
divided into 34.8 (100*1.15/3.3) for each principal adult and 30.3 (100*1/3.3)
for the dependent adult.
In general, the information on income provided by household surveys is
less problematic since the major sources of income (such as labor income)
16. All tables and figures are available in Gandelman (2015a).
17. Kirsanova and Sefton (2007).
208 E C O N O M I A , Spring 2016
are generally well identified at the individual level. When such identification
is not possible (for example, a government housing subsidy), this income is
divided like consumption.
Data
The data set comprises microdata for seventeen Latin American and Carib
bean countries (namely, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pan
ama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay), the United States,
and Korea. The databases for Nicaragua present data only at the household
level. I therefore present the country’s descriptive statistics, but do not include
it in the counterfactual exercises at the individual level.
Countries perform income and expenditure surveys every decade or so as
an input for the construction of the consumer price index. Since the objective
of the surveys is the construction of an average consumption basket, data on
consumption expenditures are very disaggregated. It includes all forms of con
sumption like food, beverages, transportation, leisure, education, and health
expenditures. Table 1 presents the data sources, most of which are countries’
national statistical institutes.
The dates, also reported in table 1, range from 2003 to 2012. Ideally, the
information from different countries would capture the same moment in time
and the same phase of the business cycle. This is not possible, however, when
working with a sample of countries as wide as in this paper. Thus, one of the
contributions of this paper is, in itself, a limitation.
There are some differences in the way data are gathered and reported in
the surveys. To the extent possible, I have homogenized the definition of
saving rates. Labor income is the main source of income for most individu
als. It is reported after tax in all cases except Brazil and Nicaragua, where
data are gathered gross of taxes and social security contributions. According
to Nicaraguan documentation, taxes and social security contributions are
gathered in a separate question, but this information is not reported in the
microdata. The results section reports descriptive statistics for Brazil and
Nicaragua with the rest of the countries. Brazil is included in the counter
factual exercises, but Nicaragua is not due to the inability to compute indi
vidual saving rates for this country. As shown in the results section, there
are no noticeable differences that can clearly be attributed to this difference
in the computation of income. When there is a differential pattern relative
TABLE 1 . Data Sources
| aBolivia | 2003–0 4 | | 38,50 0 | | 9,14 9 | Encuesta Continua de los Hogare s | Instituto Nacional de Estadística |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Brazi l | 2008–0 9 | 132,323 | | 55,70 | 2 | Pesquisa de Orçamentos Familiares | Instituto Brasilei
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